Subtitled “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam”, this fascinating work compares the performance of the British Armed Forces against Communist insurgents in Malaya in 1948-51 with the US Military’s performance against similar forces in Vietnam, from 1950-72. Using the old adage that “an army is always fighting the last war”as a starting point, the author looks in depth at why the British succeeded in eradicting the Communist threat in Malaya, but the U.S. was unable to do so in Vietnam. His over-arching conclusion is that the culture within the British Army was far more adaptable to changing circumstances than that in the U.S. Military, and that as a result the British were able to confront the Malay Communists far more successfully than the Americans were in Vietnam. The U.S. relied far more on numbers and firepower than the British, who used special forces tactics as their mainstay, and who seldom relied on firepower or massive raids to combat an entrenched enemy. A very interesting work, highly recommended. This 2005 Trade Paperback is in very good condition, with no internal markings and a cover with nominal wear.