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The Schlieffen Plan
Critique of a Myth
by
Gerhard Ritter
Translated by
Andrew and Eva Wilson
Foreword by
B. H. Liddell Hart
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This is
the 1958 First English Edition [This] book is “a
source of fundamental importance for understanding the causes of
the First World War.
All existing accounts must now be revised.”
A. J. P. Taylor
“No
bolder stroke has ever been conceived in all military
history than that by which the German Supreme Command in
1914 almost succeeded in capturing the whole of France
in one lightning-like offensive. And no military mystery
has ever aroused more controversy in the pages of
history than has the question of whether this bold
stroke was well- or ill-conceived as military strategy.
Was the original Schlieffen Plan, as authored by Graf
Alfred von Schlieffen who had died only a year before
the war broke out, robbed of its success because those
who tried to follow it -- and those of these,
particularly von Molke -- lacked the courage to take the
full risk, thereby bungling? Or was it the Plan itself
which, considering the time and place, was at fault?”
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Front cover and spine
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Publisher and place of
publication |
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Dimensions in inches (to
the nearest quarter-inch) |
London: Oswald Wolff |
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5½ inches wide x 8½ inches tall |
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Edition |
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Length |
1958 [First English Edition] |
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195 pages |
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Condition of covers |
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Internal condition |
Original blue cloth blocked in gilt on the
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rubbed and discoloured. In particular (and I have only seen this on a few
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resulting in a very definite negative-type image which can be seen be seen
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less obvious. There is also a very distinct thin line of colour loss along
the top and bottom edges, and the covers have bowed outwards. The
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Dust-jacket present? |
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Other
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Yes: however, the dust-jacket is torn, scuffed and creased around the edges.
There is a small tear in the centre of the bottom edge of the front panel,
and further tears along the top front flap fold, and, particularly, at the
head of the spine panel, where there is some very minor loss. The rear panel
is very discoloured and grubby. The dust-jacket is not price-clipped but the
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Contents |
NONE : No illustrations are called
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The Schlieffen Plan
Contents
Foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart
Introduction
Part One: Exposition
I. The development of Schlieffen's operational ideas
1. The shift of emphasis from East to
West
2. Preliminary stages of the
operational plan of 1905
3. The military testament of 1905
4. Operational memoranda after
retirement
II. The political implications of the
Schlieffen Plan
1. The breach of neutrality
2. Schlieffen, Holstein and the Morocco crisis of 1905-6
Part Two: Texts
I. Schlieffen's great memorandum of December 1905
A. Editor's Introduction
B. Text of the memorandum
Appendix: Extracts from the preliminary drafts of the December memorandum of
1905
1. Draft I
2. The beginning of Draft TV
3. From Draft II
4. From Draft III
5. From Draft W
6. From Draft IV
7. From Draft VI
8. From Fragment VII
9. From Draft VI
II. Schlieffen's additional memorandum of February 1906
III. General observations on the Schlieffen
Plan by H. von
Moltke
IV. Schlieffen's memorandum of December 28th, 1912 Appendix to the
memorandum of 1912
V. Notes by Major von Hahnke on Graf Schlieffen's memorandum of December 28th, 1912
VI. Schlieffen's operational plan for "Red" (France) of 1911
Index
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The Schlieffen Plan
Introduction
THE deployment and operational plans
of the Chief of the General Staff, Graf Schlieffen, here published
for the first time in their entirety, are without doubt among the
most controversial documents of recent military history. Probably no
general staff study ever aroused such widespread interest and
excitement among the general public. It has let loose a whole flood
of military and political literature. Yet these plans have so far
been known to the public only in the form of a summary of their
contents by military writers—and these refer mostly only to the
memorandum of 1905. Of the complete text, all that has so far
appeared is a few sentences. Relatively the fullest reproduction may
be found in the official publication of the Reichs-archiv. Yet this
too is incomplete, partly for political reasons. In the midst of the
quarrel over the famous "war guilt question" German officials,
particularly in the Foreign Ministry, had grave hesitations about
publishing those passages of Schlieffen's memoranda which discuss
marching not just through Belgium but through Holland as well. For
these would have presented Germany's accusers (and slanderers) with
new propaganda material. Such fears lost their foundation with the
appearance in 1922 of the memoirs of the younger Moltke, which
included a memorandum of 1915 setting out his different point of
view on this question as a kind of apologia. But the qualms of the
Foreign Ministry persisted, since no one wanted to get involved in
ticklish explanations to the Dutch about Schlieffen's views on Dutch
policy. Later on, publication was planned within the framework of
Schlieffen's Dienstschriften, which were issued by the reconstituted
General Staff from 1937 onwards. But the series was never completed
because of the outbreak of the war.
The manuscripts on which the second part of this book is based are
among the Schlieffen papers originally handed over to the Army
archives (subsequently incorporated in the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam)
by Schlieffen's son-in-law, Major von Hahnke. Along with other
military documents, they fell into the hands of the American Army,
which turned them over to the National Archives in Washington. It
was there that I found them, after my attention had been drawn to
the matter by Professor Fritz Epstein, during a visit undertaken for
quite separate purposes in the spring of 1953. Not only was I
granted free access to the manuscripts, but I asked for, and
received, photostat copies of the papers which most interested me.
In the meantime the entire Schlieffen papers have been returned to
Germany. The official manuscripts are in the hands of the Federal
Defence Ministry, to whom I am greatly obliged for further access to
the documents and permission to publish them, as well as for help in
making sketch-maps and further photostats.
The significance of the Schlieffen Plan extends far beyond purely
military history. Its political consequences made it nothing less
than fateful for Germany. In latter times it has been looked on as a
design for a preventive war against France, made in collusion with
the leading brain of the Foreign Ministry, Baron Fritz von Holstein,
towards the end of 1905. In consequence, the Schlieffen Plan has
become the centre of every discussion about the role of the German
general staff before 1914, and about the whole question of German
"militarism." Such are the special circumstances which may justify
its present publication, not by an officer schooled in the methods
of the General Staff, but by a political historian who has long made
this kind of problem the object of special study. The author feels
that this publication is indispensable as a preliminary study and
supplement to the second volume of his book Staatkunst und
Kriegshandwerk, Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland, of
which the first volume appeared in 1954. Of course, he does not feel
called upon to appear as an expert in purely military matters—to
appreciate, for example, Graf Schlieffen's strategic achievements as
such. He is not tempted by the role either of "civilian strategist"
or "historical umpire" in the quarrel of the military experts. But
what must be accomplished within the framework of such a
publication, and what may be achieved by a civilian, is threefold:
An analysis of the historical features of Schlieffen's strategic
plans compared with those of his predecessor and his successor.
A portrait of Schlieffen as a man and as the holder of his office.
An appreciation of the political significance of his plans—in their
intent as well as in their consequences.
Gerhard Ritter
Freiburg im Breisgau, March 1956.
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Foreword
by B. H. Liddell Hart
FOR two generations the Schlieffen
Plan has been a magic phrase, embodying one of the chief mysteries
and "might have beens" of modern times. The mystery is cleared up
and the great "If" analysed in Gerhard Ritter's book—a striking
contribution to twentieth-century history.
In the years following World War I German soldiers spoke of Graf
Schlieffen with wistful awe as their supreme strategist, and
ascribed the failure of the 1914 invasion of France to the way in
which his masterly plan, worked out when Chief of the Great General
Staff from 1891 to 1905, had been whittled down and mishandled by
his successor, the second Moltke.
The repulse of that opening offensive was followed by years of
trench-deadlock, and eventually by Germany's collapse in 1918. By
the time she and her allies collapsed, her surviving European
opponents were themselves near to exhaustion, Russia had turned
Communist and gone out of the war, while the United States had
become the world's leading Power. So the consequences were immense
and far-reaching.
It was very natural, in retrospect, that German soldiers and war
historians should have placed so much weight on the second Moltke's
departure from the Schlieffen Plan as the prime cause of their
military calamities. That view also gained general acceptance in
military and historical circles abroad, as it was so obvious that
the operational plan pursued by the German Supreme Command of 1914
had gone wrong, and that the repulse of the German armies in the
Battle of the Marne had been a turning-point in the war. Moreover
the evidence that became known, from German staff disclosures,
tended to confirm the conclusion that Schlieffen's plan had been
much more promising and that his. successor had violated
Schlieffen's principal prescriptions.
The course of the campaign was exhaustively examined during the
postwar years, and there was voluminous discussion of the fateful
changes which took place in the German plan. But the examination and
discussion were conducted on an inadequate basis of knowledge about
the Schlieffen Plan itself. Detailed information about its content
was too sparse to be satisfying. Only broad outlines and fragmentary
passages were published. That state of insufficiency has continued
until the publication of Gerhard Fitter's book. He unearthed
Schlieffen's papers during a visit to the United States in 1953.
After lying for many years in the German archives at Potsdam, where
they had been deposited by Schlieffen's son-in-law, they had been
carried away to the American archives in Washington after World War
II, along with a mass of other military documents.
It was fortunate that the papers should have come into the hands of
Gerhard Ratter—an historian of high quality, whose discernment is
matched by his trustworthiness, and a gifted writer. He presents the
full text of Schlieffen's military testament, and the relevant parts
of other memoranda which shed light on the evolution of the Plan.
They are preceded by Professor Ritter's masterly exposition of their
content and significance, while his accompanying notes add to the
illuminating effect.
The whole forms a book of outstanding historical importance. But it
is also extraordinarily interesting to read for a book of its kind.
At first glance it may look too scholarly in form to be of wide
appeal. But that impression soon changes as one gets deeper in the
book. It might well be described as an "historical detective
story"—and is fascinating when read in that way.
Going on from clue to clue, it becomes evident that the secret of
the Schlieffen Plan, and the basis of Schlieffen's formula for quick
victory amounted to little more than a gambler's belief in the
virtuosity of sheer audacity. Its magic is a myth. As a strategic
concept it proved a "snare and delusion" for the executants, with
fatal consequences that were on balance inherently probable from the
outset.
The basic problem which the Plan had to meet was that of two-front
war, in which Germany and her Austrian ally faced Russia on the East
and France on the West—a combination whose forces were numerically
superior although separated from one another. Schlieffen sought to
solve the problem in a different way from that contemplated by his
predecessors, the elder Moltke and Waldersee. His way, in his view,
would be quicker in execution and more complete in effect.
The elder Moltke, despite the triumphant result of the offensive
against France which he had directed in 1870, doubted whether it
could be repeated against the reorganised and strengthened French
Army. His plan was to stay on the defensive against France, nullify
Russia's threat by a sharp stroke at her advanced forces, and then
turn westward to counter-attack the French advance. It was
essentially a defensive-offensive strategy. His aim was to cripple
both opponents, and bring about a favourable peace, rather than to
pursue the dream of total victory. Moltke's immediate successor,
Waldersee, showed more bias in favour of offensive action and
aggressive policy. But he did not change Moltke's decision to stay
on the defensive in the West, and when he urged the case for a
preventive war against Russia his offensive impulse was curbed by
Bismarck.
But Schlieffen, in his very first memorandum after taking office in
1891, questioned the assumption that the French fortifications were
such a great obstacle as "to rule out an offensive" in the West,
emphasising that "they could be by-passed through Belgium." It was
an early indication of a tendency to view strategic problems in a
purely military way, disregarding political factors and the
complications likely to arise from a violation of neutral countries.
In the next year his mind began to turn against the existing plan of
taking the offensive in the East, along with the Austrian Army,
since on his calculation it would be very difficult to gain a
decisive victory there, or prevent the Russian Army retiring out of
reach. For him it did not suffice to lame the opponents— they must
be destroyed. His conception of war was dominated by the theoretical
absolutes of Clausewitzian doctrine. So when he came to the
conclusion that such absolute victory was unattainable in the East,
he came back to the idea of seeking it in the West.
Initially, he considered the problems of a direct thrust into
France, but soon concluded that success was impossible in that way.
While hoping that the French might take the offensive, giving him
the chance to trap them and deliver a counter-thrust into France, he
felt that such self-exposure on their part was too uncertain a hope
to provide the quick victory he desired. By 1897 he became convinced
that he must take the offensive from the outset, and as it could
only be successful by outflanking the French fortress system it
meant that the German Command "must not shrink from violating the
neutrality of Belgium as well as of Luxembourg." For the turning
manoeuvre must be wide enough- for the deployment of ample forces,
and too wide for the enemy to block it by a short extension of his
front.
The plan was developed by degrees during the years that followed. At
first his idea was only to march through the southern tip of
Belgium, aiming to turn the French flank near Sedan. But by 1905 he
planned to go through the centre of Belgium in a great wheeling
movement, with his right wing-tip passing into France near Lille.
To avoid it being checked by the Belgian fortresses of Namur and
Liege in the deep-cut stretch of the Meuse valley, he decided that
it must sweep through the southern part of Holland—which meant
violating another neutral country. To avoid being blocked by Paris
or exposing his right flank to a counter-stroke from Paris, he
decided to extend his wheel wider still and sweep round west of
Paris. That, he felt, was also the only way to ensure that the
French armies were cut off from the possibility of escaping
southward. Such a large wheel required correspondingly large forces
for its execution, taking account of the need to leave adequate
detachment on guard over the fortresses by-passed, while keeping up
the strength of the long-stretched marching line. Thus he was led to
shift the weight of his forces so heavily rightwards that nearly
seven-eighths of the total was dedicated to "the great wheel," and
barely one-eighth left to meet a possible French offensive across
his own frontier.
It was a conception of Napoleonic boldness, and there were
encouraging precedents in Napoleon's early career for counting on
the decisive effect of arriving in the enemy's rear with the bulk of
one's forces. If the manoeuvre went well it held much greater
promise of quick and complete victory than any other course could
offer, and the hazards of leaving only a small proportion to face a
French frontal attack were not as big as they appeared. Moreover if
the German defensive wing was pushed back, without breaking, that
would tend to increase the effect of the offensive wing. It would
operate like a revolving door—the harder the French pushed on one
side the more sharply would the other side swing round and strike
their back.
But Schlieffen failed to take due account of a great difference
between the conditions of Napoleonic times and his own—the advent of
the railway. While his troops would have to march on their own feet
round the circumference of the circle, the French would be able to
switch troops by rail across the chord of the circle. That was all
the worse handicap because his prospects mainly depended on the time
factor. The handicap was further increased because his troops would
be likely to find their advance hampered by a succession of
demolished bridges, while their food and ammunition supply would be
restricted until they could rebuild the rail tracks and rail bridges
through Belgium and Northern France.
The great scythe-sweep which Schlieffen planned was a manoeuvre that
had been possible in Napoleonic times. It would again become
possible in the next generation—when air-power could paralyse the
defending side's attempt to switch its forces, while the development
of mechanised forces greatly accelerated the speed of encircling
moves, and extended their range. But Schlieffen's plan hada very
poor chance of decisive success at the time it was conceived.
The less he could count on an advantage in speed the more would
depend on having a decisive superiority of strength, at any rate in
the crucial area. His recognition of this need was shown in the way
he whittled down the proportion of the German strength to be left on
the Eastern Front and on the defensive wing in the West. His main
device to produce an actual increase of attacking strength was to
create a number of additional army corps from reservists of various
grades, and incorporate them in the striking force for subsidiary
tasks. But even then the Germans' total forces in the West would
have only a slight margin of numbers over the French, and that
margin would disappear with the addition of the Belgian and British
armies (small as these were) to the forces with which the Germans
would have to deal—as a consequence of going through Belgium.
It is evident from Schlieffen's papers that by the time he finally
framed his Plan he had come to feel very doubtful whether Germany
had or could attain the superiority of force needed for a reasonable
assurance of success in such an offensive venture. But he seems to
have taken the technician's view that his duty was fulfilled if he
did the utmost with the means available, and "made the best of a bad
job" in compliance with the customs and rules of his profession. He
did not consider that he had the higher responsibility of warning
the Emperor and the Chancellor that the chances of success were
small compared with the risks, and that German policy ought to be
adjusted to that grave reality.
Still less was he conscious of a responsibility to humanity. When,
in further reflection after leaving office, he came to realise how
dubious were the chances of success for his offensive Plan, his only
fresh suggestions for improving its chances were to make a wider
sweep through Holland and hasten the advance through Belgium by
threat of a terror-bombardment of the town populations.
During these later years Russia's recovery from the effects of her
war with Japan, and reorganisation of her forces, made the overall
situation more adverse to the prospects of his Plan. But he showed
no realisation of the changed situation, and in his last memorandum
at the end of 1912—a week before his death, just short of his
eightieth birthday—he virtually ignored Russia's power of
interference and the likelihood that it might compel a reinforcement
of the Germans' slender strength on the Eastern Front at the expense
of their concentration on the Western Front. He had become obsessed
with the dream of a quick knock-out blow against France, and his
dying words are reported to have been: "It must come to a fight.
Only make the right wing strong."
His successor, the second Moltke, was not happy about the Plan that
came to him as a legacy, and found little help in the advice which
Schlieffen offered after his retirement. It is not surprising to
learn from a note by Schlieffen's son-in-law that by 1911 neither
Moltke, Ludendorff (the head of the Operations directorate,
1908-13), nor any other of the chief members of the General Staff
thought it worth while to consult "the master" about the problem.
Moltke, with more political sense and scruple than his predecessor,
decided to avoid violating Holland's neutrality in addition to
Belgium's, and found an alternative solution in a swift capture of
the Liege bottleneck by a surprise coup. This was achieved in 1914
under the personal direction of Ludendorff, so the German offensive
enjoyed a successful start. It was helped even more by the recently
recast French operational plan, which played into the Germans' hands
far better than Schlieffen could have expected.
This was due to a new school of thought in France, which was
intoxicated with the offensive spirit. In 1912 the leaders of this
school ousted the then Chief of the General Staff, Michel, who had
expected the Germans to come through Belgium and planned a defence
against the move. The new school ignored the danger in their
eagerness to launch an offensive of their own across the German
frontier. This ran headlong into a trap, and the French Army was
caught badly off balance when the Germans swept round its left wing.
Nevertheless the French were able to switch reinforcements thither
by rail, while the German advance dwindled in strength and lost
cohesion as it pressed deeper into France. It suffered badly from
shortage of supplies, caused by the demolition of the railways, and
was on the verge of breakdown by the time the French launched a
counter-stroke, starting from the Paris area—which sufficed to
dislocate the German right wing and cause a general retreat.
After the event, Moltke was blamed for the way he exposed his flank
to such a riposte by wheeling inwards before Paris was passed,
contrary to the Schlieffen Plan. But it now becomes clear from
Schlieffen's papers that he himself had come to recognise that his
forces were insufficient for such an extremely wide stretch, and
that he contemplated wheeling inwards north of Paris as Moltke did.
Another charge brought against Moltke is that he spoilt the Plan by
allotting more of the newly raised corps to the left wing than to
the right. But here again we find that Schlieffen had also come to
see the need of strengthening the left wing. In any case the course
of events amply proved that the right wing could not have been made
stronger than it was, nor its strength maintained as the advance
continued—because of the rail demolitions. It is useless to multiply
numbers if they cannot be fed and munitioned.
In the light of Schlieffen's papers, and of the lessons of World War
I, it is hard to find reason for the way he has so long been
regarded as a master mind, and one who would have been victorious if
he had lived to conduct his own Plan.
Schlieffen very clearly grasped the value of turning the opponent's
flank—but that was no new discovery. He further saw that the effect
depended on successive by-passing moves, progressively pressed
deeper towards the opponent's rear. But that had been appreciated
and excellently brought out as far back as 500 B.C., in Sun Tzu's
teaching on "The Art of War." Schlieffen's operational expertness in
war games has been acclaimed by many of his subordinates. But it was
never tested in war, and does not suffice as proof of his mastery of
strategic theory. This can now be examined in the light of his
papers. On their evidence, his grasp of strategy was broad but
shallow, more mathematical than psychological. Although he was a
strong believer in the virtues of indirect approach, he seems to
have regarded it principally as a physical-geographical
matter—rather than as a compound way of applying pressure upon the
mind and spirit of the opposing commander and troops. There is
little in Schlieffen's papers that suggests understanding of the
finer points of strategy, and the subtler ways in which it can
decisively change the balance.
Nor do his papers show any clear realisation of the extent to which
strategic success depends on what is tactically possible. The papers
provide little evidence of concern with the vital change in tactical
conditions that was being produced by the tremendous development in
the fire-power of weapons, and their multiplication. His discussion
of the strategic problem of invading France, and achieving a quick
victory there, recognises that the fortresses are likely to be
serious obstacles to the German advance, and emphasises the need of
heavy field artillery to overcome them. But it does not take account
of other and newer tactical hindrances. There is no mention in
Schlieffen's military testament, handed to his successor in 1906, of
the quick-firing field artillery developed by the French—the famous
"75s"—nor of machine-guns. Even in his final thoughts on the war
problem set forth in his memorandum of December 1912, there are only
two incidental mentions of the machine-gun—which, when war came in
1914, proved the greatest obstacle to any advance, paralysing
operations once the front had been extended to the coast and no open
strategic flank could be found. Nowhere does Schlieffen consider
barbed-wire entanglements, which became such an important supplement
to the machine-gun in producing the trench-deadlock. Moreover he did
not take adequate account of the effect of demolitions, particularly
of rail bridges, as a brake on the supplies needed to maintain his
strategic advance. In one of the early drafts of his 1906 memorandum
for his successor he devoted a lengthy paragraph to the matter, but
dropped this out in the final draft, and skated over the problem.
That is symptomatic of a tendency to discount difficulties in
becoming more ardent for a long cherished plan.
Worse still—not only for Germany but for the world—was his lack of
understanding of the wider political, economic, and moral factors
which are inseparable from the military factors on the higher plane
of strategy that is aptiy termed "grand strategy." His failure to
understand these non-military factors and their influence is ably
examined by Gerhard Ritter, and forms one of the most interesting
parts of this book.
In previous generations, state policy had governed the use of
military means—as it must, if policy is to fulfil its purpose, and
make sense. But that proper relationship began to be altered, and in
effect reversed, when Bismarck's removal from the Chancellorship in
1890 was closely followed by Schlieffen's appointment to be head of
the General Staff. As Ritter has pointed out, the Schlieffen Plan
forms the prime example of "state-reasoning" being distorted by a
purely military way of thinking. The consequences were disastrous.
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The Schlieffen Plan
From the dust-jacket flap:
Graf Schlieffen—the architect of the
German campaign against France through Belgium in 1914—has always
been a figure of controversy. Was he, as many military writers have
represented him, both in Britain and Germany, the great strategist
whose bold plan was robbed of success by the fumbling of those who
inherited it? And was he, as many historians have believed, the
archetype of "warmongering" Prussian generals, who sought to
instigate the conflict which resulted in the slaughter of millions
of men on both sides?
For forty years the controversy has been waged without the central
piece of evidence: the full text of the "Schlieffen Plan" itself.
In 1953 the text was unearthed by the distinguished German
historian, Professor Gerhard Ritter. Now, after the work of editing
and comparing the many different drafts, it has been presented to
the world for the first time.
The book forms a work of outstanding historical importance. In
dealing with the central points of argument, Professor Ritter
reopens the vital question whether Schlieffen intended his plan for
an attack on France at the time of the Morocco crisis of 1905-6. On
the military side, he traces the argument which led Schlieffen to
conclude that the great "hook" round Paris required the invasion
"not only of Belgium but also of the Netherlands".
Finally he throws a sidelight—new for most English readers—on the
Field-Marshal's remarkable private life.
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From the rear panel:
THE AUTHOR
Gerhard Ritter, who since the end of the war has made an
international reputation for himself as one of Germany's most
distinguished historians, was born in 1888. He studied at Munich,
Leipzig, Heidelberg and Berlin, and was on active service during the
First World War, from 1915 to 1918.
In 1924 he became a professor at Hamburg, and a year later he moved
to Freiburg University, where he has taught ever since. During the
Nazi Period he came into open conflict with the regime, and was
imprisoned from 1944 until 1945 for his part in the abortive revolt
of July 20th, 1944.
In addition to his work as editor of a number of learned
publications (among them the important bibliography German
Historiography in the Second World War which appeared in 1951),
Ritter has written several historical works of outstanding
importance since the war. Following his book Europe and the German
Question, he became a member, in 1950, of the Munich Institute for
Research into the National-Socialist Period. He was one of the
editors of the volume of Hitler's Table-Talk, published by. the
Institute, which caused an international sensation and a great deal
of controversy inside Germany.
Among his more recent works are The Reorganisation of Europe in the
16th Century; The Corrupting Influence of Power; The Art of
Statesmanship and the Craft of War; and a book on his friend Carl
Goerdeler, the titular head of the revolt of the 20th of July, Carl
Goerdeler and the German Resistance Movement.
Professor Ritter attaches special importance to the present work,
since he regards the Schlieffen Plan as the beginning of Germany's,
and Europe's, misfortune. In the words of the distinguished English
historian, Mr. A. J. P. Taylor, the book is "a source of fundamental
importance for understanding the causes of the First World War. All
existing accounts must now be revised."
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Please note: to avoid opening the book out, with the
risk of damaging the spine, some of the pages were slightly raised on the
inner edge when being scanned, which has resulted in some blurring to the
text and a
shadow on the inside edge of the final images. Colour reproduction is shown
as accurately as possible but please be aware that some colours
are difficult to scan and may result in a slight variation from
the colour shown below to the actual colour.
In line with eBay guidelines on picture sizes, some of the illustrations may
be shown enlarged for greater detail and clarity.
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The
dust-jacket outline has been imprinted on the front cover
resulting in a very definite negative-type image which can
be seen be seen in the image below.
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There is the armorial bookplate of M.
Brocklebank (motto: "God send Grace") on the front pastedown,
together with a small "Foyles Bookshop" sticker :
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The dust-jacket is not price-clipped but the
interior has tanned significant with age.
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U.K. buyers:
To estimate the
“packed
weight” each book is first weighed and then
an additional amount of 150 grams is added to allow for the packaging
material (all
books are securely wrapped and posted in a cardboard book-mailer).
The weight of the book and packaging is then rounded up to the
nearest hundred grams to arrive at the postage figure. I make no charge for packaging materials and
do not seek to profit
from postage and packaging. Postage can be combined for multiple purchases. |
Packed weight of this item : approximately 600 grams
Postage and payment options to U.K. addresses: |
-
Details of the various postage options can be obtained by selecting
the “Postage and payments” option at the head of this
listing (above).
-
Payment can be made by: debit card, credit
card (Visa or MasterCard, but not Amex), cheque (payable to
"G Miller", please), or PayPal.
-
Please contact me with name,
address and payment details within seven days of the end of the
listing;
otherwise I reserve the right to cancel the sale and re-list the item.
-
Finally, this should be an
enjoyable experience for both the buyer and seller and I hope
you will find me very easy to deal with. If you have a question
or query about any aspect (postage, payment, delivery options
and so on), please do not hesitate to contact me.
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International
buyers:
To estimate the
“packed
weight” each book is first weighed and then
an additional amount of 150 grams is added to allow for the packaging
material (all
books are securely wrapped and posted in a cardboard book-mailer).
The weight of the book and packaging is then rounded up to the
nearest hundred grams to arrive at the shipping figure.
I make no charge for packaging materials and do not
seek to profit
from shipping and handling.
Shipping can
usually be combined for multiple purchases
(to a
maximum
of 5 kilograms in any one parcel with the exception of Canada, where
the limit is 2 kilograms). |
Packed weight of this item : approximately 600 grams
International Shipping options: |
Details of the postage options
to various countries (via Air Mail) can be obtained by selecting
the “Postage and payments” option at the head of this listing
(above) and then selecting your country of residence from the drop-down
list. For destinations not shown or other requirements, please contact me before buying.
Due to the
extreme length of time now taken for deliveries, surface mail is no longer
a viable option and I am unable to offer it even in the case of heavy items.
I am afraid that I cannot make any exceptions to this rule.
Payment options for international buyers: |
-
Payment can be made by: credit card (Visa
or MasterCard, but not Amex) or PayPal. I can also accept a cheque in GBP [British
Pounds Sterling] but only if drawn on a major British bank.
-
Regretfully, due to extremely
high conversion charges, I CANNOT accept foreign currency : all payments
must be made in GBP [British Pounds Sterling]. This can be accomplished easily
using a credit card, which I am able to accept as I have a separate,
well-established business, or PayPal.
-
Please contact me with your name and address and payment details within
seven days of the end of the listing; otherwise I reserve the right to
cancel the sale and re-list the item.
-
Finally, this should be an enjoyable experience for
both the buyer and seller and I hope you will find me very easy to deal
with. If you have a question or query about any aspect (shipping,
payment, delivery options and so on), please do not hesitate to contact
me.
Prospective international
buyers should ensure that they are able to provide credit card details or
pay by PayPal within 7 days from the end of the listing (or inform me that
they will be sending a cheque in GBP drawn on a major British bank). Thank you.
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![](https://www.flamboroughmanor.co.uk/images/components.jpg)
(please note that the
book shown is for illustrative purposes only and forms no part of this
listing)
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Book dimensions are given in
inches, to the nearest quarter-inch, in the format width x height.
Please
note that, to differentiate them from soft-covers and paperbacks, modern
hardbacks are still invariably described as being ‘cloth’ when they are, in
fact, predominantly bound in paper-covered boards pressed to resemble cloth. |
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Fine Books for Fine Minds |
I value your custom (and my
feedback rating) but I am also a bibliophile : I want books to arrive in the
same condition in which they were dispatched. For this reason, all books are
securely wrapped in tissue and a protective covering and are
then posted in a cardboard container. If any book is
significantly not as
described, I will offer a full refund. Unless the
size of the book precludes this, hardback books with a dust-jacket are
usually provided with a clear film protective cover, while
hardback books without a dust-jacket are usually provided with a rigid clear cover.
The Royal Mail, in my experience, offers an excellent service, but things
can occasionally go wrong.
However, I believe it is my responsibility to guarantee delivery.
If any book is lost or damaged in transit, I will offer a full refund.
Thank you for looking.
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Please also
view my other listings for
a range of interesting books
and feel free to contact me if you require any additional information
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