Publisher Description

Consciousness is a perennial source of mystification in the philosophy of mind - how can processes in the brain amount to conscious experiences? Robert Kirk uses the notion of "raw feeling" to bridge the intelligibility gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ourselves as subjects of experience. He argues that there is no need for recourse to dualism or private mental objects. The task is to understand how the truth about raw feeling could be "strictly implied" by narrowly physical truths. Kirk's explanation turns on an account of what it is to be a subject of conscious perceptual experience. He offers analyses of the problems of cnsciousness, and suggests novel solutions which, unlike their rivals, can be accepted without gritting one's teeth. His sustained defence of non-reductive physicalism shows that the reader need not abandon hope of finding a solution to the mind-body problem. Robert Kirk is the author of "Translation Determined".

Author Biography

Robert Kirk is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Department at the University of Nottingham, UK.

Table of Contents

Part 1 Raw feeling and the intelligibility gap: Anna; problems; the plot; relational accounts and the infinite regress objection; Jackson's defence of a relational analysis; states, processes and ontology; bundle theories; epiphenomenalism; behaviourism; a rough fix on raw feeling. Part 2 Is the notion sound: Wittgenstein and the inverted spectrum; does raw feeling fall foul of the private language argument?; anti-realism about sensation language; how we can know what others' raw feels are like; beetles in boxes and transformation; a brain in a vat; can raw feeling be "quined"?; eliminativism in general. Part 3 Strict implication and the Swiss cheese principle: the zombie idea; the two-stage creation scenario and the strict implication thesis; more on the strict implication thesis; absolute impossibility and the example of "gnarled"; what has to be done?; neurone replacement therapy - will it work?; the Swiss cheese principle; some general points about the nature of mental life; the core argument; Cartesian resistance; we may assume the strict implication thesis is true. Part 4 Perceptual information: pure stimulus-response systems; the basic package; the machine-table robot; the realistic construal of information being for the system; the GIANT; the richness of perceptual information; perceptual information and consciousness; help from connectionist models. Part 5 Conscious subjects: the stickleback; more on "directly active" information; how the stickeback's internal processes have characters for it; the stickleback as conscious subject; no further cognitive sophistication is required; language is not necessary; blindsight; why there coudn't be zombies; is consciousness all-or-nothing?; subjects of raw feeling. Part 6 The character of raw feeling; what seems to be the trouble; why the bald identity theory won't help; failure of the "inner sense" approach; the inverter operation; shoemaker's martians; a structure of contrasts; what determines which way round?; alternative vision; where does this leave functionalism. Part 7 The gap has been bridged: is there still a mystery?; the inverted spectrum strikes again - or does it?; the question of necessary connection; an impossible requirement; Nagel's challenge; the argument from knowledge; "facts beyond the reach of human concepts"; "the real nature of human experience"; a last look at the intelligibility gap.

Review

`Much of Raw Feeling is technical in character and impossible to do justice to in a brief review.'The Times Literary Supplement

Long Description

Consciousness is a perennial source of mystification in the philosophy of mind: how can processes in the brain amount to conscious experiences? Robert Kirk uses the notion of `raw feeling' to bridge the intelligibility gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ourselves as subjects of experience; he argues that there is no need for recourse to dualism or private mental objects. The task is to understand how the truth about raw
feeling could be strictly implied by narrowly physical truths. Kirk's explanation turns on an account of what it is to be a subject of conscious perceptual experience. He offers penetrating analyses of the problems of consciousness and suggests novel solutions which, unlike their rivals, can be
accepted without gritting one's teeth. His sustained defence of non-reductive physicalism shows that we need not abandon hope of finding a solution to the mind-body problem.

Review Text

`Much of Raw Feeling is technical in character and impossible to do justice to in a brief review.'
The Times Literary Supplement

Review Quote

Much of Raw Feeling is technical in character and impossible to do justice to in a brief review.

Feature

Penetrating new analysis of a perennial philosophical debate
Innovative approach to how we view ourselves in mind and body

Details