The Schlieffen Plan

Introduction

THE deployment and operational plans of the Chief of the General Staff, Graf Schlieffen, here published for the first time in their entirety, are without doubt among the most controversial documents of recent military history. Probably no general staff study ever aroused such widespread interest and excitement among the general public. It has let loose a whole flood of military and political literature. Yet these plans have so far been known to the public only in the form of a summary of their contents by military writers—and these refer mostly only to the memorandum of 1905. Of the complete text, all that has so far appeared is a few sentences. Relatively the fullest reproduction may be found in the official publication of the Reichs-archiv. Yet this too is incomplete, partly for political reasons. In the midst of the quarrel over the famous "war guilt question" German officials, particularly in the Foreign Ministry, had grave hesitations about publishing those passages of Schlieffen's memoranda which discuss marching not just through Belgium but through Holland as well. For these would have presented Germany's accusers (and slanderers) with new propaganda material. Such fears lost their foundation with the appearance in 1922 of the memoirs of the younger Moltke, which included a memorandum of 1915 setting out his different point of view on this question as a kind of apologia. But the qualms of the Foreign Ministry persisted, since no one wanted to get involved in ticklish explanations to the Dutch about Schlieffen's views on Dutch policy. Later on, publication was planned within the framework of Schlieffen's Dienstschriften, which were issued by the reconstituted General Staff from 1937 onwards. But the series was never completed because of the outbreak of the war.

The manuscripts on which the second part of this book is based are among the Schlieffen papers originally handed over to the Army archives (subsequently incorporated in the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam) by Schlieffen's son-in-law, Major von Hahnke. Along with other military documents, they fell into the hands of the American Army, which turned them over to the National Archives in Washington. It was there that I found them, after my attention had been drawn to the matter by Professor Fritz Epstein, during a visit undertaken for quite separate purposes in the spring of 1953. Not only was I granted free access to the manuscripts, but I asked for, and received, photostat copies of the papers which most interested me. In the meantime the entire Schlieffen papers have been returned to Germany. The official manuscripts are in the hands of the Federal Defence Ministry, to whom I am greatly obliged for further access to the documents and permission to publish them, as well as for help in making sketch-maps and further photostats.

The significance of the Schlieffen Plan extends far beyond purely military history. Its political consequences made it nothing less than fateful for Germany. In latter times it has been looked on as a design for a preventive war against France, made in collusion with the leading brain of the Foreign Ministry, Baron Fritz von Holstein, towards the end of 1905. In consequence, the Schlieffen Plan has become the centre of every discussion about the role of the German general staff before 1914, and about the whole question of German "militarism." Such are the special circumstances which may justify its present publication, not by an officer schooled in the methods of the General Staff, but by a political historian who has long made this kind of problem the object of special study. The author feels that this publication is indispensable as a preliminary study and supplement to the second volume of his book Staatkunst und Kriegshandwerk, Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland, of which the first volume appeared in 1954. Of course, he does not feel called upon to appear as an expert in purely military matters—to appreciate, for example, Graf Schlieffen's strategic achievements as such. He is not tempted by the role either of "civilian strategist" or "historical umpire" in the quarrel of the military experts. But what must be accomplished within the framework of such a publication, and what may be achieved by a civilian, is threefold:

An analysis of the historical features of Schlieffen's strategic plans compared with those of his predecessor and his successor.

A portrait of Schlieffen as a man and as the holder of his office.

An appreciation of the political significance of his plans—in their intent as well as in their consequences.

Gerhard Ritter

Freiburg im Breisgau, March 1956.

 

 

 

 

Foreword
by B. H. Liddell Hart
 

FOR two generations the Schlieffen Plan has been a magic phrase, embodying one of the chief mysteries and "might have beens" of modern times. The mystery is cleared up and the great "If" analysed in Gerhard Ritter's book—a striking contribution to twentieth-century history.

In the years following World War I German soldiers spoke of Graf Schlieffen with wistful awe as their supreme strategist, and ascribed the failure of the 1914 invasion of France to the way in which his masterly plan, worked out when Chief of the Great General Staff from 1891 to 1905, had been whittled down and mishandled by his successor, the second Moltke.

The repulse of that opening offensive was followed by years of trench-deadlock, and eventually by Germany's collapse in 1918. By the time she and her allies collapsed, her surviving European opponents were themselves near to exhaustion, Russia had turned Communist and gone out of the war, while the United States had become the world's leading Power. So the consequences were immense and far-reaching.

It was very natural, in retrospect, that German soldiers and war historians should have placed so much weight on the second Moltke's departure from the Schlieffen Plan as the prime cause of their military calamities. That view also gained general acceptance in military and historical circles abroad, as it was so obvious that the operational plan pursued by the German Supreme Command of 1914 had gone wrong, and that the repulse of the German armies in the Battle of the Marne had been a turning-point in the war. Moreover the evidence that became known, from German staff disclosures, tended to confirm the conclusion that Schlieffen's plan had been much more promising and that his. successor had violated Schlieffen's principal prescriptions.

The course of the campaign was exhaustively examined during the postwar years, and there was voluminous discussion of the fateful changes which took place in the German plan. But the examination and discussion were conducted on an inadequate basis of knowledge about the Schlieffen Plan itself. Detailed information about its content was too sparse to be satisfying. Only broad outlines and fragmentary passages were published. That state of insufficiency has continued until the publication of Gerhard Fitter's book. He unearthed Schlieffen's papers during a visit to the United States in 1953. After lying for many years in the German archives at Potsdam, where they had been deposited by Schlieffen's son-in-law, they had been carried away to the American archives in Washington after World War II, along with a mass of other military documents.

It was fortunate that the papers should have come into the hands of Gerhard Ratter—an historian of high quality, whose discernment is matched by his trustworthiness, and a gifted writer. He presents the full text of Schlieffen's military testament, and the relevant parts of other memoranda which shed light on the evolution of the Plan. They are preceded by Professor Ritter's masterly exposition of their content and significance, while his accompanying notes add to the illuminating effect.

The whole forms a book of outstanding historical importance. But it is also extraordinarily interesting to read for a book of its kind. At first glance it may look too scholarly in form to be of wide appeal. But that impression soon changes as one gets deeper in the book. It might well be described as an "historical detective story"—and is fascinating when read in that way.

Going on from clue to clue, it becomes evident that the secret of the Schlieffen Plan, and the basis of Schlieffen's formula for quick victory amounted to little more than a gambler's belief in the virtuosity of sheer audacity. Its magic is a myth. As a strategic concept it proved a "snare and delusion" for the executants, with fatal consequences that were on balance inherently probable from the outset.

The basic problem which the Plan had to meet was that of two-front war, in which Germany and her Austrian ally faced Russia on the East and France on the West—a combination whose forces were numerically superior although separated from one another. Schlieffen sought to solve the problem in a different way from that contemplated by his predecessors, the elder Moltke and Waldersee. His way, in his view, would be quicker in execution and more complete in effect.

The elder Moltke, despite the triumphant result of the offensive against France which he had directed in 1870, doubted whether it could be repeated against the reorganised and strengthened French Army. His plan was to stay on the defensive against France, nullify Russia's threat by a sharp stroke at her advanced forces, and then turn westward to counter-attack the French advance. It was essentially a defensive-offensive strategy. His aim was to cripple both opponents, and bring about a favourable peace, rather than to pursue the dream of total victory. Moltke's immediate successor, Waldersee, showed more bias in favour of offensive action and aggressive policy. But he did not change Moltke's decision to stay on the defensive in the West, and when he urged the case for a preventive war against Russia his offensive impulse was curbed by Bismarck.

But Schlieffen, in his very first memorandum after taking office in 1891, questioned the assumption that the French fortifications were such a great obstacle as "to rule out an offensive" in the West, emphasising that "they could be by-passed through Belgium." It was an early indication of a tendency to view strategic problems in a purely military way, disregarding political factors and the complications likely to arise from a violation of neutral countries. In the next year his mind began to turn against the existing plan of taking the offensive in the East, along with the Austrian Army, since on his calculation it would be very difficult to gain a decisive victory there, or prevent the Russian Army retiring out of reach. For him it did not suffice to lame the opponents— they must be destroyed. His conception of war was dominated by the theoretical absolutes of Clausewitzian doctrine. So when he came to the conclusion that such absolute victory was unattainable in the East, he came back to the idea of seeking it in the West.

Initially, he considered the problems of a direct thrust into France, but soon concluded that success was impossible in that way. While hoping that the French might take the offensive, giving him the chance to trap them and deliver a counter-thrust into France, he felt that such self-exposure on their part was too uncertain a hope to provide the quick victory he desired. By 1897 he became convinced that he must take the offensive from the outset, and as it could only be successful by outflanking the French fortress system it meant that the German Command "must not shrink from violating the neutrality of Belgium as well as of Luxembourg." For the turning manoeuvre must be wide enough- for the deployment of ample forces, and too wide for the enemy to block it by a short extension of his front.

The plan was developed by degrees during the years that followed. At first his idea was only to march through the southern tip of Belgium, aiming to turn the French flank near Sedan. But by 1905 he planned to go through the centre of Belgium in a great wheeling movement, with his right wing-tip passing into France near Lille.

To avoid it being checked by the Belgian fortresses of Namur and Liege in the deep-cut stretch of the Meuse valley, he decided that it must sweep through the southern part of Holland—which meant violating another neutral country. To avoid being blocked by Paris or exposing his right flank to a counter-stroke from Paris, he decided to extend his wheel wider still and sweep round west of Paris. That, he felt, was also the only way to ensure that the French armies were cut off from the possibility of escaping southward. Such a large wheel required correspondingly large forces for its execution, taking account of the need to leave adequate detachment on guard over the fortresses by-passed, while keeping up the strength of the long-stretched marching line. Thus he was led to shift the weight of his forces so heavily rightwards that nearly seven-eighths of the total was dedicated to "the great wheel," and barely one-eighth left to meet a possible French offensive across his own frontier.

It was a conception of Napoleonic boldness, and there were encouraging precedents in Napoleon's early career for counting on the decisive effect of arriving in the enemy's rear with the bulk of one's forces. If the manoeuvre went well it held much greater promise of quick and complete victory than any other course could offer, and the hazards of leaving only a small proportion to face a French frontal attack were not as big as they appeared. Moreover if the German defensive wing was pushed back, without breaking, that would tend to increase the effect of the offensive wing. It would operate like a revolving door—the harder the French pushed on one side the more sharply would the other side swing round and strike their back.

But Schlieffen failed to take due account of a great difference between the conditions of Napoleonic times and his own—the advent of the railway. While his troops would have to march on their own feet round the circumference of the circle, the French would be able to switch troops by rail across the chord of the circle. That was all the worse handicap because his prospects mainly depended on the time factor. The handicap was further increased because his troops would be likely to find their advance hampered by a succession of demolished bridges, while their food and ammunition supply would be restricted until they could rebuild the rail tracks and rail bridges through Belgium and Northern France.

The great scythe-sweep which Schlieffen planned was a manoeuvre that had been possible in Napoleonic times. It would again become possible in the next generation—when air-power could paralyse the defending side's attempt to switch its forces, while the development of mechanised forces greatly accelerated the speed of encircling moves, and extended their range. But Schlieffen's plan hada very poor chance of decisive success at the time it was conceived.

The less he could count on an advantage in speed the more would depend on having a decisive superiority of strength, at any rate in the crucial area. His recognition of this need was shown in the way he whittled down the proportion of the German strength to be left on the Eastern Front and on the defensive wing in the West. His main device to produce an actual increase of attacking strength was to create a number of additional army corps from reservists of various grades, and incorporate them in the striking force for subsidiary tasks. But even then the Germans' total forces in the West would have only a slight margin of numbers over the French, and that margin would disappear with the addition of the Belgian and British armies (small as these were) to the forces with which the Germans would have to deal—as a consequence of going through Belgium.

It is evident from Schlieffen's papers that by the time he finally framed his Plan he had come to feel very doubtful whether Germany had or could attain the superiority of force needed for a reasonable assurance of success in such an offensive venture. But he seems to have taken the technician's view that his duty was fulfilled if he did the utmost with the means available, and "made the best of a bad job" in compliance with the customs and rules of his profession. He did not consider that he had the higher responsibility of warning the Emperor and the Chancellor that the chances of success were small compared with the risks, and that German policy ought to be adjusted to that grave reality.

Still less was he conscious of a responsibility to humanity. When, in further reflection after leaving office, he came to realise how dubious were the chances of success for his offensive Plan, his only fresh suggestions for improving its chances were to make a wider sweep through Holland and hasten the advance through Belgium by threat of a terror-bombardment of the town populations.

During these later years Russia's recovery from the effects of her war with Japan, and reorganisation of her forces, made the overall situation more adverse to the prospects of his Plan. But he showed no realisation of the changed situation, and in his last memorandum at the end of 1912—a week before his death, just short of his eightieth birthday—he virtually ignored Russia's power of interference and the likelihood that it might compel a reinforcement of the Germans' slender strength on the Eastern Front at the expense of their concentration on the Western Front. He had become obsessed with the dream of a quick knock-out blow against France, and his dying words are reported to have been: "It must come to a fight. Only make the right wing strong."

His successor, the second Moltke, was not happy about the Plan that came to him as a legacy, and found little help in the advice which Schlieffen offered after his retirement. It is not surprising to learn from a note by Schlieffen's son-in-law that by 1911 neither Moltke, Ludendorff (the head of the Operations directorate, 1908-13), nor any other of the chief members of the General Staff thought it worth while to consult "the master" about the problem.

Moltke, with more political sense and scruple than his predecessor, decided to avoid violating Holland's neutrality in addition to Belgium's, and found an alternative solution in a swift capture of the Liege bottleneck by a surprise coup. This was achieved in 1914 under the personal direction of Ludendorff, so the German offensive enjoyed a successful start. It was helped even more by the recently recast French operational plan, which played into the Germans' hands far better than Schlieffen could have expected.

This was due to a new school of thought in France, which was intoxicated with the offensive spirit. In 1912 the leaders of this school ousted the then Chief of the General Staff, Michel, who had expected the Germans to come through Belgium and planned a defence against the move. The new school ignored the danger in their eagerness to launch an offensive of their own across the German frontier. This ran headlong into a trap, and the French Army was caught badly off balance when the Germans swept round its left wing. Nevertheless the French were able to switch reinforcements thither by rail, while the German advance dwindled in strength and lost cohesion as it pressed deeper into France. It suffered badly from shortage of supplies, caused by the demolition of the railways, and was on the verge of breakdown by the time the French launched a counter-stroke, starting from the Paris area—which sufficed to dislocate the German right wing and cause a general retreat.

After the event, Moltke was blamed for the way he exposed his flank to such a riposte by wheeling inwards before Paris was passed, contrary to the Schlieffen Plan. But it now becomes clear from Schlieffen's papers that he himself had come to recognise that his forces were insufficient for such an extremely wide stretch, and that he contemplated wheeling inwards north of Paris as Moltke did. Another charge brought against Moltke is that he spoilt the Plan by allotting more of the newly raised corps to the left wing than to the right. But here again we find that Schlieffen had also come to see the need of strengthening the left wing. In any case the course of events amply proved that the right wing could not have been made stronger than it was, nor its strength maintained as the advance continued—because of the rail demolitions. It is useless to multiply numbers if they cannot be fed and munitioned.

In the light of Schlieffen's papers, and of the lessons of World War I, it is hard to find reason for the way he has so long been regarded as a master mind, and one who would have been victorious if he had lived to conduct his own Plan.

Schlieffen very clearly grasped the value of turning the opponent's flank—but that was no new discovery. He further saw that the effect depended on successive by-passing moves, progressively pressed deeper towards the opponent's rear. But that had been appreciated and excellently brought out as far back as 500 B.C., in Sun Tzu's teaching on "The Art of War." Schlieffen's operational expertness in war games has been acclaimed by many of his subordinates. But it was never tested in war, and does not suffice as proof of his mastery of strategic theory. This can now be examined in the light of his papers. On their evidence, his grasp of strategy was broad but shallow, more mathematical than psychological. Although he was a strong believer in the virtues of indirect approach, he seems to have regarded it principally as a physical-geographical matter—rather than as a compound way of applying pressure upon the mind and spirit of the opposing commander and troops. There is little in Schlieffen's papers that suggests understanding of the finer points of strategy, and the subtler ways in which it can decisively change the balance.

Nor do his papers show any clear realisation of the extent to which strategic success depends on what is tactically possible. The papers provide little evidence of concern with the vital change in tactical conditions that was being produced by the tremendous development in the fire-power of weapons, and their multiplication. His discussion of the strategic problem of invading France, and achieving a quick victory there, recognises that the fortresses are likely to be serious obstacles to the German advance, and emphasises the need of heavy field artillery to overcome them. But it does not take account of other and newer tactical hindrances. There is no mention in Schlieffen's military testament, handed to his successor in 1906, of the quick-firing field artillery developed by the French—the famous "75s"—nor of machine-guns. Even in his final thoughts on the war problem set forth in his memorandum of December 1912, there are only two incidental mentions of the machine-gun—which, when war came in 1914, proved the greatest obstacle to any advance, paralysing operations once the front had been extended to the coast and no open strategic flank could be found. Nowhere does Schlieffen consider barbed-wire entanglements, which became such an important supplement to the machine-gun in producing the trench-deadlock. Moreover he did not take adequate account of the effect of demolitions, particularly of rail bridges, as a brake on the supplies needed to maintain his strategic advance. In one of the early drafts of his 1906 memorandum for his successor he devoted a lengthy paragraph to the matter, but dropped this out in the final draft, and skated over the problem. That is symptomatic of a tendency to discount difficulties in becoming more ardent for a long cherished plan.

Worse still—not only for Germany but for the world—was his lack of understanding of the wider political, economic, and moral factors which are inseparable from the military factors on the higher plane of strategy that is aptiy termed "grand strategy." His failure to understand these non-military factors and their influence is ably examined by Gerhard Ritter, and forms one of the most interesting parts of this book.

In previous generations, state policy had governed the use of military means—as it must, if policy is to fulfil its purpose, and make sense. But that proper relationship began to be altered, and in effect reversed, when Bismarck's removal from the Chancellorship in 1890 was closely followed by Schlieffen's appointment to be head of the General Staff. As Ritter has pointed out, the Schlieffen Plan forms the prime example of "state-reasoning" being distorted by a purely military way of thinking. The consequences were disastrous.