Wax Backing 3 3/4" X 2 1/4" INFANTRY LEG - Grunt - Embroidered Patch - So Dirty - So Nasty
The Civil War
The infantry, both North and South, was far from ready for war in 1861. There were but ten Union foot regiments, and they were largely in the West, scattered by companies over thousands of miles. Until assembled, which would take time, they could be counted on for very little. Many of the Regular officers, the core of any expansion, had served in the Mexican War fifteen years before, but few had commanded any sizable body of troops. Moreover, although a small number had kept abreast of world military developments after their services in Mexico, they were not in a position to dictate policy in Washington.
To add to the problems of the infantry early in the war, virtually no preparations had been made, apparently because statesmen hoped until the last minute that conflict could be averted. They believed that military adjustments would damage the chances of peaceful compromise. Thus, when war began, the foundations of what was to become a huge infantry establishment had to be commenced hastily and without real planning.
Since Congress was not in session, President Lincoln began the war buildup in May 1861 with a proclamation of doubtful constitutionality. On the strength of his executive authority, he summoned thirty-nine regiments of volunteer infantry and one of cavalry to serve for three years. His next step was to authorize an addition of eight infantry regiments to the Regular Army. Somehow a ninth got included. Thereafter, the nineteen regiments in being- the 1st through the 19th- were the whole of the Regular infantry during the war. So neglected a part of the whole establishment were these nineteen that they were never able to attain their full authorized strength.
Prior to issuing his call, the President consulted the War Department as to the best. organization for the new Regular units. The Secretary of War, being overburdened, turned the matter over to Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and loaned him three officers as technical advisors. The result was a recommendation in favor of the French structure. This included regiments of three battalions instead of one. Two battalions were supposed to take the field, the third to maintain a regimental depot for collecting and training recruits. Battalions of 800 men in eight companies were adopted as the most efficient fighting units because they were thought to be small enough to maneuver and to be controlled by the voice of the commanding officer, yet large enough to withstand attack by cavalry.
A battalion in the French system was the fighting unit, a regiment the unit of administration. The French felt that a regimental headquarters could administer more than one battalion, an arrangement which appealed to Americans because it eliminated some field officers and thus saved money. The new three-battalion organization, however, was not extended to the ten old regiments, which continued to comprise ten companies each, with regiment and battalion one and the same. The men in authority felt that there was no time to bother with reorganizing outfits already extant, when so many remained to be organized from scratch. Furthermore, the old, single-battalion regiment was hallowed by age and tradition. This meant that two different regimental organizations were tolerated in the Regular infantry, a dualism that might have caused much confusion had the Regular regiments loomed larger than they did in the whole infantry establishment.
The number of men in all Regular companies was raised at once to the maximum authorized by law, that is, 84 enlisted men in the first ten regiments and 97 in the other nine. Even so, the regiments never reached full strength because they could not compete with the volunteers for enlistments. By December 1861, some 30,000 Regular infantrymen were authorized, but barely 11,000 enlisted, while during the same period 640,000 volunteers entered the service. The third battalions of the 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, and 19th Infantry were never organized, and not all the companies were raised for the third battalions of the other four new regiments. In fact, the 11th, 12th, and 13th only imperfectly organized their second battalions. Each battalion of the new regiments designated its companies by letters beginning with A, so that, if fully raised, there were three A companies, three B companies, and so on in each regiment.
Since replacements came more slowly than losses to the Regular regiments, all of them grew smaller as the war continued. By July 1864, as an illustration, the 2d Infantry had shrunk to 7 officers and 38 enlisted men, who were, thereafter grouped into one company and assigned to guard duty. Moreover, by 1 November 1864 all the Regular outfits of the Army of the Potomac were so reduced that it was necessary to withdraw them from the field. Such shrinkage was, of course, not confined to the Regulars. The average strength of regimentsmost of which ought to have contained 1,046 officers and men-was as follows in the battles named:
Shiloh (6-7 April 1862) 560
Fair Oaks (31 May-1 June 1862) 650
Chancellorsville (1-5 May 1863) 530
Gettysburg (1-3 July 1863) 375
Chickamauga (19-20 September 1863) 440
Wilderness (5-7 May 1864) 440
The comments so far have referred mainly to Regulars, but this should not obscure the fact that most infantrymen were volunteers. These volunteers were members of regiments raised and officered by the several states. Initially President Lincoln called for thirty-nine such outfits, but before the war was over more than 1,700 volunteer regiments served. This was not far from one hundred times as many as there were units of Regulars. The three-battalion organization was not extended to the volunteers because the states, which raised them, were thought to be too much accustomed to the old system to change. As a result, the volunteer units, like the first ten Regular regiments, contained ten companies in one battalion.
These regiments were variously numbered and designated by the several states, but in practice came to be called merely the "8th Indiana" or the "45th New York." Although patterned after the old regiments in overall organization, the state regiments borrowed their company structure from the new, that is, they had ninety seven enlisted men, instead of eighty-four, plus one wagoner whom the Regulars did not have. As matters were arranged, therefore, there were three different regimental organizations in the infantry. The volunteer regiments aggregated 1,046 officers and men; the 1st through the 10th Infantry, 878; and the 11th through the 19th, 2,367. Actually the battalions of the latter ought to be .compared with the old regiments, since they were designed to act independently and approximated the size of the others. They contained a few more than 800 enlisted men.
Even though most of the volunteer infantrymen were raised and officered by the states, a few hundred units were not. Several types of volunteers were more directly linked to the United States than to any state, the earliest of these being two regiments of U.S. Sharpshooters (1st and 2d) organized in 1861. These two contained companies from several states, raised by the states. Their origin in more than one state was an uncommon attribute, but their real distinguishing feature was the manner in which they were officered. While the states appointed the company and field officers in ordinary volunteer units, the Federal government appointed them in the Sharpshooters and similar outfits.
The next type appeared when large-scale acceptance of Negro troops began in 1863. A number of battalions had started as state units, but with the exception of two Massachusetts regiments, all Negro outfits were finally mustered directly into Federal service, and were organized and officered under the authority of the United States and not of any particular state. Known at first as the Corps d'Afrique and by other names, these units came to be called U.S. Colored Troops by the spring of 1864. Indian regiments (1st-4th Indian Home Guards) were handled in the same way. In all, there were 138 regiments of Negro infantry and 4 of Indians. Except for these two races, diverse nationalities could and did intermingle in infantry units, although men of German, Irish, and Scandinavian extraction proudly associated together in exclusive regiments.
Yet another type of Federal volunteer emerged because casualties had reached such proportions that provision for the incapacitated, and replacements for them, had become critical problems. To solve these problems, the Invalid Corps was established in April 1863 and classed as infantry. It was composed of men who in the line of duty had become physically unfit for combat. Those who could handle a gun and make light marches were put in the 1st Battalion and were used for guard duty. The worse crippled formed the 2d Battalion and were used as nurses and cooks around hospitals. Six companies from the 1st Battalion and four from the 2d made up a regiment in the Corps after September 1863. In all, 24 regiments and 188 separate companies of invalids did duty, thus releasing able-bodied soldiers for combat service. In March 1864-because the Corps' abbreviation, "IC," was confused with "InspectedCondemned"-the name was changed to Veteran Reserve Corps.
Finally, in 1864 six infantry regiments of U.S. Volunteers (1st-6th) were recruited for service on the frontiers (not against the Confederacy) from Confederate prisoners of war. Then in 1865, nine infantry regiments of U.S. Veteran Volunteers (1st-9th) were raised directly by the United States. Although all types of United States volunteers made up only a small fraction of the foot troops who served for the Union, they merit attention because of the intimate relationship between them and the Federal government, and because of the lack of vital connection between them and any state. This relationship foreshadowed the National Army of the twentieth century.
The Confederate Army arranged infantry units pretty much as the Union did, except that all regiments contained ten companies. Authorized company strength was 64 privates minimum and 125 maximum. Around 642 infantry regiments served at some time or another, along with 9 legions, 163 separate battalions, and 62 unattached companies. Many of the Confederate units were the forbears of Army National Guard elements existing today.
In the heat of the conflict, no changes were made in regimental organization, despite the fact that it was soon recognized as unsuitable. Improved firearms forced regiments and their companies to disperse to such an extent that officers could not effectively exercise control over them. Once .a regiment deployed, it was too big for one man and his staff to control. This fact helped to cause a high casualty rate among general officers, since the only way they could influence an assault, or rally a broken line, was to place themselves where everyone in the command could see them. At such times the enemy's sharpshooters saw them equally well.
Years after the Civil War, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, who had commanded the Army of the Ohio under Sherman, said that the cumbersome regimental organization had only worked in the course of the war because the replacement system was faulty. What he meant was that the unwieldy regiments at the beginning of the conflict dwindled through casualties until they reached a size which a colonel and his staff could handle. The same attrition, of course, applied to the control of companies.
Companies were also unwieldy yet were. not reorganized. On the contrary, the promise of wide use of platoons, sections, and squads- a promise that may be detected in the infantry manuals of the 1850's- was not fulfilled during the war. As a result, notwithstanding the fact that the need was far greater, there were no more officers in an infantry company than there had been forty years before.
The reason why types of organization were retained that had been designed for use under different conditions stemmed from the great haste with which the armies were assembled in 1861. There was no time to make a wide canvass of professional soldiers, and those consulted were deceived by their belief that the conditions of the wars of Napoleon had not been radically modified. Few foresaw, and perhaps could not have foreseen, the full impact of the Minie ball upon warfare.
The keystone of the whole matter was the heightened firepower which the infantry had to face and which it could wield. The foot soldier's rifle musket, although a muzzle-loader, was vastly more effective than the weapons infantrymen had handled before 1855. It was accurate from 200 to 400 yards, and capable of killing at 800 to 1,000. Nor was it the only improved weapon. Scattered among the soldiers were many types of breech-loading repeating rifles which did great execution.
Except for being unwieldy, regiments and their components proved otherwise adaptable to wartime conditions. For example, heightened firepower more than ever before demanded skirmishers in front of the battle line. These the regimental organization was able to supply simply by assigning any of its companies to the duty. Likewise, regimental organization lent itself well to the attack formation which became characteristic of the Civil War. This was a succession of lines. Each line was composed of two ranks with a prescribed distance of thirty-two inches between them. Of course, the lines varied greatly in length and in the distance at which they followed each other. Some were as long as a whole brigade lined up in two ranks, others only as long as a company. If there was a usual length, it was that of a brigade, since attacks by divisions in column of brigades were most frequent. In any case, regiments as organized were easily utilized in that type of attack formation, as they were in others.
New means began to work during the Civil War to knit armies together and to speed their movements. For the first time, railroads were used extensively to move infantrymen to and from battle areas. This employment gave the foot soldier greater speed than he had in the past. In the field of communications, signal flags were first used. These enabled the parts of a force to keep contact with each other and to pass on information about the enemy. Newer still was the use of electricity, in the form of the telegraph, to link the components of a large force and to connect field elements with the Commander in Chief at Washington. The new modes of communication did not much improve the connection between units of the same army on the battlefield, but their indirect influence on the use of infantry was very great. The Signal Corps was constituted during the conflict to handle the new media of communication. Its service was great, but its relation to the infantry was only a tiny fragment of what it was to become in the future.
In conclusion it must be said that the Civil War occurred in one of those periods, common in history, when weapons outdistanced organization and tactics. It is true that deadly fire brought about modifications in the use of infantry, one of which was the use of a succession of lines in the assault, another the regular employment of temporary field works. But even after taking these into account, it .seems clear that the rifle musket was more modern than the organization of the infantry and the resultant formations used in the assault. Otherwise stated, organization and tactics were basically those of the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the weapons were fifty years more modern. This discrepancy between weapons and minor tactics accounts in part for the shocking destructiveness of the Civil War.
The Second World War
The coming of war resulted in the largest expansion of the infantry ever undertaken. During the three years, 1941-43, it increased 600 percent. Although this was 100 percent more than the field artillery, it fell far short of some of the newer arms, for example the antiaircraft artillery, which expanded 1,150 percent and later had to be cut back. In any case, before the conflict ended sixty-seven infantry divisions saw overseas service, plus one mountain and five airborne divisions, as well as a cavalry division which fought as infantry. Even the creation of armored divisions expanded the infantry, since they contained substantial foot components.
There were in all, at some time during the war, 317 regiments of infantry of various kinds. Among these were types unknown before the war, such as three mountain, twelve glider, and sixteen parachute infantry regiments. In addition there were 99 separate battalions, some of which were also very highly specialized.
Among the remarkable separate battalions were the 1st-6th Rangers. These were light infantry trained to slash deep into enemy-held territory in order to demoralize the foe in every way they could. Although the ranger battalions were not created by redesignating existing infantry outfits, and so not given any official history before the time of their constitution in 1942, they were nevertheless heirs to a very old and proud tradition. That tradition went further back than the American Revolution; indeed the rules drawn up by Robert Rogers in 1757 for his famous ranger companies that served for England in North America were reprinted for use in training the rangers of World War II.
The rangers were not the only infantry constituted to perform commando missions. A comparable unit was the 1st Special Service Force, established in July 1942. This force was designed to operate behind enemy lines when snow covered Europe. Accordingly, all its men were volunteers whose civilian aptitudes seemed to prepare them for swift operations in snow. Among them were lumberjacks, game wardens, forest rangers, and professional skiers. The 1st Special Service Force was remarkable also in another way; its personnel were drawn about equally from Canada and from the United States. It was an early experiment in international co-operation, and it worked well. After vigorous campaigning-but not much of it in snow-the unit was disbanded in January 1945 and most of its American personnel transferred to a new regiment, the 474th Infantry.
Still another commando-type outfit was the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), which was organized in October 1943. Its specialization was operation in Burma along the Ledo Road, and its personnel were drawn from men who knew jungle fighting. This unit was commanded by Brig. Gen. Frank D. Merrill and became very famous under the nickname of "Merrill's Marauders." Like the men of the ranger battalions and of the 1st Special Service Force, the Marauders were volunteers. At length, on 10 August 1944 the unit was reorganized and called the 475th Infantry.
Another type of specialized infantry was that intended to provide the foot elements of the new armored divisions. It was called "armored infantry." The first unit of this type in the United States Army came into being when the old 6th Infantry was reorganized as armored.on 15 July 1940. In addition to the 6th, certain regiments which had been on the inactive list since just after World War I were reactivated to become armored infantry. These were the 36th, 41st, 46th, 48th-52d, 54th-56th, 59th, and 62d Infantry. Most of the armored infantry regiments were broken up during World War II to form separate armored infantry battalions, but the 41st and 36th Armored Infantry-assigned to the 2d and 3d Armored Division, respectively-retained the regimental structure throughout the war.
Armored infantry differed very little from standard infantry, and Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, objected to its differing at all. The chief variance was that armored troops had enough organic vehicles to move all of their men at once. They shared this characteristic with motorized infantry (an element of motorized divisions), which came into existence in August 1940 and lasted only until July 1943. Unlike motorized, armored infantry had vehicles that could operate cross-country and that were lightly armored to repel small arms fire.
Several types of light infantry were also extensively tested. One was specialized for jungle action. This type, embodied in the regiments of the 71st Light Division, never had a chance to prove itself in combat. It had not shown to very good advantage in training; hence it was converted to standard infantry in the early summer of 1944. In consequence, it was the ordinary doughboy who, beginning in the fall of 1942, did the jungle fighting in the Southwest Pacific. Another specialized type was organized for use in mountains. It was embodied in the regiments of the 10th Mountain Division, which, unlike the jungle division, enjoyed a brief opportunity to practice its specialty. The 10th Division reached Italy late in 1944 and took part in the fight. Its arrival, however, did not preclude many other infantry outfits from having to fight in the mountains the best way they could.
The last of the nonstandard types of infantry units to be considered here was the most specialized. It included the foot soldiers who were trained and equipped to reach the combat zone by air and to assault from the air. Their primary mission was to land behind the enemy's main line of resistance and there employ commando tactics. This type, new in the United States, like armored infantry, was first organized in 1940. As with armored, General McNair objected in the beginning to so high a degree of specialization, but by 1942 acknowledged the need for airborne troops.
Some foot troops that assaulted from the air were dropped behind the enemy's line by parachute. Numbers above 500 were reserved for the designation of paratroops. Thus the lowest numbered paratroop infantry regiment was the 501st Parachute Infantry. In addition, there was a second type of airborne foot troops, called "glider infantry." According to the doctrine, these landed by glider in the airheads cleared by the paratroops to reinforce the latter and to widen the assault upon the rear of the foe. The numerical designations for glider units were drawn from the whole range of numbers below 500. This was the result of an effort to perpetuate earlier history, as in the case of the 88th Glider Infantry, which descended from the 88th Infantry of World War I. Likewise, the 325th-328th Glider Infantry were redesignated from the infantry regiments of the same numbers which had made up the 82d Division in World War I. The same was true of the 401st Glider Infantry of the 101st Division. Both the 82d and the 101st Divisions became airborne on 15 August 1942.
The World War II infantry also included a few units that were made up of Americans of different racial or ethnic extraction. There was ample precedent-for such outfits. Indian.and Negro infantry regiments were the oldest, but Puerto Rican and Filipino units came close behind. Added to these during the war were several separate battalions, the most conspicuous of which was the 100th Infantry Battalion because it contained soldiers of an enemy race. Its men were American-born Japanese. The 100th Battalion was organized in June 1942, and two years later was absorbed as one of the battalions of a Japanese-American regiment designated the 442d Infantry.
Another unit of this type was the 99th Infantry Battalion, which was made up of Norwegian-Americans and marked for use in Scandinavia. Although the 99th did not get to the Scandinavian Peninsula until the Germans there had surrendered, it did distinguish itself in the fighting in Europe. Finally, early in 1945, when its use as a separate battalion seemed to be over, it was made one of the battalions of a newly organized regiment designated the 474th. The latter was a remarkable hybrid. It contained many men from the disbanded 1st Special Service Force, some from the 1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions, as well as the entire 99th Battalion. Another hybrid was the 473d Infantry. Also created early in 1945, it absorbed no groups of nationals but rather the veterans of four antiaircraft battalions coupled with the headquarters of an armored group.
Early in the war, the organization of scores of new units proceeded along the lines laid down in the reorganization of 1939. The National Guard, however, entered Federal service in square combinations and retained them until directed to triangularize during the first four months of 1942. As in World War I, the reorganization of the National Guard for Federal service wrecked many old outfits and associations. For example, in each of the square divisions one whole regiment of infantry had to be cut away and broken up or associated elsewhere.
In spite of the wrench it gave the National Guard, triangularization brought with it important benefits. Not the least of these was a very simple tactical doctrine which had the advantage of being applicable to the use of units of any size from squad up to division. This doctrine was developed and well established by the time the National Guard was triangularized. Its essence was that one of the three elements of every level, say one regiment, should, in the assault, fix the enemy in position; a second was to maneuver around him, once fixed, in order to strike a decisive blow; while the third element acted as a reserve. This doctrine gave great flexibility to American infantry.
During the five years before Pearl Harbor, the position of the doughboy's champion, the Chief of Infantry, weakened. The Chief himself felt that his office was being bypassed in important matters, while the Chief of Staff inclined more and more to the opinion that all of the heads of combat arms fostered schisms within the Army. In any case, during the grand revision of the late thirties, the General Staff, more often than not, overruled the recommendations of the Chief of Infantry. Moreover, the latter had less control over his branch than he thought necessary. For example, in the revamping of the infantry division, his responsibility was held to the preparation of tables of organization and equipment for brigades and below. The end came in the spring of 1942 when the top command was completely reorganized. In that great realigning the Chief of Infantry, together with the other chiefs of combat arms, was eliminated. Thereafter, the problems of the infantry were considered by special branches of the newly created Army Ground Forces.
General McNair became Commanding General of the new organization. He had been chief of staff of the provisional division that had tested triangularization in 1937, and he believed in the basic principles of the revision that had resulted. Foremost among these was pooling. Its natural corollary was to keep all units lean, because, when extraordinary needs arose, those units could draw from the pools maintained at the next higher level. Another of the important principles embraced by McNair was that which gave the best of men and equipment to the offensive portions of units, and cut the other segments to a minimum. The application of these austere principles was sharpened by the urgent need to conserve shipping space; McNair, therefore, caused infantry organization to be finely combed for excess personnel and equipment.
A general revision of the tables of organization and equipment (TOE'S) took place in the spring of 1942. For the most part, McNair's principles prevailed, but he was unable to prevent two significant changes in a contrary direction. The first of these was the substitution of headquarters companies for detachments in all battalions. In spite of this alteration the total strength of a battalion dropped by sixteen, the cut occurring in the rifle companies and in heavy weapons. The second change brought a new company, the cannon company, into the regiment. In it were at last to be found the accompanying cannon that officers had been seeking since World War I. As first equipped, the new cannon company contained six self-propelled 75-mm. howitzers and two selfpropelled 105's. It added 123 men to each regiment, but since the other regimental companies were cut at the same time, a regiment was actually enlarged by only 23 men. The TOE's of 1 April 1942 moved automatic rifles for the last, time. These weapons, which were proving themselves more and more valuable, went back to the rifle squad where they had been placed prior to February 1940. They had gone into a separate squad at the insistence of the Chief of Infantry, and they returned to the rifle squad when that office was eliminated.
The pinch for shipping space continued so great that the War Department requested cuts in the April tables. Accordingly, a Reduction Board was established in November 1942. Before its recommendations were approved, General McNair strove to reduce the infantry regiment by 400 men, a slice which he believed could be made without diminishing the number of front-line riflemen to any great extent. His proposal was made into a new TOE published on 1 March 1943. The chief casualty was the cannon company, which was eliminated altogether; its howitzers were put into headquarters company. This arrangement was shortlived, since the final work of the board resulted in a cut of only 216 which, when finally approved, was embodied in tables dated 15 July 1943. Most of the 216 came from administrative elements and from heavy weapons. The cannon company was back, but this time with towed howitzers. The sharpest reduction in arms that accompanied the drop in personnel fell upon BAR's. These were eliminated from every echelon except the rifle squad, where there was one per squad. This change removed very little automatic rifle fire from the firing line, but it did reduce the number of BAR's in a regiment from 189 to 81 (there being 81 rifle squads in a regiment).
If a regiment lost any firepower by the cut in automatic rifles, it made it up by the addition of twenty-five .50-caliber machine guns plus one hundred and twelve new 2.36-inch rocket launchers, nicknamed "bazookas." The bazookas, which had splendid attributes for antitank and antipillbox use, were extra weapons; that is, no specific men were designated to operate them. In consequence, each regiment made its own organizational modification to use the new arm. Later the orphan situation of rocket launchers was officially corrected.
Bazookas and .50-caliber machine guns fitted into General McNair's theory of antitank and antiaircraft defense for infantry regiments. He held that such defense should center on weapons which individual infantrymen, not crews, could operate. Once again, he did not win out 100 percent, for he failed to eliminate either the towed antitank guns from the armament of regiments or the mine platoon from antitank companies: There were, however, changes in the antitank guns: their caliber was increased from 37-mm. to 57-mm., while the number of guns in the regiment dropped from twenty-four to eighteen. Half of the remaining guns were in the regimental antitank company, the other half divided evenly (three each) among the battalions. Considering the mine platoon as strictly defensive, General McNair strove to eliminate it altogether. Accordingly, it did not find a place in the TOE of 26 May 1943; but was back on 15 July, thirty-one strong.
Removal of tanks from the infantry and the creation of an armored force in 1940 had left unsolved problems in the relationship of foot soldiers to tanks. The principle of pooling took care of the association of tanks with infantry units, for tank elements were simply attached in the quantities needed. This, however, did not help to determine how much infantry ought to be organic to armored divisions. Since these divisions, as first set up, did not include enough foot soldiers, General McNair created pools of separate armored infantry battalions (AIB's) from which the divisions could draw. Later his solution was scrapped, and in the TOE of 15 September 1943 the proportion of organic infantry to armor doubled. In consequence, all but one of the separate AIB's were inactivated.
Each of the studies of infantry organization, made in the first three years of the war, had to take vehicles into account. The number of motors allowed to units was closely related to the shipping space then available. Shortage of shipping was one of the factors which caused the elimination of motorized infantry in the summer of 1943, since the planners felt that more economical means of moving standard infantry by motor were at hand. The first such means was to attach truck outfits to the infantry for specific movements. This method remained standard until divisions developed the field expedient of piling their doughboys onto their tanks, tank destroyers, and howitzers.
All these complications were faced by Army Ground Forces during the year from October 1942 to October 1943, and the organization developed for infantry in that year persisted for the duration of the war in Europe with only minor changes. However, when redeployment to the Pacific area became necessary, Ground Forces once more examined the tables of organization and equipment. This time three factors were decisive in the appraisal. The first one was the wealth of combat experience accumulated in Europe; the second, that the scarcity of shipping space had eased; and the third, the death of General McNair. These new factors resulted in a general enlargement of infantry units.
The new tables were dated 1 June 1945. They carried the implication that the earlier arrangements had been too lean for greatest efficiency. For example, they increased the total strength of an infantry regiment from 3,256 to 3,697, and added weapons and vehicles. Most of the increase took place in rifle companies, which jumped from 193 to 242 men. Indeed, two new sections were added to them, both in the weapons platoons. The first one, called an assault section, was based on the 2.36-inch bazooka (the number of which increased to six per rifle company). With this change, rocket launchers ceased to be orphans. They became the principal weapons of the men in the new section. The other, a special weapons section,. employed a revolutionary type of new arm, the 57-mm. recoilless rifle.
Further use of the recoilless technique occurred at battalion level. Here a 75-mm. rifle was added to the armament, and a gun platoon was created in the heavy weapons company to operate it. The two new types of recoilless guns, which combined the effect of artillery with the mobility of soldier-carried arms, gave an unheard of weight of fire to the infantry.
Yet another remarkable change related to the infantry regiment's artillery. All towed guns were at last eliminated from the regiment. The 57's of the regimental antitank company gave place to tanks which mounted 90-mm. guns, while those in battalions went out with the antitank platoons. The cannon company became in effect a tank unit equipped with heavy tanks mounting 105-mm. howitzers. The pieces of the antitank and the cannon companies, mounted as they were on tanks, were much more mobile than their predecessors, and they threw much more metal.
The organization established in June 1945, slightly modified from time to time, was the one that governed to the end of the conflict. There was, however, one development which went forward apart from the tables of organization. This was an ever widening use of regimental combat teams (RCT's). An RCT was a grouping of combat units around an infantry regiment in order to accomplish a special mission. A typical combat team contained a regiment of infantry, a battalion of 105-mm. artillery, a company of combat engineers, a medical collecting company, and a signal detachment. But, because its very essence was flexibility, any element needed to accomplish the special mission might be attached. RCT's proved of great value in adapting organization to all types of terrain and conditions of combat. They remained, however, temporary arrangements without official history or lineage, and were discontinued when their special mission had been accomplished.
Before concluding the discussion of infantry organization during World War II, it remains to record a few generalizations relating to the use of infantry in that war. First, it is clear that no earlier conflict had sent American infantrymen into so many different parts of the world. Although specialized units were at first created to fight in extreme zones, mountain, jungle, and arctic foot soldiers carried, in fact, a very small part of the fighting in extreme climates and terrain. As a result, the standard doughboy took over the job.
The doctrine of fixing the enemy, maneuvering to strike him in flank or rear, all the while holding an element in reserve to exploit an ad- vantage or cover a retreat, applied in all terrains. Naturally the details of using it varied with geography. Thus in Normandy the hedgerows obliged the infantry to work out a team play with tanks and engineers. Likewise, in the jungles of the Southwest Pacific, the coral atolls of the Central Pacific, the desert of North Africa, and the mountains of Italy, it was necessary to develop the exact means by which the doctrine was applied. But in all cases it required closer-than-ever co-operation with the other arms.
Furthermore, never before had the doughboys been required to use so bewildering a complex of weapons. Perhaps the most confusing of the latter to adjust to was the greatly enlarged class of defensive weapons, which included land mines and boobytraps. These insidious manglers complicated an infantryman's task and introduced a new type of terror into his campaigning. He dared no longer even trust the ground, which had always been his close ally. As a result, it was necessary to learn not only to detect and disarm the enemy's mines and traps, but to lay some effectively for his own protection. Also, he had to learn to use demolition charges and often to improvise them out of materials at hand.
To add to the confusion, types of grenades (hand and rifle) were multiplied. What is more, their use vastly increased. Whether the enemy lurked in rocks or in dense vegetation, grenades helped to root him out. To supplement them in the business of dislodging the foe from strong positions, new weapons developed. The most notable of these, not already mentioned, was a flame thrower which, carried by foot soldiers or mounted on tanks, did terrible execution.
Tank and air enthusiasts, observing the Nazi blitzkrieg, had jumped to the conclusion that infantry could be used only to hold ground taken by armor or by air bombardment. This did not prove to be the case. Although foot soldiers, more than ever before, had to learn to co-operate with tanks and with planes, this did not spare them from having to be in the forefront of almost all important assaults. In short, while they could not advance against the enemy without the aid of tanks, artillery, and air, neither could those arms gain ground or destroy the enemy's will to fight without the aid of the infantry. What was required was not a reshuffling of the importance of the several branches, but the development of better techniques by means of which they could work together. Such techniques were far from perfect when the conflict came to an end.
Battlefield communication continued its trend-which stretched back to the Civil War-toward improvement. For the first time there was radio communication between the elements of a company. By the end of World War II eight radios were included in the rifle company's equipment. Radios and telephones knit companies tighter together, but by no means made them act as one man. Dispersion to avoid the deadly effects of enemy fire threw, squads, or fractions of squads, on their own in combat, particularly in dense foliage, in the mountains, and in night operations. This put a heavier-than-ever burden on the ingenuity of squad and platoon leaders, and even on the individual doughboy.
Probably the most important technique to come out of the war had to do with landing an attacking force on hostile shores. The doctrine for such operations had been in the process of development by the U.S. Marine Corps since the 1920's. Marine theory worked well, but it required the assistance of special amphibious equipment ,which was not developed until war had commenced. Indeed, in the early landings in 1942, landing forces were obliged to use the vessels that were ready at hand. Gradually, however, landing craft were developed, such as LCI's, LST's, LCT's, amphibious tanks, and DUKW's. In the greatest amphibious operations of World War II, these craft were as essential to success as the weapons of the infantry.
Whether in landing actions, in airborne assaults, or in advances of a traditional type, infantry was better prepared than in the past to fight on a circular perimeter. This was true because of the many supporting mortars, machine guns, and rocket launchers, made organic to infantry units, which enabled them to throw fire quickly in all directions. Thus, the tendency was to be less sensitive about the flanks than in earlier wars, and to push forward with slighter concern for the progress of the units to the right and to the left.
During World War II new terrains, new climates, strange weapons, and unfamiliar peoples acted upon American infantrymen. These destroyed thousands of men, put a lifelong mark on others, and changed somewhat the techniques of fighting on foot; nevertheless, in spite of everything, the basic characteristics of the infantry hardly shifted. Foot soldiers continued to be the only carriers of weapons who, in theory, were never exhausted, could always go another mile, and who could be counted upon to move across any terrain in every quarter of the globe.
Two gold color crossed muskets, vintage 1795 Springfield musket (Model 1795 Musket), 3/4 inch in height.
Branch plaque
The plaque design has the branch insignia, letters and border in gold. The background is light blue.
Regimental insignia
Personnel assigned to the Infantry branch affiliate with a specific regiment and wear the insignia of the affiliated regiment.
Regimental coat of arms
There is no standard infantry regimental flag to represent all of the infantry regiments. Each regiment of infantry has its own coat of arms which appears on the breast of a displayed eagle. The background of all the infantry regimental flags is flag blue with yellow fringe.
Branch colors
Light blue – 65014 cloth; 67120 yarn; PMS 5415.
The Infantry has made two complete cycles between white and light blue. During the Revolutionary War, white facings were prescribed for the Infantry. White was the color used for Infantry until 1851 at which time light or Saxony blue was prescribed for the pompon and for the trimming on Infantry horse furniture. In 1857, the color was prescribed as light or sky blue. In 1886, the linings of capes and trouser stripes were prescribed to be white. However, in 1902, the light blue was prescribed again. In 1917, the cape was still lined with light blue but the Infantry trouser stripes were of white as were the chevrons for enlisted men. The infantry color is light blue; however, infantry regimental flags and guidons have been National Flag blue since 1835. White is used as a secondary color on the guidons for letters, numbers, and insignia.
Birthday
14 June 1775. The Infantry is the oldest branch in the Army. Ten companies of riflemen were authorized by the Continental Congress Resolve of 14 June 1775. However, the oldest Regular Army Infantry Regiment, the 3d Infantry, was constituted on 3 June 1784 as the First American Regiment.