This is a facsimile reprint of an exceedingly difficult book to find.
From an Amazon review (https://www.amazon.com/March-1939-British-Guarantee-Continuity/dp/0198225326):
This is a wonderfully researched book (using British archives) on the subject of the British guarantee to Poland in 1939. Unfortunately, the book relies only on British archives. I wish that equally well researched books on the subject were available that relied on German, Polish and French archives (or even better, a comprehensive tome that included research from all of the available archival material from all concerned countries).
This book is well written, and is very readable. I commend the author for providing frequent references to the positions held by the persons of interest (and there are many). While the Preface could perhaps have been expanded to provide a bit more background as to the giving of the guarantee, I can appreciate that anyone taking up this book is probably already familiar with the background, and is looking for information. And this book is the place to start for those who have ever wondered about the British guarantee to Poland.
I have read several books on the casus belli of WWII, and the British guarantee to Poland in March 1939 always seems to come up as one of the pivotal events that eventually lead to WWII. Previous accounts I have read tended to suggest that: (i) Chamberlain gave the guarantee without much consultation with others within the government; and (ii) Britain somehow considered Poland to be strategically important to British interests. This book proves both accounts to be false. On count 1, Chamberlain was deeply involved with the Foreign Office and the Cabinet in making this decision. On count 2, Britain really didn't give a hoot about Poland per se, but only wanted to use her as an ally to stem German aggression in south east Europe (and in particular, to give Germany pause when considering whether to go after Rumania, which was an important source of oil, and a gateway to the Mediterranean (which could have disrupted Britain's access to a significant portion of her empire)). So from this standpoint (i.e., answering my two questions) the book was a success.
What comes across very clearly in this book is that: (i) Britain assumed that the German economic success in south east Europe was a threat to Britain's economy; (ii) Britain assumed that German political expansion into south east Europe was a threat to Britain's empire; (iii) Britain was certain that Germany had designs on conquering the world (or at least conquering all of Europe, including western Europe); and (iv) as a result, Britain intended early on (perhaps as early as September 1938) that a war with Germany was inevitable, made plans for war, and looked for ways to forestall the inevitable war (e.g., via the guarantee to Poland) until Britain could build a war machine to take on Germany. Where this book falls short is in never questioning how Britain arrived at these assumptions (esp. with respect to items i-iii, as just recited). It is perhaps beyond the scope of this book to question the bases for these assumptions (as well as the validity of the assumptions). Notwithstanding, the author might have at least provided some citations to support these assumptions. As it is, the author (being an apparent pro-Brit advocate) takes the assumptions on their face, and only questions them in the last 2 pages of the book.
What I also gleaned from this book is an astounding arrogance on the part of Britain following WWI. She somehow still believed that Britain was the pre-eminent global power, and that British dominance (both economic and political) over other countries was somehow morally superior to German economic and political designs. Britain defaulted on her loans to America in order to provide economic support to Turkey, and to build a war machine to take on the Third Reich. This book proves to me that Britain was a war-monger, and it was Britain who precipitated WWII. She used Poland as a tool to protect British interests by essentially imposing the March 1939 guarantee on Poland.
Chapter 9 of this book is pure dynamite, wherein the author provides all of the motivations (regardless of whether or not the fundamental underlying motives were valid - as indicated above), and the ostensible logic, for Britain giving the guarantee, The author also does not shy away from drawing conclusions as to the base motivations for Britain giving the guarantee.
It is unfortunate that the author (Simon Newman) did not pursue a career as a published historian. His method of raising critical questions, and providing exhaustive research in order to provide answers to those questions, could go a long way towards finally providing some level-headed answers to the casus belli of WWII. There are too many biased "histories" on this subject (everything from "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" by William Shirer to "The Bad War" by M.S. King), and it's about time that someone provided a comprehensive, well researched book on the subject. Simon Newman could have been (and perhaps, may still be) the one to do this. Alas, there is little profit (and thus, little motivation) for a historian to write a well researched, non-biased, historical account that argues against the populist view of events.