The Naval Annual, 1909

Preface

In the last number of the Naval Annual we commented on the practice, recently adopted in our own and certain foreign navies, of withholding particulars of ships for the construction of which provision is made in the Estimates, as most unlikely (as far as this country is concerned), to prevent those obtaining information from whom it may be desirable to conceal it. In the United States no such concealment is attempted. The designs of ships are openly discussed, and Congress insists on being furnished with information as to the leading features of new ships before voting the money for their construction. There is no reason to suppose that the United States Navy suffers from this publicity. There is, on the other hand, good reason to believe that the practice initiated by the British Government in the case of the Dreadnought, and copied with greater success in Germany, is in no small measure responsible for the scare produced by the Debate on the Navy Estimates on March 16th.

This debate took place when this volume was already in print, and necessitated the revision of several passages. Almost daily up to the moment of going to press fresh information has been forthcoming which has suggested further modifications. Within the last fortnight there has been the offer of one or, if necessary, two battleships for the Royal Navy by the Dominion of New Zealand; a similar offer has come from the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria (a striking anticipation of the suggestion made at the conclusion of Chapters I and III), and we have read the not altogether satisfactory reply of the Imperial Government to the Government of New Zealand, the statement of Admiral von Tirpitz as to the German programme of construction, and of the pressure brought to bear by Germany on Russia in order to compel the latter to modify her attitude on the Servian question.

The danger to our naval supremacy at the present moment and in the immediate future has undoubtedly been much exaggerated in certain quarters. The salient features in the situation with which we have to deal are the determination of Germany to become a great Naval Power, and the tendencies of German policy, described in Mr Frederic Harrison's letters to the Times (reprinted in Part IV). Germany has an absolute right to increase her Navy as she pleases, but her naval activity imposes increased exertions on ourselves. Owing to the liberality of expenditure on new construction in the years preceding 1907 our naval position is at the present moment secure. A comparison of relative strength cannot be confined to Dreadnoughts. Many competent authorities do not consider the all-big-gun ship the best type. Our position for the future is not secure, for the simple reason that expenditure on new construction has been recently cut down, and in consequence at the time this volume is published there will only be five battleships under construction for the British Navy as compared with ten (at any rate nine) for Germany and six for the United States. In July two ships, and in November two more ships, are to be laid down in Great Britain. By November the Superb as well as two of the German ships will have been completed, and two ships will have been laid down in the United States; so that the figures at the end of the year will probably be eight battleships building for Great Britain as compared with sixteen for the German and United States Navies. The two-Power standard cannot be maintained on our present scale of expenditure on new construction, which for the years 1908 and 1909 is roughly equivalent to that of Germany alone. The Cawdor programme of new construction was abandoned in 1908-9 when only one battleship and one cruiser battleship were laid down. The construction programme of 1909-10 should have made good the deficiency. If provision had been made for laying down six (or better seven) battleships there would have been no good cause for agitation.

The expansion already accomplished, and still in progress, of German resources for the building of war ships, and the supply of guns, armour, and machinery is another factor in the situation which must be borne in mind. Great though that expansion has been, the resources which we possess in the great private establishments of Armstrong, Vickers, J. Brown and Co., and others, are still superior to those of Germany. In order, however, that these resources may be maintained, if not developed, it is essential that these firms should have in the future a better assurance of the continuity of Government orders than they have had in the past.

Part I of the Naval Annual for 1909, apart from the usual articles, contains papers on German Naval Expansion by Mr. Leyland, on the Naval Volunteer Reserve by a very energetic officer of the force, the Marquis of Graham, and on Dockyard Administration by Admiral W. H. Henderson (in collaboration with Mr Russell) who was Superintendent of Devonport Dockyard.

 

In Part II an important new feature has been introduced. The leading particulars of ships are given on the Plates as well as in the lists. In spite of repeated suggestions that the lists of ships should be arranged in classes, the arrangement in alphabetical order has been retained as more convenient for purposes of reference.

Part IV, in addition to the usual matter, contains the speech of the First Lord on the Navy Estimates, Mr. Harrison's letters to the Times, already alluded to, and the paper read by Lord Brassey at the spring meeting of the Institute of Naval Architects, which, by the courtesy of the council, we are permitted to republish.

In conclusion, we must again express our thanks to those who have been good enough to point out errors in former volumes. It is twenty years since the present editor first became responsible for the publication of the Naval Annual. The difficulty of securing accuracy does not tend to diminish.