Publisher Description

The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific hypothesis? What does it mean to say that a scientist or a theory explains a phenomenon? Should scientific theories that postulate "unobservable" entities such as electrons be construed realistically as aiming to correctly describe a world underlying what is directly observable, or should such theories beunderstood as aiming to correctly describe only the observable world? Distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein provides answers to each of these questions in essays written over aperiod of more than 40 years. The present volume brings together his important previously published essays, allowing the reader to confront some of the most basic and challenging issues in the philosophy of science, and to consider Achinstein's many influential contributions to the solution of these issues. He presents a theory of evidence that relates this concept to probability and explanation; a theory of explanation that relates this concept to an explaining act as well as to thedifferent ways in which explanations are to be evaluated; and an empirical defense of scientific realism that invokes both the concept of evidence and that of explanation.

Author Biography

Peter Achinstein is Jay and Jeanie Schottenstein University Professor of Philosophy at Yeshiva University, and Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Concepts of Science; Law and Explanation; The Nature of Explanation; Particles and Waves (1993 Lakatos Award winner); and The Book of Evidence.

Table of Contents

IntroductionPART I: EVIDENCE AND INDUCTION1. Concepts of Evidence2. Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence are (and ought to be) Ignored by Scientests3. The Grue Paradox4. The War on Induction5. Waves and the Scientific MethodPART 2: EXPLANATION6. An Illocutionary Theory of Explanation7. The Pragmatic Character of Explanation8. Can there be a Model of Explanation?9. Explanation vs. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?10. Function StatementsPART 3: REALISM, MOLECULES, AND ELECTRONS11. Is there a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism?12. Jean Perrin and Molecular Reality13. The Problem of Theoretical Terms14. What to do if you want to Defend a Theory you can't Prove: A Method of Physical Speculation15. Who Really Discovered the Electron?

Review

"Warmly recommended... It collects some of the best works of one of today's most significant thinkers on science." --International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group

Promotional

This volume brings Achinstein's important essays together allowing the reader to confront some of the most basic and challenging issues in the philosophy of science.

Long Description

The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific hypothesis? What does it mean to say that a scientist or a theory explains a phenomenon? Should scientific theories that postulate

Review Text

"Warmly recommended... It collects some of the best works of one of today's most significant thinkers on science." --International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group

Review Quote

"Warmly recommended... It collects some of the best works of one of today's most significant thinkers on science." --International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group

Feature

This book could serve as collateral reading in an introductory or more advanced course in philosophy of science
Selling point: This volume brings Achinstein's important essays together allowing the reader to confront some of the most basic and challenging issues in the philosophy of science.

Details