Publisher Description

Building Better Beings presents a new theory of moral responsibility. Beginning with a discussion of ordinary convictions about responsibility and free will and their implications for a philosophical theory, Manuel Vargas argues that no theory can do justice to all the things we want from a theory of free will and moral responsibility. He goes on to show how we can nevertheless justify our responsibility practices and provide a normatively andnaturalistically adequate account of responsible agency, blame, and desert. Three ideas are central to Vargas' account: the agency cultivation model, circumstantialism about powers, and revisionism aboutresponsibility and free will. On Vargas' account, responsibility norms and practices are justified by their effects. In particular, the agency cultivation model holds that responsibility practices help mold us into creatures that respond to moral considerations. Moreover, the abilities that matter for responsibility and free will are not metaphysically prior features of agents in isolation from social contexts. Instead, they are functions of both agents and their normatively structuredcontexts. This is the idea of circumstantialism about the powers required for responsibility. Third, Vargas argues that an adequate theory of responsibility will be revisionist, or at odds with importantstrands of ordinary convictions about free will and moral responsibility. Building Better Beings provides a compelling and state-of-the-art defense of moral responsibility in the face of growing philosophical and scientific skepticism about free will and moral responsibility.

Author Biography

Manuel Vargas is Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of San Francisco. His principal areas of research include moral psychology, philosophy of action, philosophy of law and Latin American philosophy. He received his joint-PhD in Philosophy and Humanities from Stanford University. He is the co-author of Four Views on Free Will (Blackwell, 2007) with John Fischer, Robert Kane, and Derk Pereboom, and co-editor of Rational and Social Agency:On Themes in the Philosophy of Michael Bratman (OUP, forthcoming) with Gideon Yaffe.

Table of Contents

PART I. Building Blocks1: Folk Convictions2: Doubts About Libertarianism3: Nihilism and Revisionism4: Building a Better TheoryPART II. A Theory of Moral Responsibility5: The Primacy of Reasons6: Justifying the Practice7: Responsible Agency8: Blame and Desert9: History and Manipulation10: Some ConclusionsAppendix: Activity and Origination

Review

[W]ill appeal to both thos with interest in moral responsibility literature and to others with broader interests in moral concepts and conceptual revision ... Interested philosophers should pick up the book * Zac Cogley, Social Theory and Practice *
extraordinarily rich . . . Vargas has achieved something that is quite rare: he has given us an entirely new way to approach an ancient and, yes, seemingly intractable problem. * Tamler Sommers, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
Vargas sets out and defends a subtle and powerful view, according to which holding one another morally responsible is justified by the effects of our practices on cultivating moral agency. * Neil Levy, Philosophical Quarterly *
Recommended. * J. Hoffman, CHOICE *

Promotional

A compelling and state-of-the-art defense of moral responsibility

Prizes

Winner of Winner of the 2015 APA Book Prize.

Long Description

Building Better Beings presents a new theory of moral responsibility. Beginning with a discussion of ordinary convictions about responsibility and free will and their implications for a philosophical theory, Manuel Vargas argues that no theory can do justice to all the things we want from a theory of free will and moral responsibility. He goes on to show how we can nevertheless justify our responsibility practices and provide a normatively and
naturalistically adequate account of responsible agency, blame, and desert. Three ideas are central to Vargas' account: the agency cultivation model, circumstantialism about powers, and revisionism about
responsibility and free will. On Vargas' account, responsibility norms and practices are justified by their effects. In particular, the agency cultivation model holds that responsibility practices help mold us into creatures that respond to moral considerations. Moreover, the abilities that matter for responsibility and free will are not metaphysically prior features of agents in isolation from social contexts. Instead, they are functions of both agents and their normatively structured
contexts. This is the idea of circumstantialism about the powers required for responsibility. Third, Vargas argues that an adequate theory of responsibility will be revisionist, or at odds with important
strands of ordinary convictions about free will and moral responsibility. Building Better Beings provides a compelling and state-of-the-art defense of moral responsibility in the face of growing philosophical and scientific skepticism about free will and moral responsibility.

Review Quote

"Vargas has achieved something that is quite rare: he has given us an entirely new way to approach an ancient and, yes, seemingly intractable problem."--Tamler Sommers, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews "...will appeal to both thos with interest in moral responsibility literature and to others with broader interests in moral concepts and conceptual revision...Interested philosophers should pick up the book..." -- Social Theory and Practice "He does an admirable job of showing how his agency cultivation model is largely immune to the sorts of worries thought to plague other versions of the approach...anyone interested in the questions of whether and how praise and blame can be justified will want read this book and think seriously about its arguments." -- Journal of Moral Philosophy

Feature

An original and revisionist account of moral responsibility, by a leading expert in the field
Defends our ordinary, common-sense convictions about free will and agency
Draws on recent debates in social psychology, and illuminates the relationship between moral philosophy and legal practice

Details