From the Dardanelles to Oran

Contents

Preface

Chapter I. The Dardanelles Revisited: Further Thoughts on the Naval Prelude

Scope of the chapter — The two fundamental errors preceding the operation — The Turkish defences at the Dardanelles — Torpedoes — Floating mines-Guns v. forts-The importance of air spotting — Ark Royal and her seaplanes — Their misuse on 4 March — Air spotting for the Queen Elizabeth, 5 March — Postmortem on air spotting — The Turkish minefields — Failure of the minesweepers — The reasons — De Robeck relieves Carden — The attack on the Narrows forts, 18 March — Line 11 of the minefields — The state of Turkish morale — De Robeck's initial feelings — He changes his mind, 22 March — Churchill appeals to de Robeck — His later criticism of the Admiral — Keyes and Sandford see hope in the new minesweeping force — Effectiveness of the destroyer sweepers on 25-27 April — If the fleet had tried again in mid-April — Supposing the fleet had anchored off Constantinople — How the Turks and Germans visualized the scenario — The lost opportunity of April.

Chapter II. The Influence of History on Sea Power: the Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914-1918

Purpose of the chapter — The 'Young Turks' look forward to post-war reform-Post-war committees-The work of the Naval Staff College-The Tactical School is founded — The Naval War Manual — Post-war reforms — Improvement in inter-Service co-operation — Neglect of the larger problems and lessons of the war — The convoy system in the inter-war period — Explanation of the indifferent attitude towards convoy — Admiralty views on convoy are summed up by the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary in 1935 — Convoy developments in 1937 — 8 — Wartime results of the pre-war attitude towards convoy — The role of naval aircraft in convoy is forgotten between the wars-Unaware-ness of the 'law of convoy size'-The Navy is unprepared for U-boat night surface attacks — The question of convoy escort dispositions — The inter-war obsession with a fleet action — Q-ships are revived in the Second World War-Magnetic mines — Paravanes — The wastefulness of the Northern Mine Barrage — Aircraft in minesweeping — The sorry state of Scapa's defences in 1939 — The lag in the development of combined operations — The tactical lessons of the First World War are not completely absorbed-The problem of over-centralization at the Admiralty — The failure to develop naval aviation — The battleship complex and the Fleet Air Arm-Reasons for the neglect of the lessons of 1914 — 18 — Conclusions.

Chapter III. The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-1936

Purpose of the chapter — The Services enter the Ethiopian picture — The Chiefs of Staff warn against precipitating hostilities with Italy — Their admonitions guide the Foreign Office — The emergency Cabinet of 22 August orders precautionary measures — Admiralty policy on sending reinforcements to the Mediterranean — The problem of Malta's vulnerability — The Mediterranean Fleet is sent to Alexandria — Hoare addresses the League Assembly, n September — Naval preparations are intensified during September — Purpose of the build-up in the Mediterranean — The Italians begin the invasion of Ethiopia, 3 October-The League Assembly votes sanctions-Failure of attempts to effect a military detente-Fear of an Italian 'mad-dog act'-Chatfield, the First Sea Lord: characteristics, influence, ideas-Comparative figures for the British and Italian fleets in the Mediterranean and Red Sea-Confidence of the Admiralty and Mediterranean Fleet-The C-in-C, Fisher, and his Chief of Staff, Pound-The naval war plan-Fisher is prepared to close the Suez Canal -The Admiralty opposes a strong sanctions policy-Britain's Far Eastern responsibilities and the Japanese threat-The fear of sustaining serious losses and damage in a war with Italy-The Navy and the air threat-The efficiency of the Fleet is a factor — The Admiralty are unable to count on active French naval and air co-operation-The effect of the Rhineland Crisis-Admiralty pressure on the Foreign Office to ease the naval situation-The state of war readiness ends, June-July 1936-Post-mortem: Was 'faint-heartedness' responsible for Britain's sanctionist position ?-The principal lessons of the crisis for the Navy.

Appendix. A note on the Naval War Plan.

Chapter IV. 'Winston is Back' Churchill at the Admiralty, 1939-40

Churchill returns to the Admiralty, 3 September 1939-He stimulates the Admiralty and the Fleet-Love of job — Rights and responsibilities — Relations with his professional advisers — Churchill and Pound — Churchill's relations with the sailors afloat — His interest in personnel questions — and defensive devices: dummy ships, the 'Naval Wire Barrage', the antidote to magnetic mines — Churchill and capital-ship construction policy — Appreciates importance of trade defence — Attitude towards convoy — Supports a Northern Mine Barrage-Churchill and the statistics of U-boat kills-He presses for the use of southern Irish bases — His Mediterranean policy — His anxiety over the defences of Scapa-The problem of the Home Fleet's base-His itch for the offensive — He secures approval for 'trench-cutting tanks' — Churchill and 'Operation Royal Marine' — His role in naval strategy and operations — Takes a keen interest in the Graf Spee operation — His decisive intervention in the Altmark operation — Churchill and 'Operation Catherine' — His Baltic strategy: the problem of the Swedish iron ore — His ideas and initiatives in the Norwegian campaign-The bizarre Keyes entr'acte-A balance sheet of the campaign-An analysis of Churchill's role in the campaign — The Navy's faith in a warship's A A defences — Churchill's alleged interference with the naval side of the campaign-A reply to his critics — Churchill becomes Prime Minister, 10 May-and maintains his profound interest in the naval war — A summary of his time at the Admiralty.

Appendix. Musings on a Bolt from Olympus.

Chapter V. Oran, 3 July 1940: Mistaken Judgement, Tragic Misunderstanding, or Cruel Necessity ?

Interest of the subject — The French military collapse, June 1940 — The French Navy remains a powerful force — Anglo-French naval co-operation — The vital importance to the British of the disposition of the French Fleet — The problem is under serious discussion from 7 June — Assurances are sought from the French-The French contemplate an armistice with Germany-Reynaud's telegram to Churchill, 15 June — The War Cabinet's reply, 16 June — The dramatic offer of complete union — A new French Government is formed under Petain-It asks the Germans for armistice terms and assures the British re the Fleet, 17 June — Churchill's last appeal-Darlan's views and volte-face-Further assurances as regards the Fleet — Pound and Alexander confer with Darlan in Bordeaux, 18 June — and are 'apparently satisfied' — French Admiralty instructions to the Fleet, 18 June-Hitler's 'principles' in framing an armistice — The desiderata of the German Naval War Staff-Hitler meets Mussolini in Munich, 17 — 18 June — The armistice negotiations, 21-22 June: Article 8 and the French counterproposals — The British Ambassador precipitately leaves Bordeaux — as does the Naval Mission: significance — The War Cabinet's discussion on the 22nd — Final appeals to Darlan — The three meetings of the War Cabinet during 24 June: a decision is postponed-The concerted attempt to determine French naval opinion-The intensified Anglophobia in Bordeaux-French naval grievances: their ships in British ports and at Alexandria-Churchill's Commons speech of 25 June — 'Contrdle', a problem in semantics — The Darlan factor in British calculations-Churchill sees important political advantages in a bold policy — American support is needed — The decisive War Cabinet, 27 June — Churchill is the driving force behind 'Catapult'-The attitude of Alexander, Pound, and Phillips — The Joint Planners have no enthusiasm for 'Catapult' — But the Chiefs of Staff back the War Cabinet, 30 June — The Germans accept a modification of Article 8-British naval preparations — Somerville is given command of Force H — He has no premonition of a grand tragedy — He confers with his officers at Gibraltar — and communicates their reservations to the Admiralty — The four 'most secret' Admiralty messages of 2 July — Somerville discusses his plans with his officers-Force H steams towards Oran, 2 — 3 July — The destroyer Foxhound is sent on ahead-French naval strength at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran-Pen portraits of Holland and Gensoul-The Holland-Gensoul sparring — Gensoul agrees to receive Holland — Why Gensoul had changed his mind — The discussion in the Dunkerque-Reflections on the events of 3 July — Somerville opens fire-The action-Escape and chase of the Strasbourg — The torpedo bombers attack the Dunkerque, 6 July — The surprise seizure of the French ships in British Home ports, 3 July-The unpleasant aftermath — Cunningham and Force X at Alexandria, 3 — 4 July-British policy post-3 July re French warships — The Rigault de Genouilly is sunk, 4 July-and the Richelieu damaged at Dakar, 8 July — The performance of the fleet at Mers-el-Kebir — Somerville is sickened by the action-Admiral North relieves his feelings — and is put down by the Admiralty-Churchill reports to the House of Commons, 4 July-British press and naval reaction to Mers-el-Kebir — Reactions in Vichy-The Joint Planners and Service Chiefs report on the 'implications of French hostility' — Mers-el-Kebir embarrasses the British war effort — The German reaction — The gains to Britain, naval and moral — The French case-How the situation looked to the British leaders at the time — The factor of German capabilities and intentions — Were the misunderstandings tragic? — The real tragedy of Mers-el-Kebir.

 

Index
 

List of illustrations

Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, 14 October 1939 Frontispiece

I Aboard HMS Triad at the Dardanelles, 17 October 1915. Left to right: Commodore Roger Keyes (Chief of Staff to de Robeck), Acting Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck (C-in-C, Eastern Mediterranean Squadron), and General Sir Ian Hamilton (C-in-C, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force)

IIa Admiral Sir Ernie Chatfield, C-in-C, Atlantic Fleet, 1929-30 b Admiral Sir William Fisher, C-in-C, Mediterranean Fleet, 1932-6

III Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, with King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, and Neville Chamberlain, meeting relatives of men of HMS Exeter who were killed in the River Plate action, when men of the Exeter and Ajax marched through London, en route to the Guildhall, 23 February 1940

IV Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, between (left to right) Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall (Chief of Air Staff) and General Sir Edmund Ironside (Chief of Imperial General Staff), arriving for a War Cabinet meeting at No. 10 Downing Street, 27 September 1939

Va Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, C-in-C, Mediterranean Fleet, 1939-42

b Captain Cedric Holland, Commanding HMS Ark Royal, 1940-1

VI Vice-Admiral Sir lames Somerville, Commanding 'Force H', 1940-2, in his cabin with his Siamese cat 'Figaro', who always accompanied Somerville on board his ships

VIIa Vice-Admiral Marcel Gensoul, C-in-C, Atlantic Fleet (Force de Raid), 1938-40

b Admiral of the Fleet Frangois Darlan, C-in-C, French Fleet, 1939-40; Minister of Marine, 1940-2

 

c General view of Mers-el-Kebir shortly before 3 July

 

VIIIa The Bretagne on fire after the bombardment and beginning to sink

b Admiral Gensoul at the funeral of the 'victims' of the action at Mers-el-Kebir, held on 5 July 1940 (see p. 275)

Illustration in text

The 'round robin' from the Captain and officers of the Dunkerque sent to Admiral Somerville, July/August 1940, after the action at Mers-el-Kebir
 

 

List of Charts

1. The Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora: February-April 1915

2. The Mediterranean: 1935-40

3. The North Sea and the Baltic

4. Mers-el-Kebir: 3 July 1940: Positions of French ships at start of action (5.54 p.m.) and subsequent movements

5. Mers-el-Kebir: 3 July 1940: Force H and escape of the Strasbourg