Publisher Description

It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology'--that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether consciousthought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion. Threebroad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence ofcognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concernsthe implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.

Author Biography

Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008).Michelle Montague lectures in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and she has published in these areas in philosophy journals including Nous, Philosophical Studies, and Analysis. She is currently writing a book on the notion of content, with particular reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.

Table of Contents

Contents1: Michelle Montague and Tim Bayne: Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction2: Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet: The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology3: Terry Horgan: From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed4: Uriah Kriegel: Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content5: Joseph Levine: On The Phenomenology of Thought6: Michelle Montague: The Phenomenology of Particularity7: David Pitt: Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content8: Jesse Prinz: The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology9: William Robinson: A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology10: Christopher Shields: On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia11: Charles Siewert: Phenomenal Thought12: Maja Spener: Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology13: Galen Strawson: Cognitive Phenomenology: real life14: Michael Tye and Briggs Wright: Is There a Phenomenology of Thought?15: David Woodruff-Smith: Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking

Review

The volume is an important contribution to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. It should be of interest to philosophers of mind working on consciousness, cognition, and their intersections. * Anders Nes, Mind *
Cognitive Phenomenology is an excellent collection of articles on an important debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. We strongly recommend it to anyone interested in consciousness, or philosophy of mind more generally. * Mendelovici and Bourget, Australasian Journal of Philosophy *

Promotional

Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and emotion.

Long Description

It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology'--that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether consciousthought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion. Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against theexistence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of thedebate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.

Review Quote

"The volume is an important contribution to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. It should be of interest to philosophers of mind working on consciousness, cognition, and their intersections." --Mind

Feature

A ground-breaking collection of new essays, written by an outstanding international team of experts
The first volume dedicated to this progressive subject
Provides a state-of-the-art account of the debate

Details