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TITLE: Crisis Incident Management Compilation, 410 pages (slides)

SLIDE TOPICS, SUBTOPICS and CONTENTS:

Introduction to ICS
Developed as part of the National Emergency Services Curriculum Project
FIVE PRIMARY I.C.S. MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
UNITY AND CHAIN OF COMMAND
INCIDENT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION
REASONS TO TRANSFER COMMAND
A MORE QUALIFIED PERSON ASSUMES COMMAND
A JURISDICTIONAL OR AGENCY CHANGE IN COMMAND IS LEGALLY REQUIRED OR MAKES GOOD MANAGEMENT SENSE
PERSONNEL TURNOVER ON LONG INCIDENTS
ICS ORGANIZATION
GENERAL GUIDELINE: DO NOT COMBINE ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS. ONE PERSON MAY SUPERVISE MORE THAN ONE UNIT
MANAGING AN INCIDENT USING UNIFIED COMMAND
UNDER UNIFIED COMMAND THERE WILL ALWAYS BE:
ONE INCIDENT COMMAND POST
A SINGLE COORDINATED INCIDENT ACTION PLAN
ONE OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF (OFFICER IN CHARGE, SUPERVISOR, ETC.)
SPAN OF CONTROL
OPTIMUM SPAN OF CONTROL IS ONE TO FIVE
IN ICS COMMON TERMINOLOGY IS APPLIED TO:
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS
POSITION TITLES
RESOURCES
FACILITIES
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY IS MAINTAINED THROUGH:
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY IS MAINTAINED THROUGH:
ICS INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
FREQUENCY AND RESOURCE USE PLANNING
INFORMATION TRANSFER PROCEDURES
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED
COMMAND NET
TACTICAL NETS
SUPPORT NET
GROUND-TO-AIR
AIR-TO-AIR
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN I.C.S.
USING TASK FORCES AND STRIKE TEAMS:
MAXIMIZES EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES
REDUCES SPAN OF CONTROL
REDUCES COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC
RESOURCE STATUS CONDITIONS IN I.C.S.
WRITTEN ACTION PLANS ARE IMPORTANT WHEN:
THE INCIDENT WILL OVERLAP AN OPERATIONAL PERIOD CHANGE
TWO OR MORE JURISDICTIONS ARE INVOLVED
SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVATION OF THE I.C.S. ORGANIZATION
QUESTIONS



























































































































































































































































Module 14 Major Incident Management
Problems in major and complex incident management

Major incident management organizations
Module 14 Objectives:
1. List the principal factors often found in, or related to, major and/or complex incidents.

2. List the expansion options for incident organization, and describe the conditions under which they will be applied.

3. Demonstrate, through an exercise, how to apply the various options related to major or complex incident management.

Characteristics of Major Incidents
Involve more than one agency (often many)

May involve more than one political jurisdiction.

Have the more complex management and communication
problems.

Require more experienced, qualified supervisory personnel.

Require large numbers of tactical and support resources.

Cause more injury, death, illness.
Characteristics of Major Incidents (cont.)
Produce the most damage to property and the environment.

Have extreme elements of crisis/psychological trauma that diminishes human capacity to function.

Are longer in duration.

Are the most costly to control and mitigate.

Require extensive mitigation, recovery and rehabilitation.

Have greater media interest.
Incidents can become major in two ways:
Characteristics of Major Incidents:
All of the Command and General Staff positions are filled, a large organization is in place or is developing.

Most or all of the functional organizational units within sections are needed.

Divisions/groups are established to geographically facilitate making work assignments.
Characteristics of Major Incidents (cont.)
The number of Divisions may be such that Operations Section Branches are needed to reduce span of control.

Multiple operational periods are probably required.

There will be a transition to a more qualified Incident Commander and the most qualified personnel will be used throughout the organization.

Other agencies or jurisdictions will be assisting.
Characteristics of Major Incidents (cont.)
Written action plans will be required.

Operations personnel may exceed several hundred per operational period.

Costs associated with maintaining the incident are high.
Factors in Determining Size of ICS Organization
Administrative and jurisdictional complexity.

Geographical area involved.

Span of control considerations. This includes span of control in Operations as well as all other organizational elements.

Functional specialties required.

Incident logistical, planning, and other support needs.

Potential for growth.

Example Division (Wildland Fire Model)
3 Hand Crew Strike Teams 108
1 Bulldozer Strike Team 6
1 Engine Strike Team 16 Total Personnel 130
Large Incident Management ICS Organizational Options
Incident Complex - Multiple incident management with a single ICS organization.

Dividing a single incident into two (or more) incidents

Expanding the ICS planning capability for incidents.

Expanding the ICS organization to accommodate a second Operations or Logistics Section.
Three Fires Managed as a Complex
Examples for the Use of an Incident Complex
An earthquake, tornado, flood, etc., situation where there are many separate incidents occurring close together.

Several separate fires are burning in close proximity to one another.

One incident is underway with an ICS management team assigned, and other smaller incidents occur in the same proximity.
Considerations for the Use of a Complex
A complex may be managed under a single or unified command.

The incidents are close enough to be managed by the same incident management team.

Some staff and/or logistical support economies could be achieved through a combined management approach.


Guideline in Establishing an Incident Complex:
Establish each of the separate
incidents within an Incident
Complex as branches of a
single incident.
Dividing a Single Incident into Two Incidents
Steps in Dividing an Incident
Reach a decision on how to divide the Incident.
Consider:
-Terrain and access considerations
-Locations of future resource and logistical support
-Jurisdictional/administrative boundaries
-Current Operations Section structure (branches, divisions, etc.)

Select Incident Commanders and the Command and General Staff for each incident.

Steps in Dividing an Incident (cont.)
Designate supporting organization facilities, locations, etc.

Designate time for establishing two separate incidents with individual names.

Direct the two incident management organizations to coordinate strategy and critical resources.

An Area Command could normally be established.
Expanding the ICS Planning Capability
Two ways:
Branch tactical planning
Advanced incident planning
Branch Level Tactical Planning
Major or complex incident.

Widely varied objectives exist

Plan preparation and distribution can not be done within available time.
Branch Tactical Planning
General incident objectives
Specific strategy for the branch for the next operational period
Branch resource summary for the next operational period.
Weather and safety information as appropriate.
Any changes to logistical support.
Personnel to support planning as required.
Options for Accomplishing Advance Incident Planning:
Assign a Deputy Planning Chief the advance planning function.

Assign a Technical Specialist(s) to perform the function.

Establish a special unit within the Planning Section to handle advance planning.
Advanced Planning Considerations at an Incident
Overall goal and incident objectives

Previous and present operational period plan adequacy

Future agency and mutual-aid resource availability

Strategy assessment and alternatives

Environmental factors (terrain, weather, etc.)

Organizational assessment and alternatives

Political issues

Economic issues

Long-term recovery/rehabilitation needs


Example #1
Example #2

Major Steps in Adding a Second Operations Section to an Existing ICS Organization:
Ensure Command and General Staff functions can adequately support the expansion. This could require establishing a Deputy Incident Commander for Operations.

Ensure that adequate incident action planning can be accomplished.
Major Steps in Adding a Second Operations Section to an Existing ICS Organization:
Ensure that Logistics, Facilities, and Communications are adequate to support the additional section.

Establish the second Operations Section at the beginning of an operational period.

Ensure that all incident supervisory personnel are aware of the expanded organization.
Example #2

Major Steps in Adding Another Logistics Section to an Existing ICS Organization:
Ensure Command and General Staff functions can adequately support the expansion. This may require designating a Deputy Incident Commander for Logistics.

Ensure that adequate incident action planning can be accomplished.


Major Steps in Adding Another Logistics Section to an Existing ICS Organization:
Establish the second Logistics Section at the beginning of an operational period.

Ensure that all incident supervisory personnel are aware of the expanded organization.


Module 15 Area Command
Description of Area Command.
Differences between Area Command, Multi-agency Coordination, and EOCs.
Establishing Area Command.
General responsibilities.
Position Responsibilities and checklists.
Area Command exercise.
Module 15 Objectives
1. Define Area Command.

2. Identify differences between area command, unified command, multiagency coordination systems and emergency operations centers.

3. List the principal advantages of using area command or unified area command.
Module 15 Objectives (cont.)
4. Describe how, when, and where Area Command would be established.

5. Describe the Area Command organization.

6. Identify six primary functional responsibilities of Area Command.

7. Working with a simulated scenario, develop an Area Command organization.
For the Small Group Exercise Area Command Teams will:
Develop an Area Command organization.

Determine Area Command staffing requirements.

Describe Area Command facility and support needs.

Develop statement of agency policy to be given to Incident Commanders.

Establish resource priorities.

Establish Area Command supplemental resource needs.

Develop questions to ask the Agency Executive.
Definition of Area Command
Oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being handled by an Incident Command System organization;

or

To oversee the management of a very large incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams assigned to it.
Incident Command System
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan.
Incident Command System
The management system used to direct all operations at the incident scene. The Incident Commander (IC) is located on scene at an Incident Command Post (ICP) at the incident scene.
Unified Command
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan.
Area Command (Unified Area Command)
Established as necessary to provide command authority and coordination for two or more incidents in close proximity. Area Command works directly with Incident Commanders. Area Command becomes Unified Area Command when incidents are multijurisdictional. Area Command may be established at an EOC facility or at some other location other than an incident ICP.
Multiagency Coordination Systems (MACS)
An activity or a formal system used to coordinate resources and support between agencies or jurisdictions. A MAC Group functions within the MACS. MACS interact with agencies or jurisdictions not with incidents. MACS are useful for regional situations. A MACS can be established at a jurisdictional EOC or at a separate facility.
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)
Also called Expanded Dispatch, Emergency Command and Control Centers, etc. EOC’s are used in varying ways at all levels of government and within private industry to provide coordination, direction and control during emergencies. EOC facilities can be used to house Area Command and MACS activities as determined by agency or jurisdiction policy.
Differences Between MAC Groups and Area Command
-Expansion of the off-site coordination and support system.
-Members are agency administrators or designees from the agencies involved or heavily committed to the incident
-Organization generally consists of the MAC Group (agency administrations), MAC Group Coordinator, and an intelligence and information support staff.
-Is the agency administrator or designee.
-Allocate and reallocate critical resources through the dispatch system by setting incident priorities.
-Make coordinated agency administrator level decisions on issues that affect multiple agencies.

Area Command Responsibilities
Set overall agency incident-related priorities.

Allocate critical resources based on priorities.

Ensure that incidents are properly managed.

Ensure that incident(s) objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or with agency policy.
Chain of Command and Reporting Relationships
Agency
Administrator
Area Command
Where?
How?
When?
Why?
Reasons to Use Area Command
Much of the inter-incident coordination normally required of each IC will be accomplished at the Area Command level allowing incident management teams to focus attention on assigned incidents.

Area Command sets priorities and allocates critical resources.

Area Command helps the Agency executive by ensuring that agency policies, priorities, constraints, and guidance are being made known to the respective Incident Commanders.

Area Command also reduces the workload of the Agency Executive, especially if there are multiple incidents going on at the same time.
When Should Area Command be Established?
Early and When:

Several active incidents are in close proximity.

Critical human or property values are at risk due to incidents.

Incidents will continue into the next operational period.

Incidents are using similar and limited critical resources.

Difficulties are encountered with inter-incident resource allocation and coordination.
Area Command:
Is established by Agency Executive.
Is given written delegated authority.
Has best qualified, experienced personnel.
Is patterned after ICS Command/General Staff.
Operates under same principles as ICS.
Organization should be kept small.
Area Command Organization
Area
Commander
Example of Technical Specialists at an Area Command
Aviation Specialist

Hazardous Materials Specialist

Environmental Specialist

Communications Specialist
Criteria for Establishing an Area Command Facility
Close to incidents (but not an ICP).
Sufficient Size (for staff, displays, and conferences).
Capable of continuous operation.
Adequate communications facilities (telephones, FAX, computer connections).
Criteria for Establishing an Area Command Facility (cont.)
Availability of backup power.
Capable of supporting radio communications to incidents and agency offices.
Adequate and secure parking.
Near sources of food and lodging.
Communications Considerations
Adequate telephone trunks
More telephone service can be added
Rooftop antennas can be installed
Line of sight to incidents or repeaters
Primary Functions of an Area Command
Provide agency or jurisdictional authority for assigned incidents.

Ensure a clear understanding of agency expectations, intentions, and constraints.

Establish critical resource use priorities between various incidents.
Primary Functions of an Area Command (cont.)
Ensure that incident management team personnel assignments and organizations are appropriate.

Maintain contact with officials in charge, other agencies and groups.

Coordinate the demobilization or reassignment of resources between assigned incidents.
Providing Management Authority Over Incidents (Checklist)
General situation

Incidents assigned

Jurisdictional delegation of authority

Assumption of command timing and notifications procedure

Names and qualifications of assigned Incident Commanders
Providing Management Authority Over Incidents (Checklist)
Incidents operating under Unified Command

Limitations on the Area Commander’s authority over Incident Commanders (should be in the delegation of authority)

Incident Action Plans available

Policies, political factors, or other constraints

Agency advisor assigned

Area Command facility designated
Providing Management Authority Over Incidents (Checklist)
Status of communications systems to incidents and agency/jurisdictional headquarters

Critical resource designations

Policy and expectations for interaction with the media

Area Command reporting responsibility to agency

Schedules for required briefings, and contacts
Area Commander Responsibility
Set overall objectives

Establish priorities

Allocate/reallocate critical resources
Area Command Considerations
Area Command is usually established to support incidents which are already underway.

Objectives, strategies, and Incident Action Plans should already be in place.

Area Commander must rapidly assess each incident and ensure the incident action planning is addressing the priorities and direction set by the Agency Executive.
Area Command Considerations
Area Commander should establish, in writing, priorities related to incidents. This information should be part of the delegation of authority from the Agency Executive.

Area Commander should develop procedures to be followed.
Area Command Procedures Should Include:
Incident and agency/jurisdictional priorities

Priorities for assignments of critical resources

Schedules of meetings and briefings

Reports and Incident Action Plans

Points of contact with Agency Executives

Media relations and contact procedures

Unusual situation or emergency procedures reporting

Demobilization procedures
Agenda for Area Command Meeting with Incident Commanders
Obtain concise individual incident briefings.

Explain the role and responsibilities of an Area Commander.

Review policy and direction received from Agency Executive.

Resolve any conflicts.

Review appropriate procedures as outlined above.

Open for questions.

Collect available Incident Action Plans and other essential documentation.
Establish Priorities Among Various Incidents Based on Incident Needs and Agency Policy and Direction
Priorities among incidents (often related to the life and property values at risk)

Priorities related to allocating critically needed resources

Priorities related to demobilization
The Management Team Must be Appropriate for the Incidents
Recommend/make appropriate important personnel changes and moves only as necessary.

Ensure that appropriate incident organization activation's have been made.

Determine if temporary flight restrictions are adequate or need revision.
Coordinating Services Done by Area Command
Between Agency/Jurisdictional Executives and Incident Commanders

Between Area Command, Incidents, and assisting and cooperating agencies

Between the media and the incidents
Coordinate the Demobilization of Assigned Incidents
Establish procedures with incidents and agency dispatch centers on demobilization.

Determine demobilization priorities and procedure for handling critical resources.

Provide incidents with a list of critical resources and instructions for clearing releases with Area Command.

Incidents must provide Area Command with copies of demobilization schedules.
Module 16 Objectives
1. Describe the kinds of incident management problems that can occur due to a lack of multiagency coordination.

2. Define essential terms related to multiagency coordination.

3. Identify the levels at which multiagency coordination is commonly accomplished.

4. Identify essential differences between Unified Command, Area command, Multi-agency coordination and Emergency Operations Centers.
Module 16 Objectives (cont.)
5. Identify the primary components of a Multi-agency Coordination System.

6. List the responsibilities of a Multi-agency Coordination Group.

7. Identify the major guidelines for establishing and using Multi-agency Coordination Groups and Systems.

8. Identify principal positions within a Multi-agency Coordination System.
Multi-agency Coordination
Problems necessitating improved Multi-agency Coordination

Examples of Multi-agency Coordination

Terminology and relationships

Defining an intergovernmental Multi-agency Coordination System

Multi-agency Coordination Groups

Guidelines for establishing MACS and MAC Groups.

Primary function responsibilities associated with MACS

Sample position descriptions for a MACS organization

A MACS development exercise.
Past Problems Related to Effective Interagency Coordination
Different Policies and procedures among agencies.

Lack of a common interagency organizational structure.

Lack of a process for coordinated and collocated incident planning between agencies.

Lack of interagency communications including systems, frequencies, and use agreements.
Past Problems Related to Effective Interagency Coordination (cont.)
Differences in terminology for personnel, for assignments, and resources.

Lack of valid, timely, and complete information from all available sources.

Unfamiliarity with other agency’s methods of operation, skills and qualifications, and resource capabilities.

Little previous interagency training.
Problems of Today
Ever increasing response costs which affect, among other things, the use of mutual aid.

High property losses associated with many incidents.

Life, health, and safety issues of responders and citizens.

Often a deteriorating public view of government effectiveness.

Intense media scrutiny.
Multi-agency Coordination is Currently Done
A. At the scene of the incident(s).

B. At an Area Command.

C. At a jurisdiction’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

D. At an interjurisdictional or regional level.

E. At state and federal levels.

F. Internationally
EOC’s are often Used at Various Organizational Levels
State
EOC
Example of the Jurisdictions Involved in Multi-agency Search
A national Park

County A

County B

A coastal area

A State Recreation Area
Agencies Involved in Wide Area Search
National Park Service

County A - Fire and rescue

County B - Sheriff’s Search and Rescue

Coast Guard

State Parks Department

State National Guard

Volunteer groups

Private landowners and/or industry
Types of MACS
MACS could be as simple as a teleconference

OR

It may require an assembled group and associated support systems
Incident Command System
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan.
A Multi-agency Coordination System (MACS) will Consist of:
Jurisdictional/Agency Representatives

Facilities

Equipment

Procedures

Information Systems

Communications Systems
Primary Functions of a MACS
Incident priority determination

Critical resource use priorities

Communications systems integration

Information coordination

Intergovernmental decision coordination
Establishing a MACS will Depend on:
Goals and desires of the agencies

Established working relationships

Desired benefits
MACS Can Include:
Pre-emergency administrative systems and controls

Emergency response systems and procedures

or simply be:

An agreement to operate within an interagency mutual aid agreement
MACS Size and Complexity
Determined by its mission; may be quite simple or quite complex
Activate MACS
When an emergency situation:
Threatens,
Significantly impacts the agency, or
Involves other agencies
When pre-established threat levels are reached.
Activating a MACS assists agency dispatch centers in the following ways:
Assist in making key decisions on the use of critical resources.

Establish priorities between incidents.

Coordinating interagency policies and procedures.
Guidelines for Activating MACS
With pre-established guidelines (recommended)

Joint powers agreements, memorandums of understanding can be used for areas which experience frequent or reoccurring emergencies.

Without pre-established guidelines (not recommended)

When resource requests exceed availability.

When there is an obvious interagency need to coordinate that is not being met.
Who can Activate MACS
For agencies within a single political subdivision:

Jurisdiction Chief Executive Officer

For multiple political subdivisions:

Consensus of involved jurisdictions
MACS Locations
At a jurisdictional EOC

At a regional facility

At a state or federal facility

Wherever it is needed
Multi-agency Coordination Groups
MAC Groups are the people that make the MACS function.

Representatives are authorized to commit agency resources and funds.
MAC Group Organization
MAC Group
Agency
Representatives
MACS Information Flow
MAC Group Established to Aid in Interjurisdiction Coordination
Regional
MAC
Group
Differences Between MAC Groups and Area Command
-Expansion of the off-site coordination and support system.
-Members are agency administrators or designees from the agencies involved or heavily committed to the incident
-Organization generally consists of the MAC Group (agency administrations), MAC Group Coordinator, and an intelligence and information support staff.
-Is the agency administrator or designee.
-Allocate and reallocate critical resources through the dispatch system by setting incident priorities.
-Make coordinated agency administrator level decisions on issues that affect multiple agencies.

Principal MAC Group Functions
Situation assessment

Critical resources acquisition and allocation

Local, state, and federal disaster coordination

Coordination with agency/jurisdiction political establishments

Coordination of summary information related to multi-agency/ multi-jurisdiction response efforts

Incident priority determination
Criteria for Determining Incident Priorities
Life threatening situations

Real property threatened

High damage potential

Incident complexity

Environmental impact

Other criteria as established by the MAC Group
ICS as the EOC or MACS Model
Five primary functions of ICS are appropriate at EOCs.

Duplication of terminology could create confusion.

Example:
EOC Incident Commander
Incident Incident Commander
Best to vary the position titles to avoid confusion.

EOC sub-functions should be based on the operational need.
Module 17 ICS For Executives
Role of the executive

The Incident Command System

Definitions of ICS Components

Alternative command and coordination structures related to ICS

Executive responsibilities
Module 17 Objectives:
1. Define the role of an Executive related to the Incident Command system.

2. Describe the various ways ICS can be applied.

3. Describe the basic organization of ICS and know the functional responsibilities of the Command and General Staffs.

4. Have basic familiarity with ICS terminology.
Module 17 Objectives: (cont.)
5. Understand the differences between on-incident ICS organizations and activities, and activities accomplished by Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), Area Commands, and Multi-agency Coordination Systems (MACS).

6. Describe the three major responsibilities of an Executive as related to an incident.

7. Explain the administrative, logistical, financial, and reporting implications related to large incident operations.
Incidents/Events that can Utilize the Incident Command System
Fires, hazardous materials, and multi-casualty incidents.

Single and multi-agency law enforcement incidents.

Multi-jurisdiction and multi-agency disaster responses.

Search and rescue missions.

Oil spill response and recovery incidents.

Air, rail, water, or ground transportation accidents.

Planned events, e.g., celebrations, parades, concerts.

Private sector emergency management programs.
In ICS, common terminology is applied to:
Organizational elements

Position titles

Resources

Facilities
The Incident Action Plan
Is required on all incidents
May be oral or written
Issues of Concern to the Executive:
What are the implications of an incident to my organization and to myself?

How do I maintain control when incidents occur?

Where do I fit in the incident management process?
The Executive Provides the Following to the Incident Commander
Policy

Mission

Direction

Authority
The Executive is generally NOT at the incident
Primary office of the agency.

A jurisdictional Emergency Operations Center.

A multi-agency Coordination Group as either a functional agency representative, or representing a political subdivision in a regional situation.
Major Management Activities of the Incident Command System
Command
Has overall responsibility at the incident or event. Sets objectives and priorities based on agency direction.

Operations
Develops the tactical organization and directs all resources to carry out the Incident Action Plan.

Planning
Develops the Incident Action Plan to accomplish the objectives. Collects and evaluates information, and maintains status of assigned resources.
Major Management Activities of the Incident Command System
Logistics
Provides resources and all other services needed to support the incident.

Finance/Administration
Monitors costs related to the incident. Provides accounting, procurement, time recording, cost analyses, and overall fiscal guidance.
The Incident Command System Major Organization Elements
1. Organization elements are activated as needed.
Incident Command and Command Staff
Incident Commander

Incident Command and Command Staff
Incident Commander
Incident Command and Command Staff
Incident Commander
Incident Command and General Staff
Incident Command System
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan.
Unified Command
Unified Command is the process, in a multi-agency incident, of establishing a common set of objectives and strategies without losing agency authority, responsibility, or accountability.
Characteristics of a Unified Command
Two or more agencies share jurisdictional responsibility.

One collocated Incident Command Post.

Consensus on one set of Incident Objectives.

One Incident Action Plan.

Incident Action Plan is implemented by the Operations Section Chief.
Three Fires Managed as a Complex
The Area Command Organization
Area Commander
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)
An EOC is a pre-designated facility established by a political subdivision or an agency to coordinate the overall response and support to an emergency.
Lines of Authority at an EOC
Political Authority

EOC Director

Department Managers

On-scene Incident Commanders

Assigned Resources
Multi-agency Coordination Systems (MACS)
Established to ensure effective interagency and/or regional coordination.

Jurisdiction representatives at the MACS are called MAC Groups.

In political subdivisions (i.e., cities, counties) EOCs may perform intra-area MACS coordination functions.
MACS Established to Aid in Interjurisdiction Coordination
Steps to Accomplish Incident Objectives
Agency policy, direction, and support

Incident objectives

Strategy(s) to achieve objectives

Tactical direction
Steps to Accomplish Incident Objectives
Designation of tactics appropriate to the strategy

Selection of resources appropriate for the tactics

Assignment of resources

Performance monitoring
Major Responsibilities of the Executive:
Clearly state agency/jurisdiction policy.

Evaluate effectiveness and correct deficiencies.

Support a multi-agency approach.
Executive - Delegation of Authority Should Cover:
Legal and policy restraints and/or freedoms

Limitations on authority

Political and social concerns

Environmental issues

Cost considerations
Executive - Incident Commander briefing should cover:
The general situation.

Current jurisdictional authority over the incident(s).

Executive’s goals, priorities, and expectations.

Policies, political factors, or other constraints.

Status of communications systems.

Policy on interacting with the media.

Schedules for required briefings and meetings.
Evaluating Incident Commander Effectiveness
Understand agency policy and direction.

Be proactive.

Have a good match between objectives and strategies.

Staff the organization to meet the workloads.

Monitor span of control and adapt as necessary.
Evaluating Incident Commander Effectiveness (cont.)
Utilize deputies when appropriate.

Integrate other agency personnel in appropriate ICS locations.

Focus on organizational effectiveness.

Delegate authority to Command and General Staffs.

Identify problem areas and work to overcome them.
Evaluating Incident Commander Effectiveness in a Unified Command Situation
Should be located at the ICP and working with other agency ICs.

Knows agency policy and priorities; translates these into acceptable objectives.

Identifies policy differences between groups involved and works cooperatively to resolve them.

Actively participates in the planning process working toward a single Incident Action Plan.
Ways to Promote Multi-agency Involvement
Conducts/supports planning conferences and agreements

Involvement of other personnel

Promoting the use of Unified Command

Joint training

Incident evaluations
Additional ICS Documentation
Module 1 - ICS Orientation (self-paced study)

History of ICS

ICS Glossary

Curriculum Syllabus and/or Syllabus Summary
SSEP PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
SSEP PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
STEP 4: The SSEP Program POC will initiate Needs Assessment to:
Identify current levels of criminal activity
Identify current security and emergency preparedness activities
Complete the Security Baseline Planning Worksheet
Complete the Emergency Preparedness Assessment Worksheet
Develop SSEP Program Objectives
Develop SSEP Program Supporting Activities

STEP 5: The SSEP Program POC and VAP Committee will prepare a list of action items and a milestone schedule to address activities required to support SSEP Program Objectives

STEP 6: The SSEP Program POC will track implementation status and issue quarterly reports to the Executive Director.


Security Baseline Planning Worksheet
Emergency Preparedness Assessment Worksheet
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
To ensure SSEP Program development, [NAME OF TRANSIT AGENCY] will take the following actions:

Establish an SSEP Program Planning Team
Analyze Capabilities and Hazards
Perform Vulnerability Assessment
Develop List of Action Items and Milestone Schedule
Document Activities and Procedures
PLANNING TEAM
We will establish an SSEP PROGRAM PLANNING
TEAM. We will recruit representatives from throughout
the agency, because:

It encourages participation and gets more people invested in the process.
It increases the amount of time and energy participants are able to give.
It enhances the visibility and stature of the planning process.
It provides for a broad perspective on the issues.

We will begin with our VAP Committee, and expand membership (if necessary) to make sure we include:

Supervisors; drivers; volunteers and contractors; dispatchers; human resources; maintenance; safety and risk management; finance; marketing/community relations; and legal
PLANNING TEAM
The Executive Director will be a member of the SEPP PROGRAM PLANNING TEAM, which will be headed by the agency’s SSEP Program Point of Contact (POC).

The Executive Director will prepare a memorandum authorizing the PLANNING TEAM, and providing sufficient resources to support its activities.

The SSEP PROGRAM PLANNING TEAM will provide an open invitation to all local public safety agencies to participate in meetings.

Team members will actively seek public safety personnel review of relevant planning areas, such as security procedures and emergency scene management.

The TEAM will make a formal presentation regarding its SSEP PROGRAM PLAN to its community public safety agencies, and will request the initiation of annual drilling and exercising activities with local responders.
SAMPLE VAP COMMITTEE AGENDA


I. Status of the SSEP Program Plan

II. “Proactive” Items for Discussion
· Assess the agency’s current capabilities regarding security and
emergency preparedness program
· Look for new ways and means to improve security and emergency
preparedness
· Determine compliance with security and emergency responsibilities
· Identify organizational issues that may contribute to security
incidents or hinder effective emergency coordination and response
· Promote security awareness

III. “Reactive” Items for Discussion
· Review incidents to determine why they occurred
· Debrief incidents, emergencies, drills and training to identify “lessons
learned” and means of improvement
· Determine what measures should be taken to follow-up on incidents,
events, drills and training

IV. SSEP Program Action Items

VAP WORKSHEET
VAP WORKSHEET
VAP WORKSHEET
ANALYZE CAPABILITIES
The SSEP PROGEAM PLANNING TEAM will initiate activities to determine our agency’s current level of preparedness. We will:

1. Review Internal Plans and Policies, including the following:

Vehicle Safety Program Plan
Rulebook
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
Facility and Vehicle Evacuation Plans
Fire protection plan
Safety and health program
Environmental policies
Security procedures
Insurance programs
Finance and purchasing procedures
Employee manuals
Hazardous materials plan
Risk management plan
Capital improvement program
Mutual aid agreements

ANALYZE CAPABILITIES
2. Meet with Outside Groups, including the following:

Community emergency management office
Mayor or Community Administrator's office
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)
Fire Department
Police Department
Emergency Medical Services organizations
Local Planning Commission
Major Clients (hospitals, retirement homes, etc.)

We will discuss our current procedures, ask for any ideas or suggestions these groups may have regarding our procedures, as well as their primary concerns regarding response to an incident at our agency, or a response to a community emergency involving support from our agency.

ANALYZE CAPABILITIES
3. Identify Codes and Regulations, including:

Occupational safety and health regulations
Environmental regulations
Fire codes
Seismic safety codes
Transportation regulations
Zoning regulations
Agency policies

4. Identify Internal Resources and Capabilities that could be needed in an emergency, including the following:

Personnel
Equipment
Facilities
Organizational capabilities
Backup systems

ANALYZE CAPABILITIES
5. Identify External Resources, including the following:

Local emergency management office
Fire Department
Hazardous materials response organization
Emergency medical services
Hospitals
Local and State police
Community service organizations
Utilities
Contractors
Suppliers of emergency equipment
Insurance carriers

NOTE: There are many external resources that could be needed in an emergency. In some cases, formal agreements may be necessary to define the agency's relationship with them.

6. Perform an Insurance Review, including
Meeting with insurance carriers to review all policies and coverage levels.

Results from these activities will be summarized in minutes prepared for SSEP PROGRAM PLANNING TEAM meetings.

TRAINING AND EXERCISING
TRAINING AND EXERCISING

TRANSIT AGENCY will formulate SSEP Program Training and Exercising (T&E) Plan:

Determine Needs
Outline Plan
Set Goals
Evaluate Current Efforts
Assess Training Staff
Identify Additional Resources
Write Action Plan
TRAINING AND EXERCISING
Issues to consider:
In-house Staff
Local Law Enforcement
Contractors
RTAP Video Library
ODOT
FTA
Other
TRAINING AND EXERCISING
Adult Learning Methods for Transit Training
Demonstrations
Structured/Facilitated Discussions
Behavior Modeling
Brainstorming
Role Playing
Simulations
Lecture
Reading Assignments
TRAINING AND EXERCISING
Opportunities for SSEP Program training:
Organizational Development
Professional Development
New-Hire Driver Skill Training
Driver Skill Retraining:
Mechanic Skill Training
Safety Training
Passenger Relations Training
COORDINATION WITH LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS
Public Safety Response
Public Safety Response
Public Safety Response
Managing the emergency scene – initiating ICS functions as needed
Expanding response to unified command with State and Federal resources (if needed)
Demobilization – as control is restored
Returning the scene to “normal”
Clean-up
Incident debriefings and “after action reports”
TA Support Functions
Evacuation (transportation and identification)
Specialized transportation for mobility-impaired citizens away from scene
Transportation and shelter for emergency response response personnel
Transportation of supplies
Support of road blocks and perimeter control
Weather monitoring and route planning
Specialized equipment
Trained personnel
Communications
REQUIRED COORDINATION
Who’s participating?
Contact information?
Jurisdictional control and authority?
How is the response effort expanded?
Chain of command and control?
Transit point of contact and location?
Equipment and resources available?
Training?
Meetings?


MOUs with Local Responders
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) serve as the basis of mutual acknowledgment of the resources that each agency will provide during response and recovery efforts. These agreements:

Sometimes support Mutual Aid Pacts between two or more local jurisdictions.
May accompany formal, written mutual-aid agreements
May remain as oral agreements
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Vulnerability Assessment is a process for identifying and evaluating those areas of transit operations, facilities, and vehicles that are most susceptible to criminal events and the consequences of natural disasters and other emergency situations. Vulnerability Assessment support the need of transit management in four key areas:

Asset valuation and judgment about consequence of loss. What assets must the transit agency protect? How should these assets be valued – both to the transit agency and a potential adversary? What is the impact if these assets are lost -- on passengers, employees, public safety organizations, the general public and the transit operation?

Identification and characterization of the threats to specific assets. What are the threats to the system? How can these threats be described and quantified in terms that support management decision-making activity?

Identification and characterization of the vulnerability of specific assets. What vulnerabilities -- or weaknesses in the security posture of the asset -- exist that could be exploited? Can the transit operator make design or operational changes to reduce risk levels by altering the nature of the asset itself?

Identification of countermeasures, costs, and tradeoffs. What different countermeasures are available to protect an asset? What is the varying cost or effectiveness of alternative measures? In many cases, there is a point beyond which adding countermeasures will raise costs without appreciably enhancing the protection afforded

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
Asset Definition
Classify Assets
List the Threats
Classify Threats
Vulnerability Analysis
Document Results
ASSET DEFINITION PROCESS
Review Submissions to the Public Transportation Facilities and Equipment Management System (PTMS)
Interview Stakeholders
Review Inventories and Financial Reports
On-site “Walk-throughs”

At the conclusion of this process, [NAME OF TRANSIT AGENY] will prepare a list that prioritizes identified assets by their value.





ASSET CRITICALITY
Identification of Assets

Critical assets, and the essential elements that are associated with them, must be identified and assessed as to their importance. Critical assets include people, activities/operations, information, facilities, and equipment. Assets for a bus system may include bus terminals, buses, bus stops/shelters, maintenance and fuel storage facilities, command control center, and revenue collection facilities. Critical assets are determined primarily through inventories, interviews with asset managers, using structured interview guides, and data reviews – all in an effort to identify those system elements essential for the provision of service and protection of passengers, employees and emergency responders.

Identify Asset Criticality

Asset criticality refers to an assessment performed to determine which public transportation assets have the most impact on people (passengers and employees) and the system (ability to maintain service). This assessment makes it possible to identify those assets that are most important to the transit system, and therefore must be protected. In general, critical assets for bus systems include bus terminals, bus vehicles, and fuel storage facilities.

CLASSIFY ASSETS
VITAL– Loss Would be Catastrophic

IMPORTANT – Loss Would Prove Seriously Disruptive

SECONDARY – Loss Would Prove Relatively Insignificant

AT THE CONCLUSION OT THIS ACTIVITY, [NAME OF TRANSIT AGENCY] WILL PREPARE MATRICES WHICH SHOW CLASSIFIED ASSETS.

SAMPLE MATRIX
LIST THE THREATS
Identify Threats to Critical Assets

This step requires the identification of specific threats from criminal activity and emergency events to critical transit assets, where threat is defined as any real or potential condition that can cause injury or death to passengers or employees or damage to or loss of critical assets. Threats are identified using both historical (trend) analysis of all attacks committed against public transportation targets and surveys of transit professionals. Many transit agencies conduct a thorough review of incident reports to identify past threats, including type of incident, location of incident, and final disposition of incident.

LIST THE THREATS
CRIMINAL

Part I and Part II
Crimes:
Burglary & Robbery
Larceny & Arson
Assault & Theft
Bribery & Extortion
Vandalism
Drug / Alcohol Abuse

Terrorism & Sabotage

SPECIAL ISSUES:
Workplace Violence
Crimes against Drivers
Crimes against Passengers





CLASSIFY THREATS
PROBABILITY OF OCCURANCE
*Probable: Expect Event to Occur

*Possible: Circumstances Expected for that Event

*Unlikely: Possible But Unlikely

SEVERITY OF OCCURANCE
*Devastating: Disastrous Event

*Moderate: Survivable

*Insignificant: Relatively Inconsequential

PREPARE MATRICES WHICH DOCUMENT THREAT CLASSIFICATION.

SCENARIOS
Develop Threat Scenarios

In this step, the critical assets and the key threats are paired into scenarios to focus analytical activities. This activity provides for a representative a range of CRIMINAL AND EMERGENCY EVENTS, and allows for detailed analysis concerning the likely impacts of threats on critical assets. Some threats can be easily assessed; while others (such as hostage situations, sabotage, or terrorism) require a more detailed evaluation.

Examples of scenarios include the following:

Disgruntled former employee storms into administrative office with shotgun and takes transit staff hostage

Bomb threat is phoned into dispatch which states that caller has placed a bomb on one of the agency’s 15 buses, set to detonate in 30 minutes

Local chemical plant experience major chemical spill, requiring evacuation of downtown

SCENARIOS
To complete the vulnerability assessment, the scenarios must be investigated by the PLANNING TEAM. The costs and impacts of these scenarios for the critical assets are then specified using a standard risk level matrix, which supports the organization of consequences into categories of HIGH, SERIOUS, MEDIUM, and LOW (see matrix below).

Consequences are assessed both in terms of severity of impact and probability of loss for a given threat scenario. Scenarios with vulnerabilities identified as HIGH and SERIOUS may require further investigation. Scenario-based analysis is not an exact science but rather an illustrative tool – demonstrating potential consequences associated with low-probability/high-impact events. To determine the agency’s actual need for additional counter-measures, and to provide the rationale for allocating resources to these counter-measures, the PLANNING TEAM must use the scenarios to pin-point the vulnerable elements of the critical assets and make evaluations concerning the adequacy of current levels of protection.


SCENARIOS
OUTCOMES
The PLANNING TEAM will use the results of the scenario analysis to determine HOW WELL HAVE WE IMPLEMENTED PROCESSES FOR:

Establishing partnerships in advance so the event can be IDENTIFIED, PREVENTED, OR MANAGED with minimum loss to the community
Conducting individual and joint evaluations of risk factors
Identifying what functions are critical to our operations, and understanding those essential functions for public safety agencies
Developing joint emergency plans and procedures that address how community resources can be identified and shared to respond to disasters.
Facilitating resumption and recovery after an incident has been stabilized
Developing training exercises and understanding the value of exercising emergency plans
Incorporating mitigation throughout the entire process and recognizing its significance in preventing a major incident and reducing its potential impact

SAMPLE OUTCOME FOR SECURITY
ACTION ITEMS
PLANNING TEAM will assemble priority activities that must be performed – based on the VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

MANAGEMENT will review and approve the action item list and milestone schedule

Based on RESULTS, SSEP Program POC will initiate tracking and reporting
COUNTERMEASURES
PHYSICAL PROTECTION
PRINCIPLES
DETERRENCE
RAISED SECURITY PROFILE

Controlled Access
Increased Uniformed Presence
Visible Technical Systems
Barriers to Assets
Audited Measures & Procedures
DETECTION
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

Alarms
Security Guards
CCTV
Alert, Committed Drivers and Passengers
DELAY
LAYERS OF PROTECTION TO TARGET

Perimeter Fencing & Checkpoints
Security Personnel
“Channeled” Access
Vehicle Checks
Personnel Checks
RESPONSE
PLANNED IN ADVANCE

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
Communication and Coordination
Alarms
Security Guards
Police and Emergency Services
Effective Security Management
Introduction to ICS
Developed as part of the National Emergency Services Curriculum Project
FIVE PRIMARY I.C.S. MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
UNITY AND CHAIN OF COMMAND
INCIDENT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION
REASONS TO TRANSFER COMMAND
A MORE QUALIFIED PERSON ASSUMES COMMAND
A JURISDICTIONAL OR AGENCY CHANGE IN COMMAND IS LEGALLY REQUIRED OR MAKES GOOD MANAGEMENT SENSE
PERSONNEL TURNOVER ON LONG INCIDENTS
ICS ORGANIZATION
GENERAL GUIDELINE: DO NOT COMBINE ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS. ONE PERSON MAY SUPERVISE MORE THAN ONE UNIT
MANAGING AN INCIDENT USING UNIFIED COMMAND
UNDER UNIFIED COMMAND THERE WILL ALWAYS BE:
ONE INCIDENT COMMAND POST
A SINGLE COORDINATED INCIDENT ACTION PLAN
ONE OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF (OFFICER IN CHARGE, SUPERVISOR, ETC.)
SPAN OF CONTROL
OPTIMUM SPAN OF CONTROL IS ONE TO FIVE
IN ICS COMMON TERMINOLOGY IS APPLIED TO:
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS
POSITION TITLES
RESOURCES
FACILITIES
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY IS MAINTAINED THROUGH:
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY IS MAINTAINED THROUGH:
ICS INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
FREQUENCY AND RESOURCE USE PLANNING
INFORMATION TRANSFER PROCEDURES
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED
COMMAND NET
TACTICAL NETS
SUPPORT NET
GROUND-TO-AIR
AIR-TO-AIR
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN I.C.S.
USING TASK FORCES AND STRIKE TEAMS:
MAXIMIZES EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES
REDUCES SPAN OF CONTROL
REDUCES COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC
RESOURCE STATUS CONDITIONS IN I.C.S.
WRITTEN ACTION PLANS ARE IMPORTANT WHEN:
THE INCIDENT WILL OVERLAP AN OPERATIONAL PERIOD CHANGE
TWO OR MORE JURISDICTIONS ARE INVOLVED
SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVATION OF THE I.C.S. ORGANIZATION
QUESTIONS



























































































































































































































































Module 14 Major Incident Management
Problems in major and complex incident management

Major incident management organizations
Module 14 Objectives:
1. List the principal factors often found in, or related to, major and/or complex incidents.

2. List the expansion options for incident organization, and describe the conditions under which they will be applied.

3. Demonstrate, through an exercise, how to apply the various options related to major or complex incident management.

Characteristics of Major Incidents
Involve more than one agency (often many)

May involve more than one political jurisdiction.

Have the more complex management and communication
problems.

Require more experienced, qualified supervisory personnel.

Require large numbers of tactical and support resources.

Cause more injury, death, illness.
Characteristics of Major Incidents (cont.)
Produce the most damage to property and the environment.

Have extreme elements of crisis/psychological trauma that diminishes human capacity to function.

Are longer in duration.

Are the most costly to control and mitigate.

Require extensive mitigation, recovery and rehabilitation.

Have greater media interest.
Incidents can become major in two ways:
Characteristics of Major Incidents:
All of the Command and General Staff positions are filled, a large organization is in place or is developing.

Most or all of the functional organizational units within sections are needed.

Divisions/groups are established to geographically facilitate making work assignments.
Characteristics of Major Incidents (cont.)
The number of Divisions may be such that Operations Section Branches are needed to reduce span of control.

Multiple operational periods are probably required.

There will be a transition to a more qualified Incident Commander and the most qualified personnel will be used throughout the organization.

Other agencies or jurisdictions will be assisting.
Characteristics of Major Incidents (cont.)
Written action plans will be required.

Operations personnel may exceed several hundred per operational period.

Costs associated with maintaining the incident are high.
Factors in Determining Size of ICS Organization
Administrative and jurisdictional complexity.

Geographical area involved.

Span of control considerations. This includes span of control in Operations as well as all other organizational elements.

Functional specialties required.

Incident logistical, planning, and other support needs.

Potential for growth.

Example Division (Wildland Fire Model)
3 Hand Crew Strike Teams 108
1 Bulldozer Strike Team 6
1 Engine Strike Team 16 Total Personnel 130
Large Incident Management ICS Organizational Options
Incident Complex - Multiple incident management with a single ICS organization.

Dividing a single incident into two (or more) incidents

Expanding the ICS planning capability for incidents.

Expanding the ICS organization to accommodate a second Operations or Logistics Section.
Three Fires Managed as a Complex
Examples for the Use of an Incident Complex
An earthquake, tornado, flood, etc., situation where there are many separate incidents occurring close together.

Several separate fires are burning in close proximity to one another.

One incident is underway with an ICS management team assigned, and other smaller incidents occur in the same proximity.
Considerations for the Use of a Complex
A complex may be managed under a single or unified command.

The incidents are close enough to be managed by the same incident management team.

Some staff and/or logistical support economies could be achieved through a combined management approach.


Guideline in Establishing an Incident Complex:
Establish each of the separate
incidents within an Incident
Complex as branches of a
single incident.
Dividing a Single Incident into Two Incidents
Steps in Dividing an Incident
Reach a decision on how to divide the Incident.
Consider:
-Terrain and access considerations
-Locations of future resource and logistical support
-Jurisdictional/administrative boundaries
-Current Operations Section structure (branches, divisions, etc.)

Select Incident Commanders and the Command and General Staff for each incident.

Steps in Dividing an Incident (cont.)
Designate supporting organization facilities, locations, etc.

Designate time for establishing two separate incidents with individual names.

Direct the two incident management organizations to coordinate strategy and critical resources.

An Area Command could normally be established.
Expanding the ICS Planning Capability
Two ways:
Branch tactical planning
Advanced incident planning
Branch Level Tactical Planning
Major or complex incident.

Widely varied objectives exist

Plan preparation and distribution can not be done within available time.
Branch Tactical Planning
General incident objectives
Specific strategy for the branch for the next operational period
Branch resource summary for the next operational period.
Weather and safety information as appropriate.
Any changes to logistical support.
Personnel to support planning as required.
Options for Accomplishing Advance Incident Planning:
Assign a Deputy Planning Chief the advance planning function.

Assign a Technical Specialist(s) to perform the function.

Establish a special unit within the Planning Section to handle advance planning.
Advanced Planning Considerations at an Incident
Overall goal and incident objectives

Previous and present operational period plan adequacy

Future agency and mutual-aid resource availability

Strategy assessment and alternatives

Environmental factors (terrain, weather, etc.)

Organizational assessment and alternatives

Political issues

Economic issues

Long-term recovery/rehabilitation needs


Example #1
Example #2

Major Steps in Adding a Second Operations Section to an Existing ICS Organization:
Ensure Command and General Staff functions can adequately support the expansion. This could require establishing a Deputy Incident Commander for Operations.

Ensure that adequate incident action planning can be accomplished.
Major Steps in Adding a Second Operations Section to an Existing ICS Organization:
Ensure that Logistics, Facilities, and Communications are adequate to support the additional section.

Establish the second Operations Section at the beginning of an operational period.

Ensure that all incident supervisory personnel are aware of the expanded organization.
Example #2

Major Steps in Adding Another Logistics Section to an Existing ICS Organization:
Ensure Command and General Staff functions can adequately support the expansion. This may require designating a Deputy Incident Commander for Logistics.

Ensure that adequate incident action planning can be accomplished.


Major Steps in Adding Another Logistics Section to an Existing ICS Organization:
Establish the second Logistics Section at the beginning of an operational period.

Ensure that all incident supervisory personnel are aware of the expanded organization.


Module 15 Area Command
Description of Area Command.
Differences between Area Command, Multi-agency Coordination, and EOCs.
Establishing Area Command.
General responsibilities.
Position Responsibilities and checklists.
Area Command exercise.
Module 15 Objectives
1. Define Area Command.

2. Identify differences between area command, unified command, multiagency coordination systems and emergency operations centers.

3. List the principal advantages of using area command or unified area command.
Module 15 Objectives (cont.)
4. Describe how, when, and where Area Command would be established.

5. Describe the Area Command organization.

6. Identify six primary functional responsibilities of Area Command.

7. Working with a simulated scenario, develop an Area Command organization.
For the Small Group Exercise Area Command Teams will:
Develop an Area Command organization.

Determine Area Command staffing requirements.

Describe Area Command facility and support needs.

Develop statement of agency policy to be given to Incident Commanders.

Establish resource priorities.

Establish Area Command supplemental resource needs.

Develop questions to ask the Agency Executive.
Definition of Area Command
Oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being handled by an Incident Command System organization;

or

To oversee the management of a very large incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams assigned to it.
Incident Command System
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan.
Incident Command System
The management system used to direct all operations at the incident scene. The Incident Commander (IC) is located on scene at an Incident Command Post (ICP) at the incident scene.
Unified Command
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan.
Area Command (Unified Area Command)
Established as necessary to provide command authority and coordination for two or more incidents in close proximity. Area Command works directly with Incident Commanders. Area Command becomes Unified Area Command when incidents are multijurisdictional. Area Command may be established at an EOC facility or at some other location other than an incident ICP.
Multiagency Coordination Systems (MACS)
An activity or a formal system used to coordinate resources and support between agencies or jurisdictions. A MAC Group functions within the MACS. MACS interact with agencies or jurisdictions not with incidents. MACS are useful for regional situations. A MACS can be established at a jurisdictional EOC or at a separate facility.
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)
Also called Expanded Dispatch, Emergency Command and Control Centers, etc. EOC’s are used in varying ways at all levels of government and within private industry to provide coordination, direction and control during emergencies. EOC facilities can be used to house Area Command and MACS activities as determined by agency or jurisdiction policy.
Differences Between MAC Groups and Area Command
-Expansion of the off-site coordination and support system.
-Members are agency administrators or designees from the agencies involved or heavily committed to the incident
-Organization generally consists of the MAC Group (agency administrations), MAC Group Coordinator, and an intelligence and information support staff.
-Is the agency administrator or designee.
-Allocate and reallocate critical resources through the dispatch system by setting incident priorities.
-Make coordinated agency administrator level decisions on issues that affect multiple agencies.

Area Command Responsibilities
Set overall agency incident-related priorities.

Allocate critical resources based on priorities.

Ensure that incidents are properly managed.

Ensure that incident(s) objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or with agency policy.
Chain of Command and Reporting Relationships
Agency
Administrator
Area Command
Where?
How?
When?
Why?
Reasons to Use Area Command
Much of the inter-incident coordination normally required of each IC will be accomplished at the Area Command level allowing incident management teams to focus attention on assigned incidents.

Area Command sets priorities and allocates critical resources.

Area Command helps the Agency executive by ensuring that agency policies, priorities, constraints, and guidance are being made known to the respective Incident Commanders.

Area Command also reduces the workload of the Agency Executive, especially if there are multiple incidents going on at the same time.
When Should Area Command be Established?
Early and When:

Several active incidents are in close proximity.

Critical human or property values are at risk due to incidents.

Incidents will continue into the next operational period.

Incidents are using similar and limited critical resources.

Difficulties are encountered with inter-incident resource allocation and coordination.
Area Command:
Is established by Agency Executive.
Is given written delegated authority.
Has best qualified, experienced personnel.
Is patterned after ICS Command/General Staff.
Operates under same principles as ICS.
Organization should be kept small.
Area Command Organization
Area
Commander
Example of Technical Specialists at an Area Command
Aviation Specialist

Hazardous Materials Specialist

Environmental Specialist

Communications Specialist
Criteria for Establishing an Area Command Facility
Close to incidents (but not an ICP).
Sufficient Size (for staff, displays, and conferences).
Capable of continuous operation.
Adequate communications facilities (telephones, FAX, computer connections).
Criteria for Establishing an Area Command Facility (cont.)
Availability of backup power.
Capable of supporting radio communications to incidents and agency offices.
Adequate and secure parking.
Near sources of food and lodging.
Communications Considerations
Adequate telephone trunks
More telephone service can be added
Rooftop antennas can be installed
Line of sight to incidents or repeaters
Primary Functions of an Area Command
Provide agency or jurisdictional authority for assigned incidents.

Ensure a clear understanding of agency expectations, intentions, and constraints.

Establish critical resource use priorities between various incidents.
Primary Functions of an Area Command (cont.)
Ensure that incident management team personnel assignments and organizations are appropriate.

Maintain contact with officials in charge, other agencies and groups.

Coordinate the demobilization or reassignment of resources between assigned incidents.
Providing Management Authority Over Incidents (Checklist)
General situation

Incidents assigned

Jurisdictional delegation of authority

Assumption of command timing and notifications procedure

Names and qualifications of assigned Incident Commanders
Providing Management Authority Over Incidents (Checklist)
Incidents operating under Unified Command

Limitations on the Area Commander’s authority over Incident Commanders (should be in the delegation of authority)

Incident Action Plans available

Policies, political factors, or other constraints

Agency advisor assigned

Area Command facility designated
Providing Management Authority Over Incidents (Checklist)
Status of communications systems to incidents and agency/jurisdictional headquarters

Critical resource designations

Policy and expectations for interaction with the media

Area Command reporting responsibility to agency

Schedules for required briefings, and contacts
Area Commander Responsibility
Set overall objectives

Establish priorities

Allocate/reallocate critical resources
Area Command Considerations
Area Command is usually established to support incidents which are already underway.

Objectives, strategies, and Incident Action Plans should already be in place.

Area Commander must rapidly assess each incident and ensure the incident action planning is addressing the priorities and direction set by the Agency Executive.
Area Command Considerations
Area Commander should establish, in writing, priorities related to incidents. This information should be part of the delegation of authority from the Agency Executive.

Area Commander should develop procedures to be followed.
Area Command Procedures Should Include:
Incident and agency/jurisdictional priorities

Priorities for assignments of critical resources

Schedules of meetings and briefings

Reports and Incident Action Plans

Points of contact with Agency Executives

Media relations and contact procedures

Unusual situation or emergency procedures reporting

Demobilization procedures
Agenda for Area Command Meeting with Incident Commanders
Obtain concise individual incident briefings.

Explain the role and responsibilities of an Area Commander.

Review policy and direction received from Agency Executive.

Resolve any conflicts.

Review appropriate procedures as outlined above.

Open for questions.

Collect available Incident Action Plans and other essential documentation.
Establish Priorities Among Various Incidents Based on Incident Needs and Agency Policy and Direction
Priorities among incidents (often related to the life and property values at risk)

Priorities related to allocating critically needed resources

Priorities related to demobilization
The Management Team Must be Appropriate for the Incidents
Recommend/make appropriate important personnel changes and moves only as necessary.

Ensure that appropriate incident organization activation's have been made.

Determine if temporary flight restrictions are adequate or need revision.
Coordinating Services Done by Area Command
Between Agency/Jurisdictional Executives and Incident Commanders

Between Area Command, Incidents, and assisting and cooperating agencies

Between the media and the incidents
Coordinate the Demobilization of Assigned Incidents
Establish procedures with incidents and agency dispatch centers on demobilization.

Determine demobilization priorities and procedure for handling critical resources.

Provide incidents with a list of critical resources and instructions for clearing releases with Area Command.

Incidents must provide Area Command with copies of demobilization schedules.
Module 16 Objectives
1. Describe the kinds of incident management problems that can occur due to a lack of multiagency coordination.

2. Define essential terms related to multiagency coordination.

3. Identify the levels at which multiagency coordination is commonly accomplished.

4. Identify essential differences between Unified Command, Area command, Multi-agency coordination and Emergency Operations Centers.
Module 16 Objectives (cont.)
5. Identify the primary components of a Multi-agency Coordination System.

6. List the responsibilities of a Multi-agency Coordination Group.

7. Identify the major guidelines for establishing and using Multi-agency Coordination Groups and Systems.

8. Identify principal positions within a Multi-agency Coordination System.
Multi-agency Coordination
Problems necessitating improved Multi-agency Coordination

Examples of Multi-agency Coordination

Terminology and relationships

Defining an intergovernmental Multi-agency Coordination System

Multi-agency Coordination Groups

Guidelines for establishing MACS and MAC Groups.

Primary function responsibilities associated with MACS

Sample position descriptions for a MACS organization

A MACS development exercise.
Past Problems Related to Effective Interagency Coordination
Different Policies and procedures among agencies.

Lack of a common interagency organizational structure.

Lack of a process for coordinated and collocated incident planning between agencies.

Lack of interagency communications including systems, frequencies, and use agreements.
Past Problems Related to Effective Interagency Coordination (cont.)
Differences in terminology for personnel, for assignments, and resources.

Lack of valid, timely, and complete information from all available sources.

Unfamiliarity with other agency’s methods of operation, skills and qualifications, and resource capabilities.

Little previous interagency training.
Problems of Today
Ever increasing response costs which affect, among other things, the use of mutual aid.

High property losses associated with many incidents.

Life, health, and safety issues of responders and citizens.

Often a deteriorating public view of government effectiveness.

Intense media scrutiny.
Multi-agency Coordination is Currently Done
A. At the scene of the incident(s).

B. At an Area Command.

C. At a jurisdiction’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

D. At an interjurisdictional or regional level.

E. At state and federal levels.

F. Internationally
EOC’s are often Used at Various Organizational Levels
State
EOC
Example of the Jurisdictions Involved in Multi-agency Search
A national Park

County A

County B

A coastal area

A State Recreation Area
Agencies Involved in Wide Area Search
National Park Service

County A - Fire and rescue

County B - Sheriff’s Search and Rescue

Coast Guard

State Parks Department

State National Guard

Volunteer groups

Private landowners and/or industry
Types of MACS
MACS could be as simple as a teleconference

OR

It may require an assembled group and associated support systems
Incident Command System
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan.
A Multi-agency Coordination System (MACS) will Consist of:
Jurisdictional/Agency Representatives

Facilities

Equipment

Procedures

Information Systems

Communications Systems
Primary Functions of a MACS
Incident priority determination

Critical resource use priorities

Communications systems integration

Information coordination

Intergovernmental decision coordination
Establishing a MACS will Depend on:
Goals and desires of the agencies

Established working relationships

Desired benefits
MACS Can Include:
Pre-emergency administrative systems and controls

Emergency response systems and procedures

or simply be:

An agreement to operate within an interagency mutual aid agreement
MACS Size and Complexity
Determined by its mission; may be quite simple or quite complex
Activate MACS
When an emergency situation:
Threatens,
Significantly impacts the agency, or
Involves other agencies
When pre-established threat levels are reached.
Activating a MACS assists agency dispatch centers in the following ways:
Assist in making key decisions on the use of critical resources.

Establish priorities between incidents.

Coordinating interagency policies and procedures.
Guidelines for Activating MACS
With pre-established guidelines (recommended)

Joint powers agreements, memorandums of understanding can be used for areas which experience frequent or reoccurring emergencies.

Without pre-established guidelines (not recommended)

When resource requests exceed availability.

When there is an obvious interagency need to coordinate that is not being met.
Who can Activate MACS
For agencies within a single political subdivision:

Jurisdiction Chief Executive Officer

For multiple political subdivisions:

Consensus of involved jurisdictions
MACS Locations
At a jurisdictional EOC

At a regional facility

At a state or federal facility

Wherever it is needed
Multi-agency Coordination Groups
MAC Groups are the people that make the MACS function.

Representatives are authorized to commit agency resources and funds.
MAC Group Organization
MAC Group
Agency
Representatives
MACS Information Flow
MAC Group Established to Aid in Interjurisdiction Coordination
Regional
MAC
Group
Differences Between MAC Groups and Area Command
-Expansion of the off-site coordination and support system.
-Members are agency administrators or designees from the agencies involved or heavily committed to the incident
-Organization generally consists of the MAC Group (agency administrations), MAC Group Coordinator, and an intelligence and information support staff.
-Is the agency administrator or designee.
-Allocate and reallocate critical resources through the dispatch system by setting incident priorities.
-Make coordinated agency administrator level decisions on issues that affect multiple agencies.

Principal MAC Group Functions
Situation assessment

Critical resources acquisition and allocation

Local, state, and federal disaster coordination

Coordination with agency/jurisdiction political establishments

Coordination of summary information related to multi-agency/ multi-jurisdiction response efforts

Incident priority determination
Criteria for Determining Incident Priorities
Life threatening situations

Real property threatened

High damage potential

Incident complexity

Environmental impact

Other criteria as established by the MAC Group
ICS as the EOC or MACS Model
Five primary functions of ICS are appropriate at EOCs.

Duplication of terminology could create confusion.

Example:
EOC Incident Commander
Incident Incident Commander
Best to vary the position titles to avoid confusion.

EOC sub-functions should be based on the operational need.
Module 17 ICS For Executives
Role of the executive

The Incident Command System

Definitions of ICS Components

Alternative command and coordination structures related to ICS

Executive responsibilities
Module 17 Objectives:
1. Define the role of an Executive related to the Incident Command system.

2. Describe the various ways ICS can be applied.

3. Describe the basic organization of ICS and know the functional responsibilities of the Command and General Staffs.

4. Have basic familiarity with ICS terminology.
Module 17 Objectives: (cont.)
5. Understand the differences between on-incident ICS organizations and activities, and activities accomplished by Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), Area Commands, and Multi-agency Coordination Systems (MACS).

6. Describe the three major responsibilities of an Executive as related to an incident.

7. Explain the administrative, logistical, financial, and reporting implications related to large incident operations.
Incidents/Events that can Utilize the Incident Command System
Fires, hazardous materials, and multi-casualty incidents.

Single and multi-agency law enforcement incidents.

Multi-jurisdiction and multi-agency disaster responses.

Search and rescue missions.

Oil spill response and recovery incidents.

Air, rail, water, or ground transportation accidents.

Planned events, e.g., celebrations, parades, concerts.

Private sector emergency management programs.
In ICS, common terminology is applied to:
Organizational elements

Position titles

Resources

Facilities
The Incident Action Plan
Is required on all incidents
May be oral or written
Issues of Concern to the Executive:
What are the implications of an incident to my organization and to myself?

How do I maintain control when incidents occur?

Where do I fit in the incident management process?
The Executive Provides the Following to the Incident Commander
Policy

Mission

Direction

Authority
The Executive is generally NOT at the incident
Primary office of the agency.

A jurisdictional Emergency Operations Center.

A multi-agency Coordination Group as either a functional agency representative, or representing a political subdivision in a regional situation.
Major Management Activities of the Incident Command System
Command
Has overall responsibility at the incident or event. Sets objectives and priorities based on agency direction.

Operations
Develops the tactical organization and directs all resources to carry out the Incident Action Plan.

Planning
Develops the Incident Action Plan to accomplish the objectives. Collects and evaluates information, and maintains status of assigned resources.
Major Management Activities of the Incident Command System
Logistics
Provides resources and all other services needed to support the incident.

Finance/Administration
Monitors costs related to the incident. Provides accounting, procurement, time recording, cost analyses, and overall fiscal guidance.
The Incident Command System Major Organization Elements
1. Organization elements are activated as needed.
Incident Command and Command Staff
Incident Commander

Incident Command and Command Staff
Incident Commander
Incident Command and Command Staff
Incident Commander
Incident Command and General Staff
Incident Command System
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan.
Unified Command
Unified Command is the process, in a multi-agency incident, of establishing a common set of objectives and strategies without losing agency authority, responsibility, or accountability.
Characteristics of a Unified Command
Two or more agencies share jurisdictional responsibility.

One collocated Incident Command Post.

Consensus on one set of Incident Objectives.

One Incident Action Plan.

Incident Action Plan is implemented by the Operations Section Chief.
Three Fires Managed as a Complex
The Area Command Organization
Area Commander
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)
An EOC is a pre-designated facility established by a political subdivision or an agency to coordinate the overall response and support to an emergency.
Lines of Authority at an EOC
Political Authority

EOC Director

Department Managers

On-scene Incident Commanders

Assigned Resources
Multi-agency Coordination Systems (MACS)
Established to ensure effective interagency and/or regional coordination.

Jurisdiction representatives at the MACS are called MAC Groups.

In political subdivisions (i.e., cities, counties) EOCs may perform intra-area MACS coordination functions.
MACS Established to Aid in Interjurisdiction Coordination
Steps to Accomplish Incident Objectives
Agency policy, direction, and support

Incident objectives

Strategy(s) to achieve objectives

Tactical direction
Steps to Accomplish Incident Objectives
Designation of tactics appropriate to the strategy

Selection of resources appropriate for the tactics

Assignment of resources

Performance monitoring
Major Responsibilities of the Executive:
Clearly state agency/jurisdiction policy.

Evaluate effectiveness and correct deficiencies.

Support a multi-agency approach.
Executive - Delegation of Authority Should Cover:
Legal and policy restraints and/or freedoms

Limitations on authority

Political and social concerns

Environmental issues

Cost considerations
Executive - Incident Commander briefing should cover:
The general situation.

Current jurisdictional authority over the incident(s).

Executive’s goals, priorities, and expectations.

Policies, political factors, or other constraints.

Status of communications systems.

Policy on interacting with the media.

Schedules for required briefings and meetings.
Evaluating Incident Commander Effectiveness
Understand agency policy and direction.

Be proactive.

Have a good match between objectives and strategies.

Staff the organization to meet the workloads.

Monitor span of control and adapt as necessary.
Evaluating Incident Commander Effectiveness (cont.)
Utilize deputies when appropriate.

Integrate other agency personnel in appropriate ICS locations.

Focus on organizational effectiveness.

Delegate authority to Command and General Staffs.

Identify problem areas and work to overcome them.
Evaluating Incident Commander Effectiveness in a Unified Command Situation
Should be located at the ICP and working with other agency ICs.

Knows agency policy and priorities; translates these into acceptable objectives.

Identifies policy differences between groups involved and works cooperatively to resolve them.

Actively participates in the planning process working toward a single Incident Action Plan.
Ways to Promote Multi-agency Involvement
Conducts/supports planning conferences and agreements

Involvement of other personnel

Promoting the use of Unified Command

Joint training

Incident evaluations
Additional ICS Documentation
Module 1 - ICS Orientation (self-paced study)

History of ICS

ICS Glossary

Curriculum Syllabus and/or Syllabus Summary
SSEP PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
SSEP PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
STEP 4: The SSEP Program POC will initiate Needs Assessment to:
Identify current levels of criminal activity
Identify current security and emergency preparedness activities
Complete the Security Baseline Planning Worksheet
Complete the Emergency Preparedness Assessment Worksheet
Develop SSEP Program Objectives
Develop SSEP Program Supporting Activities

STEP 5: The SSEP Program POC and VAP Committee will prepare a list of action items and a milestone schedule to address activities required to support SSEP Program Objectives

STEP 6: The SSEP Program POC will track implementation status and issue quarterly reports to the Executive Director.


Security Baseline Planning Worksheet
Emergency Preparedness Assessment Worksheet
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
To ensure SSEP Program development, [NAME OF TRANSIT AGENCY] will take the following actions:

Establish an SSEP Program Planning Team
Analyze Capabilities and Hazards
Perform Vulnerability Assessment
Develop List of Action Items and Milestone Schedule
Document Activities and Procedures
PLANNING TEAM
We will establish an SSEP PROGRAM PLANNING
TEAM. We will recruit representatives from throughout
the agency, because:

It encourages participation and gets more people invested in the process.
It increases the amount of time and energy participants are able to give.
It enhances the visibility and stature of the planning process.
It provides for a broad perspective on the issues.

We will begin with our VAP Committee, and expand membership (if necessary) to make sure we include:

Supervisors; drivers; volunteers and contractors; dispatchers; human resources; maintenance; safety and risk management; finance; marketing/community relations; and legal
PLANNING TEAM
The Executive Director will be a member of the SEPP PROGRAM PLANNING TEAM, which will be headed by the agency’s SSEP Program Point of Contact (POC).

The Executive Director will prepare a memorandum authorizing the PLANNING TEAM, and providing sufficient resources to support its activities.

The SSEP PROGRAM PLANNING TEAM will provide an open invitation to all local public safety agencies to participate in meetings.

Team members will actively seek public safety personnel review of relevant planning areas, such as security procedures and emergency scene management.

The TEAM will make a formal presentation regarding its SSEP PROGRAM PLAN to its community public safety agencies, and will request the initiation of annual drilling and exercising activities with local responders.
SAMPLE VAP COMMITTEE AGENDA


I. Status of the SSEP Program Plan

II. “Proactive” Items for Discussion
· Assess the agency’s current capabilities regarding security and
emergency preparedness program
· Look for new ways and means to improve security and emergency
preparedness
· Determine compliance with security and emergency responsibilities
· Identify organizational issues that may contribute to security
incidents or hinder effective emergency coordination and response
· Promote security awareness

III. “Reactive” Items for Discussion
· Review incidents to determine why they occurred
· Debrief incidents, emergencies, drills and training to identify “lessons
learned” and means of improvement
· Determine what measures should be taken to follow-up on incidents,
events, drills and training

IV. SSEP Program Action Items

VAP WORKSHEET
VAP WORKSHEET
VAP WORKSHEET
ANALYZE CAPABILITIES
The SSEP PROGEAM PLANNING TEAM will initiate activities to determine our agency’s current level of preparedness. We will:

1. Review Internal Plans and Policies, including the following:

Vehicle Safety Program Plan
Rulebook
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
Facility and Vehicle Evacuation Plans
Fire protection plan
Safety and health program
Environmental policies
Security procedures
Insurance programs
Finance and purchasing procedures
Employee manuals
Hazardous materials plan
Risk management plan
Capital improvement program
Mutual aid agreements

ANALYZE CAPABILITIES
2. Meet with Outside Groups, including the following:

Community emergency management office
Mayor or Community Administrator's office
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)
Fire Department
Police Department
Emergency Medical Services organizations
Local Planning Commission
Major Clients (hospitals, retirement homes, etc.)

We will discuss our current procedures, ask for any ideas or suggestions these groups may have regarding our procedures, as well as their primary concerns regarding response to an incident at our agency, or a response to a community emergency involving support from our agency.

ANALYZE CAPABILITIES
3. Identify Codes and Regulations, including:

Occupational safety and health regulations
Environmental regulations
Fire codes
Seismic safety codes
Transportation regulations
Zoning regulations
Agency policies

4. Identify Internal Resources and Capabilities that could be needed in an emergency, including the following:

Personnel
Equipment
Facilities
Organizational capabilities
Backup systems

ANALYZE CAPABILITIES
5. Identify External Resources, including the following:

Local emergency management office
Fire Department
Hazardous materials response organization
Emergency medical services
Hospitals
Local and State police
Community service organizations
Utilities
Contractors
Suppliers of emergency equipment
Insurance carriers

NOTE: There are many external resources that could be needed in an emergency. In some cases, formal agreements may be necessary to define the agency's relationship with them.

6. Perform an Insurance Review, including
Meeting with insurance carriers to review all policies and coverage levels.

Results from these activities will be summarized in minutes prepared for SSEP PROGRAM PLANNING TEAM meetings.

TRAINING AND EXERCISING
TRAINING AND EXERCISING

TRANSIT AGENCY will formulate SSEP Program Training and Exercising (T&E) Plan:

Determine Needs
Outline Plan
Set Goals
Evaluate Current Efforts
Assess Training Staff
Identify Additional Resources
Write Action Plan
TRAINING AND EXERCISING
Issues to consider:
In-house Staff
Local Law Enforcement
Contractors
RTAP Video Library
ODOT
FTA
Other
TRAINING AND EXERCISING
Adult Learning Methods for Transit Training
Demonstrations
Structured/Facilitated Discussions
Behavior Modeling
Brainstorming
Role Playing
Simulations
Lecture
Reading Assignments
TRAINING AND EXERCISING
Opportunities for SSEP Program training:
Organizational Development
Professional Development
New-Hire Driver Skill Training
Driver Skill Retraining:
Mechanic Skill Training
Safety Training
Passenger Relations Training
COORDINATION WITH LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS
Public Safety Response
Public Safety Response
Public Safety Response
Managing the emergency scene – initiating ICS functions as needed
Expanding response to unified command with State and Federal resources (if needed)
Demobilization – as control is restored
Returning the scene to “normal”
Clean-up
Incident debriefings and “after action reports”
TA Support Functions
Evacuation (transportation and identification)
Specialized transportation for mobility-impaired citizens away from scene
Transportation and shelter for emergency response response personnel
Transportation of supplies
Support of road blocks and perimeter control
Weather monitoring and route planning
Specialized equipment
Trained personnel
Communications
REQUIRED COORDINATION
Who’s participating?
Contact information?
Jurisdictional control and authority?
How is the response effort expanded?
Chain of command and control?
Transit point of contact and location?
Equipment and resources available?
Training?
Meetings?


MOUs with Local Responders
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) serve as the basis of mutual acknowledgment of the resources that each agency will provide during response and recovery efforts. These agreements:

Sometimes support Mutual Aid Pacts between two or more local jurisdictions.
May accompany formal, written mutual-aid agreements
May remain as oral agreements
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Vulnerability Assessment is a process for identifying and evaluating those areas of transit operations, facilities, and vehicles that are most susceptible to criminal events and the consequences of natural disasters and other emergency situations. Vulnerability Assessment support the need of transit management in four key areas:

Asset valuation and judgment about consequence of loss. What assets must the transit agency protect? How should these assets be valued – both to the transit agency and a potential adversary? What is the impact if these assets are lost -- on passengers, employees, public safety organizations, the general public and the transit operation?

Identification and characterization of the threats to specific assets. What are the threats to the system? How can these threats be described and quantified in terms that support management decision-making activity?

Identification and characterization of the vulnerability of specific assets. What vulnerabilities -- or weaknesses in the security posture of the asset -- exist that could be exploited? Can the transit operator make design or operational changes to reduce risk levels by altering the nature of the asset itself?

Identification of countermeasures, costs, and tradeoffs. What different countermeasures are available to protect an asset? What is the varying cost or effectiveness of alternative measures? In many cases, there is a point beyond which adding countermeasures will raise costs without appreciably enhancing the protection afforded

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
Asset Definition
Classify Assets
List the Threats
Classify Threats
Vulnerability Analysis
Document Results
ASSET DEFINITION PROCESS
Review Submissions to the Public Transportation Facilities and Equipment Management System (PTMS)
Interview Stakeholders
Review Inventories and Financial Reports
On-site “Walk-throughs”

At the conclusion of this process, [NAME OF TRANSIT AGENY] will prepare a list that prioritizes identified assets by their value.





ASSET CRITICALITY
Identification of Assets

Critical assets, and the essential elements that are associated with them, must be identified and assessed as to their importance. Critical assets include people, activities/operations, information, facilities, and equipment. Assets for a bus system may include bus terminals, buses, bus stops/shelters, maintenance and fuel storage facilities, command control center, and revenue collection facilities. Critical assets are determined primarily through inventories, interviews with asset managers, using structured interview guides, and data reviews – all in an effort to identify those system elements essential for the provision of service and protection of passengers, employees and emergency responders.

Identify Asset Criticality

Asset criticality refers to an assessment performed to determine which public transportation assets have the most impact on people (passengers and employees) and the system (ability to maintain service). This assessment makes it possible to identify those assets that are most important to the transit system, and therefore must be protected. In general, critical assets for bus systems include bus terminals, bus vehicles, and fuel storage facilities.

CLASSIFY ASSETS
VITAL– Loss Would be Catastrophic

IMPORTANT – Loss Would Prove Seriously Disruptive

SECONDARY – Loss Would Prove Relatively Insignificant

AT THE CONCLUSION OT THIS ACTIVITY, [NAME OF TRANSIT AGENCY] WILL PREPARE MATRICES WHICH SHOW CLASSIFIED ASSETS.

SAMPLE MATRIX
LIST THE THREATS
Identify Threats to Critical Assets

This step requires the identification of specific threats from criminal activity and emergency events to critical transit assets, where threat is defined as any real or potential condition that can cause injury or death to passengers or employees or damage to or loss of critical assets. Threats are identified using both historical (trend) analysis of all attacks committed against public transportation targets and surveys of transit professionals. Many transit agencies conduct a thorough review of incident reports to identify past threats, including type of incident, location of incident, and final disposition of incident.

LIST THE THREATS
CRIMINAL

Part I and Part II
Crimes:
Burglary & Robbery
Larceny & Arson
Assault & Theft
Bribery & Extortion
Vandalism
Drug / Alcohol Abuse

Terrorism & Sabotage

SPECIAL ISSUES:
Workplace Violence
Crimes against Drivers
Crimes against Passengers





CLASSIFY THREATS
PROBABILITY OF OCCURANCE
*Probable: Expect Event to Occur

*Possible: Circumstances Expected for that Event

*Unlikely: Possible But Unlikely

SEVERITY OF OCCURANCE
*Devastating: Disastrous Event

*Moderate: Survivable

*Insignificant: Relatively Inconsequential

PREPARE MATRICES WHICH DOCUMENT THREAT CLASSIFICATION.

SCENARIOS
Develop Threat Scenarios

In this step, the critical assets and the key threats are paired into scenarios to focus analytical activities. This activity provides for a representative a range of CRIMINAL AND EMERGENCY EVENTS, and allows for detailed analysis concerning the likely impacts of threats on critical assets. Some threats can be easily assessed; while others (such as hostage situations, sabotage, or terrorism) require a more detailed evaluation.

Examples of scenarios include the following:

Disgruntled former employee storms into administrative office with shotgun and takes transit staff hostage

Bomb threat is phoned into dispatch which states that caller has placed a bomb on one of the agency’s 15 buses, set to detonate in 30 minutes

Local chemical plant experience major chemical spill, requiring evacuation of downtown

SCENARIOS
To complete the vulnerability assessment, the scenarios must be investigated by the PLANNING TEAM. The costs and impacts of these scenarios for the critical assets are then specified using a standard risk level matrix, which supports the organization of consequences into categories of HIGH, SERIOUS, MEDIUM, and LOW (see matrix below).

Consequences are assessed both in terms of severity of impact and probability of loss for a given threat scenario. Scenarios with vulnerabilities identified as HIGH and SERIOUS may require further investigation. Scenario-based analysis is not an exact science but rather an illustrative tool – demonstrating potential consequences associated with low-probability/high-impact events. To determine the agency’s actual need for additional counter-measures, and to provide the rationale for allocating resources to these counter-measures, the PLANNING TEAM must use the scenarios to pin-point the vulnerable elements of the critical assets and make evaluations concerning the adequacy of current levels of protection.


SCENARIOS
OUTCOMES
The PLANNING TEAM will use the results of the scenario analysis to determine HOW WELL HAVE WE IMPLEMENTED PROCESSES FOR:

Establishing partnerships in advance so the event can be IDENTIFIED, PREVENTED, OR MANAGED with minimum loss to the community
Conducting individual and joint evaluations of risk factors
Identifying what functions are critical to our operations, and understanding those essential functions for public safety agencies
Developing joint emergency plans and procedures that address how community resources can be identified and shared to respond to disasters.
Facilitating resumption and recovery after an incident has been stabilized
Developing training exercises and understanding the value of exercising emergency plans
Incorporating mitigation throughout the entire process and recognizing its significance in preventing a major incident and reducing its potential impact

SAMPLE OUTCOME FOR SECURITY
ACTION ITEMS
PLANNING TEAM will assemble priority activities that must be performed – based on the VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

MANAGEMENT will review and approve the action item list and milestone schedule

Based on RESULTS, SSEP Program POC will initiate tracking and reporting
COUNTERMEASURES
PHYSICAL PROTECTION
PRINCIPLES
DETERRENCE
RAISED SECURITY PROFILE

Controlled Access
Increased Uniformed Presence
Visible Technical Systems
Barriers to Assets
Audited Measures & Procedures
DETECTION
IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

Alarms
Security Guards
CCTV
Alert, Committed Drivers and Passengers
DELAY
LAYERS OF PROTECTION TO TARGET

Perimeter Fencing & Checkpoints
Security Personnel
“Channeled” Access
Vehicle Checks
Personnel Checks
RESPONSE
PLANNED IN ADVANCE

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
Communication and Coordination
Alarms
Security Guards
Police and Emergency Services
Effective Security Management