British Campaigns in Africa and the Pacific, 1914-1918

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. . .  General Smuts was now about to begin his drive towards the south. As a preliminary Van Deventer pushed on to Moschi, and apart from brushes of his vanguard with parties of enemy riflemen, he entered the place unopposed. Moschi, the centre of the British- Dutch settlement round Kilimanjaro, is a town of some importance, and about thirty miles within the German boundary. Since it was both the terminus of the railway from Tanga via Wilhelmstal, and the meeting point of several main roads, it was a jumping-off position of the highest value. At New Moschi, on the road to the west, Stewart's Column joined up.

While his advance parties were reconnoitring the positions taken up by von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces at Kahe and along the Pangani (or Ruwu) river, the British commander, with Moschi as his new base, at once got to work upon preparations for his movement. The chase, if it was to be effective, must be a long- winded chase. Risk of breakdown could not be taken. The road from Taveta to Moschi had to be repaired and improved : transport overhauled and reorganised ; supplies brought forward. Time was of consequence, because it was of no slight moment to drive the enemy across the Pangani before the coming of the rains. Unless that were done, the task of dislodging him would be difficult.

The key of the Pangani position was Kahe. Between Kilimanjaro and the Usambara plateau on the coast there is, running north to south, a long rib of rising land which at its highest point — the Pare Mountains — is more than 2,000 feet above sea-level. To the east of it lies the Umba valley and the dry country of Taveta ; to the west, the Pangani valley. The main road from Moschi to Tanga had been constructed along the westward slope of this rib, and below the road in the valley, following an almost parallel track, ran the railway. Kahe, on the main road at the upper end of the Pangani valley, occupied a hump jutting out from the ridge, and terminating in a bold, and apparently isolated, summit. The place was a natural fortress, and the enemy had turned it to the best account. To attack it in the ordinary way would have been a costly and uncertain operation. In the attack, however, General Smuts followed his characteristic South African tactics. There was a frontal advance from Moschi initiated on the 18th under the command of General Sheppard with the mounted troops of the 1st Division, supported by mountain guns and some field pieces. The advance was sharply resisted, and three battalions of the 2nd South African Brigade were detailed to stiffen it. On the 18th and 19th this action went on, and to all appearances the attack made very little impression. But on March 20, the enemy being thus busily occupied, and probably pluming himself on his defence, Van Deventer moved out of Moschi with the 1st South African Mounted Brigade, the 4th South African Horse, and two batteries of guns ; struck south-west, wheeled to the east ; crossed the river ; and while the enemy was busy with a night attack upon Sheppard's camp got astride the railway and the road. Then, moving up the valley, he boldly made for Kahe hill, driving in the rear and flank guards opposed to him. By this time, however, the enemy had taken the alarm, and Kahe had been hastily evacuated. Thus by skilful manoeuvring the Germans had in rapid succession been squeezed out of two important and naturally strong positions.


Here appeared a counter-stratagem on the part of the German general which more than once turned up in the course of the campaign. It might have been supposed that his force would have fallen back towards the east across the rise, or moved along it towards the south. Either of those moves, however, would have entrapped them. What they in fact did was to strike to the west, slipping out through the gap between Van Deventer's force and that of Sheppard. To cover this movement and give their main body a better start, they sent back a contingent ostensibly to retake Kahe, as though its abandonment had been a mistake.

Farther down the Pangani valley they took up a strong position between the Soko Nassai and Defu rivers, two of the Pangani's tributaries. Those streams covered the enemy's flanks. Along the front of his line there was a clearing in the bush varying in breadth from 600 to 1,200 yards. To attack him at close quarters this space had to be crossed. But as his forces were hidden in the high thick undergrowth on the farther side, the crossing was a ticklish proposition. Moving out on March 21 to clear the valley, Sheppard was brought up against this obstruction. His plan was to turn the right of the German line. It was found, however, that the bush there was too dense to traverse, and with the exception of two companies of the 129th Baluchis who crossed the Soko Nassai, the troops told off for this part of the work never got into the fight at all. In the circumstances a frontal attack was essayed. The effort was gallantly made, and it was well supported by the artillery, but it failed. Proofs were afterwards forthcoming that the enemy's losses had been severe, but those on the British side were 288, more than in the fight for the Latema-Reata pass. That night Sheppard's men dug in. At dawn it was intended to renew the assault, and patrols stole forward to reconnoitre. They found the German lines and trenches deserted. In the night von Lettow-Vorbeck had crossed the Pangani moving towards Lembeni.

Of two 4.1 -inch naval guns he had used in the battle, one mounted on a railway truck manoeuvred up and down the line, and the other in a fixed position, the latter had been left behind. It was evident from this action that European tactics were little suited to operations in a country where the wild growth is six to ten feet in height. At the same time, the important work of driving the enemy across the Pangani had been rapidly accomplished, and the price paid cannot be considered high. A chain of British posts was established along the river, and the preparations pushed on for continuing the campaign.

April and May are in this part of Africa the rainy months, and in this season of 1916 the rains happened to be above the average heavy. They are heaviest in any season in the mountain area round Kilimanjaro. For nearly six weeks, once the weather broke, the downpour continued day after day, the fall within twenty-four hours sometimes equalling four inches. When that occurs the country is flooded out ; roads waist deep in water ; the rivers and streams roaring and impassable torrents.

Under these conditions nothing could be done. All the same, General Smuts wasted no time. His force was increased by the 2nd South African Mounted Brigade, and he now took advantage of the rainy interval to reorganise. As he has himself stated, he was in command of a most heterogeneous army, got together from all quarters, contingent by contingent, and speaking a Babel of languages. By comparison, the enemy troops, though fewer in number, presented a unity alike in composition and in training. To tighten up the structure of the British field force was not merely advisable ; it was essential. In the meantime, too, there had arrived from Capetown Generals Brits, Manie Botha, and Berrange. With those experienced officers also at his disposition, the Commander-in-Chief was able to form a striking force of three divisions, consisting in part of South Africans, mounted and foot, in part of native regiments recruited in British East Africa. These troops were the most acclimatised. None others, it was clear, could long stand the strain of swift campaigning in such a region. Accordingly, the British and Indian units were held in reserve. They had already gone through more than a year of the war, some a year and a half. The climate of East Africa exacts a heavier toll than battles. As re-shaped, the new divisions of manoeuvre were : —

1st Division (Major-General A. R. Hoskins) comprising the 1st East African Brigade (Sheppard) and the 2nd East African Brigade (Brigadier-General J. A. Hannyngton).

2nd Division (Van Deventer) comprising the 1st South African Mounted Brigade (Manie Botha), and the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade (Berrange).

3rd Division (Brits) comprising the 2nd South African Mounted Brigade (Brigadier-General B. Enslin), and the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade (Beves).

The main body of the enemy had by this time fallen back south upon and were passing the wet season in the Pare Mountains, and that fact had a certain influence on the decision of General Smuts as to the strategy to be followed. The German recruiting ground lay west of the main mountain range, for in other parts of the colony the natives were at best passively hostile, and von Lettow-Vorbeck drew the larger part of his supplies from the same inland area, through Tabora, a place west of the mountains and on the Dar-es-Salem — Ujiji railway. If, then, the German commander, while keeping open his communications with Tabora, could retain his hold on the Pare Mountains and the Usambara plateau, a most difficult triangle of country, he had a chance of carrying on the campaign in a manner calculated at once to conserve his own resources and to waste those of the attack. Further, if to cripple him the British detached any considerable force to seize Tabora, moving it up to Kisumu, and across the Victoria Nyanza, to avoid the mountain barrier, he had the reply of a threat against Mombasa.

General Smuts inferred that the retreat of the hostile main body upon the Pare range had been made with these ideas in view. Weighing, therefore, and rejecting possible alternatives, he decided first to strike at the Tabora line of communication directly across country from Moschi. That move on his part, he had no doubt, would have the effect of detaching a strong contingent from the German main force, and, assuming that it had, he could then, with very slight risk, thrust south along the lower course of the Pangani, cut in between the two enemy bodies, and either isolate those on the Usambara heights or squeeze them out. It was a simple, bold, and practicable plan, and at the earliest moment after the rains, and on the first indication that the country was again becoming traversable, he put it into execution.

Before the wet season Arusha, seventy miles west of Moschi, had fallen into his hands, and Van Deventer with the 2nd Division was now there. The Germans had at the beginning of April a force at Lokissale, thirty- five miles south-west of Arusha. Their position commanding the road into the centre of the colony from Arusha was a mountain nearly 7,000 feet high, and it was important, because on it were the only springs of water in the area. The road from Arusha here runs with the mountains on one side, and the Masai tableland on the other, and it is a lonely upland region. Likely enough, the Germans at Lokissale did not think they would be disturbed until after the rains, but on the evening of April 3, Van Deventer, with three regiments of his mounted men, dashed out of Arusha, and, after a night ride, was next morning before the enemy stronghold. Covered by the mists, he surrounded it. The Germans and their auxiliaries resisted with determination, for the position was vital. All that day and the next they held out. On the 6th, however, the whole force, 17 white and 404 askari combatants, with their commander, Kaempf, laid down their arms. Their stores, ammunition, pack animals and machine-guns fell into Van Deventer's hands, and a body of native porters and camp followers were obtained at the same time.

But not less valuable than the captures was the information gleaned from Kaempf's papers. It was learned that von Lettow-Vorbeck, in order to close this route, was taking steps to reinforce his garrisons at Ufiome, Kandoa Irangi, and other places on the western edge of the Masai steppe, and that meanwhile these garrisons had received orders, which were also the orders of Kaempf, to hold out, if attacked, as long as possible. This information at once confirmed the British Commander-in-Chief's inference, and his instant resolution was to seize Ufiome, Umbulu, and Kandoa Irangi before the enemy could reinforce. On April 7, accordingly, Van Deventer pushed on to the first of these three places. The enemy, 20 whites and 200 askaris, were found occupying a ridge. They were defeated and driven west into the mountains. All the supplies at Ufiome, and they were large, were secured. In the interim the infantry of Van Deventer's Division had been following up, and a contingent took over the captured position. Some slight delay now arose owing to the exhaustion of the horses, but the move was as soon as possible resumed, and on April 11 Umbulu was taken. At Kandoa Irangi, one of the most important road centres in the colony, the Germans had a powerful wireless installation. On the approach of Van Deventer's mounted men, on April 17, the garrison, a considerable force, came out into the open and advanced four miles to the north. The fight went on for two days. By the end of that time Van Deventer had so manoeuvred as to thrust part of his force between the defence lines and the town, and having edged the garrison out of it and beaten them, he took it without further opposition. The captures here included 800 head of cattle.

How remarkable a feat this dash was may be inferred from the fact that Kandoa Irangi is distant from Arusha 120 miles, and the daring of the move may be gathered from the further fact that, owing to the rains, Van Deventer and his men were for several weeks entirely cut off from communication with Moschi, and had to live on supplies collected on the spot, supplemented by such provisions as could be carried across the country from Arusha by native porters.

On the campaign, however, the move had an influence beyond estimate. No sooner had the news of it reached him than von Lettow-Vorbeck, realising what it implied, hurried from Usambara at the head of 4,000 men. He had already, in the defeat and dispersal of his garrisons, had his total strength lessened by some 2,000 combatants. Rain or no rain therefore, partly by road, partly by railway, he pressed on, collecting another 1,000 men en route. From Kilimatinde, the nearest point on the central railway, Kandoa Irangi is distant about eighty miles. That final lap was covered by rapid marches, and on May 7 he arrived. Whether he still hoped to find Kandoa Irangi holding out is uncertain, but what is quite certain is that he had resolved to attack before Van Deventer's Division could be reinforced, and inflict a crushing defeat upon it. Owing to sickness and fatigue, the South African commander could not now muster more than 3,000 effectives fit for duty. In the circumstances, and looking at his isolated position, he stood upon the defensive. Von Lettow-Vorbeck gave his own troops, twenty-five double companies, two days' rest. Then he attacked, and the attack was desperate. Four times the askaris, urged on by their German officers, stormed up to the South African trenches, and four times they were beaten off. The enemy's bravery was almost fanatical. But against the shooting of the defending force it was of no avail. While by no means indifferent shots, for their German instructors had taken every pains to make them efficient, the askaris were not a match for troops who, as marksmen, have no superiors in the world. Their losses, which were heavy, included von Kornatsky, a battalion commander, killed, and another battalion commander, von Bock, wounded. Nothing could better indicate the character of this struggle. The battle continued all day and far into the night. In the early hours of the morning, and well before daybreak, von Lettow-Vorbeck and his shattered force withdrew. His next move was to try to starve Van Deventer out by ranging, before the heaviest rains came on, over the surrounding country, one of the most fertile and healthy parts of East Africa. That procedure, however, did not succeed, and before long he had serious events elsewhere to claim his attention.

The moment he had news of the enemy's defeat at Kandoa Irangi, General Smuts hurried forward the movement which on his side was to form its sequel. There was the possibility that von Lettow-Vorbeck might, to save time, march back to Handeni, across the Masai steppe by the old caravan route, and if the intended British movement down the Pangani were thus forestalled it would find itself confronted by the reunited German main body. To cross the steppe to Handeni is, for infantry, a twelve days' march. It was imperative, therefore, that the British divisions at Kahe should move out on the earliest date on which transport became feasible. The rains continued to fall until nearly the middle of May, but as usual towards the end of the wet season, they became lighter, and by degrees the sun reasserted its power. From Kahe to Handeni is, roughly, the same distance as from Kandoa Irangi, but the British forces had by far the more difficult stretch of country to negotiate. Besides, there were still in the Pare and Usambara area enough enemy troops to put up a serious delaying opposition. Everything, then, turned upon the length of time at the start.

The advance began on May 18. The main column (Sheppard and Beves) followed the road from Kahe southwards. With it was most of the artillery and the transport. Slightly to the rear of its leading formation marched, on the parallel route along the railway, a smaller flanking column (Hannyngton). A second flanking column (Col. T. O. Fitzgerald) set out from Mbuyuni, and crossing the ridge south of Kilimanjaro by the Ngulu pass, joined the main column at the Pare Mountains. The main column thus went forward covered on both flanks, a disposition which contributed to rapid movement. General Smuts was himself in command, Hoskins assisting.

The enemy had taken up a position at Lembeni, chosen because at that point the railway runs close under the hills. But General Smuts had no intention of wasting time and men in a frontal attack upon fortified lines, much less upon lines affording every advantage to the defence and none to the assault. He was aware that even should Fitzgerald's movement not have the effect of compelling an evacuation, the movement of Hannyngton, who had turned off and was moving down the Pangani west of the railway, assuredly would. And the calculation proved exact. The enemy, finding that his retreat was threatened, abandoned Lembeni without waiting for the firing of a shot. To cut him off from the TJsambara plateau, Hannyngton was sent across the hills with orders to double back through the Gonja Gap, a broad defile dividing off the Pare Mountains from the plateau. This move entirely succeeded. Hannyngton reached the Gap — it was a fine marching feat — and seized the bridge over the Mkomasi river, barring hostile retirement in that direction.

The Gap closed, the German force, headed off the TJsambara plateau, had no choice save to go on falling back down the Pangani valley, and their next stand was at Mikotscheni, a position very like that at Lembeni. On this occasion they waited for a fight, and the frontal assault they had expected was duly delivered by the 2nd Rhodesians. Is it necessary to add that it was not the real thing ? The real thing was a movement by Sheppard's Brigade. Turning to the left a slight way up the Gonja Gap, the Brigade swarmed up on to and carried the bluff overlooking and commanding the enemy's lines. To have retired now would have been disastrous, and rather shrewdly the German commander fought on, though outflanked, until past nightfall. Then as quietly as possible, he moved once more. The move was to Mombo station, connected with Handeni by a trolley line. Along this line the enemy marched to Mkalamo, where they entrenched.

So far they had been unmercifully hustled, for the distance from Lembeni to Handeni is a good hundred miles, and it had had to be covered in little more than a week, the fight at Mikotscheni included. In fact, in ten days the British force had advanced 130 miles, and that, too, in face of opposition and over a country which, with the exception of the route along the Pangani, was roadless. In bridge building and bridge repairing the engineers surpassed themselves.

Handeni, when reconnoitred, was found to be strongly fortified. Upon that position, after a sharp action in which they had been driven from their entrenchments at Mkalami by the 1st East African Brigade and had suffered serious loss, the enemy force had concentrated. In the meantime, having occupied Wilhelmstal and secured that place, Hannyngton had marched south through Mombo. His arrival made it practicable to detach Sheppard's Brigade for a characteristic manoeuvre. On the east side, that is, between the plateau and the coastal belt, the Masai steppe is fringed by mountains just as it is on the west. The light railway from Mombo to Handeni ran along the inner, or highland side of the hills, and the Handeni position was close to and commanded a gorge through which flows seaward the Msangasi river. The Handeni position itself was a bold, and nearly isolated bluff, over 2,000 feet high. Its slopes had been scored into tiers of trenches. Here, therefore, the enemy not only obstructed the way south, but was safe against any attempt to turn him by a movement along and from the coast. But that was not the British commander's intention. What he did was to send Sheppard to the west. Crossing the Msangasi higher up, Sheppard struck south, and next day was at Pongwe, on the German line of retreat. A strong detachment with quick-firing guns were found holding the place. Sheppard attacked, drove them out, and scattered them through the bush, where one of their pom- poms, left behind, was picked up. This done, he doubled back towards Handeni. The hostile force there had, however, already evacuated the stronghold. They had split up, some retreating through the gorge, some across the hills, the rest westward over the plateau.

As it was certain that they meant to reassemble farther to the south, Fitzgerald with the 5th South Africans was sent in pursuit by way of Pongwe. He was to occupy Kangata, eight miles beyond that place. And at Kangata he butted into the new concentration. It had taken place there because Kangata was at the northern end of a main road which the Germans had recently constructed from Morogoro on their Central Railway. This road, though still unfinished, had been completed for eighty miles to the north from Morogoro, cutting transversely across the Nguru mountains. Round Kangata the bush is thick, and the enemy was entirely hidden in it, and but for the vigilance of the South African scouting Fitzgerald would have been ambushed. Greatly outnumbered, he lost heavily, but the effort to drive him off proved futile, and he held on until the main British Column came up.

The next obstacle was the Lukigura river. There the enemy held the bridge on which the new road had been carried over the stream, and as the Lukigura is rapid, tumbling seaward from the steppe through the mountains, and between precipitous banks, this was again a tough little problem. Round the north end of the bridge there was laid out an arc of defences. General Smuts, however, had again thought out his turning tactics. In the night Hoskins set out with two battalions of South Africans, and a composite battalion made up of Kashmiri Imperial Service Infantry, and companies of the 25th Royal Fusiliers, and a body of mounted scouts ; followed the course of the Lukigura upstream ; found a crossing ; passed over ; and was next morning, after a rough march through the hills, on the new road to the rear of the hostile position. Preconcerted signals having shown that the manoeuvre had been brought off, Sheppard with both East African Brigades began a frontal attack, and it was in progress when Hoskins debouched on the enemy's rear. The enemy was now surrounded on three sides, and but for the bluffs, densely overgrown with scrub, would have been surrounded altogether. He no longer stood on ceremony, but breaking up, his now usual resource when in a tight place, made his way in parties through the jungle of grass and giant weeds. Much of his ammunition, and machine-gun and other equipment had, however, to be left behind, and a good proportion of his force was captured.

In every sense the drive south from Kahe had been extraordinary, and the more it is studied in detail the more remarkable it appears. There were not only the actual difficulties of such an advance in such a country ; there was the necessity of dealing with guerilla tactics in the rear. When the Germans found that direct effective resistance was out of the question, they laid themselves out to hamper the transit of supplies, remounts, and munitions. Bands of snipers infested the country, and skirmishes with convoys were of daily occurrence. All this had to be systematically dealt with and put down, and apparently innocent non-combatants of German nationality rounded up. On the coast, from Tanga as far south as Bagamoyo, the occupation of the ports was effected by landing parties from the ships of the blockading squadron. Meanwhile, in view of the distance to Moschi, the Lukigura represented for the present the limit of the advance. Th. problem of supply had been stretched to its utmost. The advanced base must be moved from Moschi farther to the south and the line of communication thoroughly secured. So far indeed had the supply problem been stretched, added to guerilla obstruction, that on the march from the Pangani the troops had lived upon half-rations. Not infrequently, also, they had had to face shortage of water. All this was wearing, and the percentage of sickness had become high. Had it not been for the wise prevision which had reserved ample force to deal with irregular attacks in the rear, the movement would have been held up. In any event, the time had come before going farther to reorganise, rest, and refit. Hence just south of the Lukigura, General Smuts laid out a standing camp sufficient for his whole force, and proceeded to overhaul his arrangements.