Enola
Gay, the B-29bomber that was used by the United States on August 6,
1945, to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, the first time the
explosive device had been used on an enemy target. The aircraft was
named after the mother of pilot Paul Warfield Tibbets, Jr.
The
B-29 (also called Superfortress) was a four-engine heavy bomber that was
built by Boeing. It was first flown in 1942 and soon became popular in
the Pacific theatre during World War II. In 1944 the B-29 was selected
to carry the atomic bomb, and a number of the aircraft subsequently
underwent various modifications, such as reinforcements of the bomb bay.
That year Lieutenant Colonel Tibbets, who was one of the most
experienced B-29 pilots, was tasked with assembling and training a crew.
The modified B-29s were later flown to the U.S. military base on
Tinian, one of the Mariana Islands.
Enola Gay
Enola Gay
U.S. bomber Enola Gay on Tinian, Mariana Islands, prior to its atomic bombing mission to Hiroshima, Japan, August 1945.
Air Force Historical Research Agency
On
July 16, 1945, the United States successfully tested an atomic bomb.
Pres. Harry S. Truman was informed of the development while attending
the Potsdam Conference, and he in turn told Soviet leader Joseph Stalin
that the United States had “a new weapon of unusual destructive force.”
On July 26 the Allied leaders called for Japan to unconditionally
surrender or face “prompt and utter destruction.” After Japan ignored
the demand, the decision was made to bomb Hiroshima.
Watch U.S. B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay decimate Hiroshima with a nuclear bomb in the Pacific War
Watch U.S. B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay decimate Hiroshima with a nuclear bomb in the Pacific War
The
B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay took off from the Mariana Islands on
August 6, 1945, bound for Hiroshima, Japan, where, with the dropping of
the atomic bomb, it heralded a new and terrible concept of warfare.
From The Second World War: Allied Victory (1963), a documentary by
Encyclopædia Britannica Educational Corporation.
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
See all videos for this article
At
approximately 2:45 AM on August 6, 1945, Tibbets—who was now a full
colonel—and a crew of 11 took off from Tinian island carrying a uranium
bomb that was known as “Little Boy.” The Enola Gay—Tibbets had a
maintenance man paint that name on the aircraft’s nose shortly before
takeoff—was accompanied by various other planes. At 8:15 AM, the bomb
was released over Hiroshima. While some 1,900 feet (580 metres) above
the city, Little Boy exploded, killing tens of thousands and causing
widespread destruction. Tibbets flew the Enola Gay back to Tinian, where
he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Three days later the
Enola Gay conducted weather reconnaissance in the lead-up to the bombing
of Nagasaki, Japan. Japan officially surrendered on September 2, 1945.
Enola Gay
Enola Gay
The
B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay backed over a pit to be loaded with the
first atomic bomb, which was released on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6,
1945.
Air Force Historical Research Agency
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The
Enola Gay remained in service for several years before being given to
the Smithsonian Institution on July 3, 1949. It was later disassembled
and stored in Maryland. In 1984 work began on restoring the aircraft,
which was in dire need of repair. Exposure to the elements had damaged
the plane, and it had been vandalized. In addition, birds had built
nests in various compartments. The project ultimately spanned some 20
years. In 1995 a portion of the plane served as the centrepiece of a
controversial exhibition at the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space
Museum (NASM) in Washington, D.C. The exhibit had originally been
scheduled to include artifacts from Hiroshima and Nagasaki and highlight
the debate over the decision to use the bomb. Amid fierce opposition,
however, the original plans were canceled, and a much scaled-back
version was staged. In 2003 the fully restored Enola Gay was put on
display at the NASM’s Steven F. Udar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Throughout
July 1945 the Japanese mainlands, from the latitude of Tokyo on Honshu
northward to the coast of Hokkaido, were bombed just as if an invasion
was about to be launched. In fact, something far more sinister was in
hand, as the Americans were telling Stalin at Potsdam.
Watch U.S. B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay decimate Hiroshima with a nuclear bomb in the Pacific War
Watch U.S. B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay decimate Hiroshima with a nuclear bomb in the Pacific War
The
B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay took off from the Mariana Islands on
August 6, 1945, bound for Hiroshima, Japan, where, with the dropping of
the atomic bomb, it heralded a new and terrible concept of warfare.
From The Second World War: Allied Victory (1963), a documentary by
Encyclopædia Britannica Educational Corporation.
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
See all videos for this article
In
1939 physicists in the United States had learned of experiments in
Germany demonstrating the possibility of nuclear fission and had
understood that the potential energy might be released in an explosive
weapon of unprecedented power. On August 2, 1939, Albert Einstein had
warned Roosevelt of the danger of Nazi Germany’s forestalling other
states in the development of an atomic bomb. Eventually, the U.S. Office
of Scientific Research and Development was created in June 1941 and
given joint responsibility with the war department in the Manhattan
Project to develop an atomic bomb. After four years of intensive and
ever-mounting research and development efforts, an atomic device was set
off on July 16, 1945, in a desert area near Alamogordo, New Mexico,
generating an explosive power equivalent to that of more than 15,000
tons of TNT. Thus the atomic bomb was born. Truman, the new U.S.
president, calculated that this monstrous weapon might be used to defeat
Japan in a way less costly of U.S. lives than a conventional invasion
of the Japanese homeland. Japan’s unsatisfactory response to the
Allies’ Potsdam Declaration decided the matter. (See Sidebar: The
decision to use the atomic bomb.) On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb
carried from Tinian Island in the Marianas in a specially equipped B-29
was dropped on Hiroshima, at the southern end of Honshu: the combined
heat and blast pulverized everything in the explosion’s immediate
vicinity, generated fires that burned almost 4.4 square miles
completely out, and immediately killed some 70,000 people (the death
toll passed 100,000 by the end of the year). A second bomb, dropped on
Nagasaki on August 9, killed between 35,000 and 40,000 people, injured a
like number, and devastated 1.8 square miles.
World War II: total destruction of Hiroshima, Japan
World War II: total destruction of Hiroshima, Japan
Total destruction of Hiroshima, Japan, following the dropping of the first atomic bomb, on August 6, 1945.
U.S. Air Force photo
The Japanese surrender
News
of Hiroshima’s destruction was only slowly understood in Tokyo. Many
members of the Japanese government did not appreciate the power of the
new Allied weapon until after the Nagasaki attack. Meanwhile, on August
8, the U.S.S.R. had declared war against Japan. The combination of
these developments tipped the scales within the government in favour of
a group that had, since the spring, been advocating a negotiated
peace. On August 10 the Japanese government issued a statement agreeing
to accept the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration on the
understanding that the emperor’s position as a sovereign ruler would
not be prejudiced. In their reply the Allies granted Japan’s request
that the emperor’s sovereign status be maintained, subject only to
their supreme commander’s directives. Japan accepted this proviso on
August 14, and the emperor Hirohito urged his people to accept the
decision to surrender. It was a bitter pill to swallow, though, and
every effort was made to persuade the Japanese to accept the defeat
that they had come to regard as unthinkable. Even princes of the
Japanese Imperial house were dispatched to deliver the Emperor’s
message in person to distant Japanese Army forces in China and in
Korea, hoping thus to mitigate the shock. A clique of diehards
nevertheless attempted to assassinate the new prime minister, Admiral
Suzuki Kantarō; but by September 2, when the formal surrender
ceremonies took place, the way had been smoothed.
See General MacArthur aboard the Missouri battleship offer surrender terms to Imperial Japan
See General MacArthur aboard the Missouri battleship offer surrender terms to Imperial Japan
On
the deck of the battleship USS Missouri, General Douglas MacArthur
invites representatives of Japan to sign the terms of surrender, thus
formally ending World War II. From The Second World War: Allied Victory
(1963), a documentary by Encyclopædia Britannica Educational
Corporation.
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
See all videos for this article
Truman
designated MacArthur as the Allied powers’ supreme commander to accept
Japan’s formal surrender, which was solemnized aboard the U.S.
flagship Missouri in Tokyo Bay: the Japanese foreign minister,
Shigemitsu Mamoru, signed the document first, on behalf of the Emperor
and his government. He was followed by General Umezu Yoshijiro on
behalf of the Imperial General Headquarters. The document was then
signed by MacArthur, Nimitz, and representatives of the other Allied
powers. Japan concluded a separate surrender ceremony with China in
Nanking on September 9, 1945. With this last formal surrender, World
War II came to an end.
Pacific War
Part of World War II
Map indicating US landings during the Pacific War
Map showing the main areas of the conflict and Allied landings in the Pacific, 1942–1945
Date
7 December 1941 – 2 September 1945
(3 years, 8 months, 3 weeks and 5 days)
Location
East AsiaSouth AsiaSoutheast AsiaOceania
Pacific OceanIndian Ocean
Result
Allied victory
End of World War II
Fall of the Japanese Empire
Continuation of the Chinese Civil War
Substantial weakening of European colonial powers and the gradual decolonization of Asia
First Indochina War
Indonesian National Revolution
Korean War
1951 Treaty of San Francisco
1956 Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration
Territorial
changes
Allied occupation of Japan
Removal of Japanese troops occupying parts of China and the retrocession of Taiwan to China
Liberation of Korea and Manchuria from Japanese rule, followed by the division of Korea
Cession of Japanese-held islands in the Central Pacific Ocean to the United Nations
Seizure and annexation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands by the Soviet Union
The
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is created by the United
Nations and placed under the authority of the United States. The UN
Security Council ended the vast trusteeship in stages, from 1986-94,
with the US gaining the territory of the Northern Mariana Islands.
Belligerents
Major Allies:
United States
China[a]
British Empire
See section Participants for further details. Major Axis:
Japan
See section Participants for further details.
Commanders and leaders
Main Allied leaders
Franklin D. Roosevelt[b]
Chiang Kai-shek
Winston Churchill[c] Main Axis leaders
Hirohito
Hideki Tōjō[d]
Casualties and losses
Military
4,000,000+ dead (1937–45)
Civilian deaths
26,000,000+ (1937–45)[e]
Military
2,500,000+ dead
Civilian deaths
1,000,000+[f]
vte
Campaigns of World War II
vte
Pacific War
vte
Japanese colonial campaigns
History of Japan
Flag of Japan (1870–1999).svg
List[show]
Topics[show]
GlossaryHistoryTimeline
Oppenheimer
vte
The
Pacific War, sometimes called the Asia–Pacific War,[12] was the
theater of World War II that was fought in the Pacific and Asia. It was
geographically the largest theater of the war, including the vast
Pacific Ocean theater, the South West Pacific theater, the South-East
Asian theater, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Soviet–Japanese
War.
The Second Sino-Japanese War between the Empire of Japan and
the Republic of China had been in progress since 7 July 1937, with
hostilities dating back as far as 19 September 1931 with the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria.[13] However, it is more widely accepted[g][15]
that the Pacific War itself began on 7/8 December 1941, when the
Japanese invaded Thailand and attacked the British colonies of Malaya,
Singapore, and Hong Kong as well as the United States military and naval
bases in Hawaii, Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines.[16][17][18]
The
Pacific War saw the Allies pitted against Japan, the latter aided by
Thailand and to a lesser extent by the Axis allies, Germany and Italy.
Fighting consisted of some of the largest naval battles in history, and
incredibly fierce battles and war crimes across Asia and the Pacific
Islands, resulting in immense loss of human life. The war culminated in
massive Allied air raids over Japan, and the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, accompanied by the Soviet Union's declaration of
war and invasion of Manchuria and other territories on 9 August 1945,
causing the Japanese to announce an intent to surrender on 15 August
1945. The formal surrender of Japan ceremony took place aboard the
battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. After the war,
Japan lost all rights and titles to its former possessions in Asia and
the Pacific, and its sovereignty was limited to the four main home
islands and other minor islands as determined by the Allies.[19] Japan's
Shinto Emperor relinquished much of his authority and his divine
status through the Shinto Directive in order to pave the way for
extensive cultural and political reforms.[20]
Overview
The
Pacific War Council as photographed on 12 October 1942. Pictured are
representatives from the United States (seated), the Philippine
Commonwealth, China, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the
Netherlands, and New Zealand
Names for the war
In Allied countries
during the war, the "Pacific War" was not usually distinguished from
World War II in general, or was known simply as the War against Japan.
In the United States, the term Pacific Theater was widely used, although
this was a misnomer in relation to the Allied campaign in Burma, the
war in China and other activities within the Southeast Asian Theater.
However, the US Armed Forces considered the China-Burma-India Theater to
be distinct from the Asiatic-Pacific Theater during the conflict.
Japan
used the name Greater East Asia War (大東亜戦争, Dai Tō-A Sensō), as chosen
by a cabinet decision on 10 December 1941, to refer to both the war
with the Western Allies and the ongoing war in China. This name was
released to the public on 12 December, with an explanation that it
involved Asian nations achieving their independence from the Western
powers through armed forces of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere.[21] Japanese officials integrated what they called the
Japan–China Incident (日支事変, Nisshi Jihen) into the Greater East Asia
War.
During the Allied military occupation of Japan (1945–52),
these Japanese terms were prohibited in official documents, although
their informal usage continued, and the war became officially known as
the Pacific War (太平洋戦争, Taiheiyō Sensō). In Japan, the Fifteen Years'
War (十五年戦争, Jūgonen Sensō) is also used, referring to the period from
the Mukden Incident of 1931 through 1945.
Participants
Political map of the Asia-Pacific region, 1939
The
Axis aligned states which assisted Japan included the authoritarian
government of Thailand, which formed a cautious alliance with the
Japanese in 1941, when Japanese forces issued the government with an
ultimatum following the Japanese invasion of Thailand. The leader of
Thailand, Plaek Phibunsongkhram, became greatly enthusiastic about the
alliance after decisive Japanese victories in the Malayan campaign and
in 1942 sent the Phayap Army to assist the invasion of Burma, where
former Thai territory that had been annexed by Britain were reoccupied
(Occupied Malayan regions were similarly reintegrated into Thailand in
1943). The Allies supported and organized an underground anti-Japanese
resistance group, known as the Free Thai Movement, after the Thai
ambassador to the United States had refused to hand over the declaration
of war. Because of this, after the surrender in 1945, the stance of
the United States was that Thailand should be treated as a puppet of
Japan and be considered an occupied nation rather than as an ally. This
was done in contrast to the British stance towards Thailand, who had
faced them in combat as they invaded British territory, and the United
States had to block British efforts to impose a punitive peace.[22]
Also
involved were members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,
which included the Manchukuo Imperial Army and Collaborationist Chinese
Army of the Japanese puppet states of Manchukuo (consisting of most of
Manchuria), and the collaborationist Wang Jingwei regime (which
controlled the coastal regions of China), respectively. In the Burma
campaign, other members, such as the anti-British Indian National Army
of Free India and the Burma National Army of the State of Burma were
active and fighting alongside their Japanese allies.[citation needed]
Moreover,
Japan conscripted many soldiers from its colonies of Korea and Taiwan.
Collaborationist security units were also formed in Hong Kong
(reformed ex-colonial police), Singapore, the Philippines (also a
member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere), the Dutch East
Indies (the PETA), British Malaya, British Borneo, former French
Indochina (after the overthrow of the French regime in 1945 (the Vichy
French had previously allowed the Japanese to use bases in French
Indochina beginning in 1941, following an invasion) as well as Timorese
militia. These units assisted the Japanese war effort in their
respective territories.[citation needed]
Germany and Italy both
had limited involvement in the Pacific War. The German and the Italian
navies operated submarines and raiding ships in the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, notably the Monsun Gruppe. The Italians had access to
concession territory naval bases in China which they utilized (and
which was later ceded to collaborationist China by the Italian Social
Republic in late 1943). After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the
subsequent declarations of war, both navies had access to Japanese
naval facilities.[citation needed]
The major Allied participants
were the United States and its colonies (including the Philippine
Commonwealth, where a guerrilla war was waged after its conquest),
China, which had already been engaged in bloody war against Japan since
1937 including both the KMT government National Revolutionary Army and
CCP units, such as the guerrilla Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, as
well as smaller groups. The United Kingdom was also a major
belligerent (mostly through colonial troops from the armed forces of
India as well as from Burma, Malaya, Fiji, Tonga, etc., but also with
large numbers of British troops). Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and
the Dutch government-in-exile (as the possessor of the Dutch East
Indies) were also involved, all of whom were members of the Pacific War
Council.[23]
Mexico provided some air support in the form of
the 201st Fighter Squadron and Free France sent naval support in the
form of Le Triomphant and later the Richelieu. From 1944 the French
commando group Corps Léger d'Intervention also took part in resistance
operations in Indochina. French Indochinese forces faced Japanese
forces in a coup in 1945. The commando corps continued to operate after
the coup until liberation. Some active pro-allied guerrillas in Asia
included the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, the Korean Liberation
Army, the Free Thai Movement and the Việt Minh.[citation needed]
The
Soviet Union fought two short, undeclared border conflicts with Japan
in 1938 and 1939, then remained neutral through the Soviet–Japanese
Neutrality Pact of April 1941, until August 1945 when it (and Mongolia)
joined the rest of the Allies and invaded the territory of Manchukuo,
China, Inner Mongolia, the Japanese protectorate of Korea and
Japanese-claimed territory such as South Sakhalin.[citation needed]
Theaters
Between
1942 and 1945, there were four main areas of conflict in the Pacific
War: China, the Central Pacific, South-East Asia and the South West
Pacific. US sources refer to two theaters within the Pacific War: the
Pacific theater and the China Burma India Theater (CBI). However these
were not operational commands.
In the Pacific, the Allies
divided operational control of their forces between two supreme
commands, known as Pacific Ocean Areas and Southwest Pacific Area.[24]
In 1945, for a brief period just before the Japanese surrender, the
Soviet Union and Mongolia engaged Japanese forces in Manchuria and
northeast China.
The Imperial Japanese Navy did not integrate
its units into permanent theater commands. The Imperial Japanese Army,
which had already created the Kwantung Army to oversee its occupation
of Manchukuo and the China Expeditionary Army during the Second
Sino-Japanese War, created the Southern Expeditionary Army Group at the
outset of its conquests of South East Asia. This headquarters
controlled the bulk of the Japanese Army formations which opposed the
Western Allies in the Pacific and South East Asia.
Historical background
Conflict between China and Japan
Main article: Second Sino-Japanese War
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater from 1942 to 1945
By
1937, Japan controlled Manchuria and it was also ready to move deeper
into China. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937 provoked
full-scale war between China and Japan. The Nationalist Party and the
Chinese Communists suspended their civil war in order to form a nominal
alliance against Japan, and the Soviet Union quickly lent support by
providing large amount of materiel to Chinese troops. In August 1937,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek deployed his best army to fight about
300,000 Japanese troops in Shanghai, but, after three months of
fighting, Shanghai fell.[25] The Japanese continued to push the Chinese
forces back, capturing the capital Nanjing in December 1937 and
conducted the Nanjing Massacre.[26] In March 1938, Nationalist forces
won their first victory at Taierzhuang,[27] but then the city of Xuzhou
was taken by the Japanese in May. In June 1938, Japan deployed about
350,000 troops to invade Wuhan and captured it in October.[28] The
Japanese achieved major military victories, but world opinion—in
particular in the United States—condemned Japan, especially after the
Panay incident.
In 1939, Japanese forces tried to push into the
Soviet Far East from Manchuria. They were soundly defeated in the Battle
of Khalkhin Gol by a mixed Soviet and Mongolian force led by Georgy
Zhukov. This stopped Japanese expansion to the north, and Soviet aid to
China ended as a result of the signing of the Soviet–Japanese
Neutrality Pact at the beginning of its war against Germany.[29]
Chinese casualties of a mass panic during a June 1941 Japanese aerial bombing of Chongqing
In
September 1940, Japan decided to cut China's only land line to the
outside world by seizing French Indochina, which was controlled at the
time by Vichy France. Japanese forces broke their agreement with the
Vichy administration and fighting broke out, ending in a Japanese
victory. On 27 September Japan signed a military alliance with Germany
and Italy, becoming one of the three main Axis Powers. In practice,
there was little coordination between Japan and Germany until 1944, by
which time the US was deciphering their secret diplomatic
correspondence.[30]
The war entered a new phase with the
unprecedented defeat of the Japanese at the Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang,
1st Battle of Changsha, Battle of Kunlun Pass and Battle of Zaoyi. After
these victories, Chinese nationalist forces launched a large-scale
counter-offensive in early 1940; however, due to its low
military-industrial capacity, it was repulsed by the Imperial Japanese
Army in late March 1940.[31] In August 1940, Chinese communists launched
an offensive in Central China; in retaliation, Japan instituted the
"Three Alls Policy" ("Kill all, Burn all, Loot all") in occupied areas
to reduce human and material resources for the communists.[32]
By
1941 the conflict had become a stalemate. Although Japan had occupied
much of northern, central, and coastal China, the Nationalist
Government had retreated to the interior with a provisional capital set
up at Chungking while the Chinese communists remained in control of
base areas in Shaanxi. In addition, Japanese control of northern and
central China was somewhat tenuous, in that Japan was usually able to
control railroads and the major cities ("points and lines"), but did
not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast
Chinese countryside. The Japanese found its aggression against the
retreating and regrouping Chinese army was stalled by the mountainous
terrain in southwestern China while the Communists organised widespread
guerrilla and saboteur activities in northern and eastern China behind
the Japanese front line.
Japan sponsored several puppet
governments, one of which was headed by Wang Jingwei.[33] However, its
policies of brutality toward the Chinese population, of not yielding
any real power to these regimes, and of supporting several rival
governments failed to make any of them a viable alternative to the
Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek. Conflicts between
Chinese Communist and Nationalist forces vying for territory control
behind enemy lines culminated in a major armed clash in January 1941,
effectively ending their co-operation.[34]
Japanese strategic
bombing efforts mostly targeted large Chinese cities such as Shanghai,
Wuhan, and Chongqing, with around 5,000 raids from February 1938 to
August 1943 in the later case. Japan's strategic bombing campaigns
devastated Chinese cities extensively, killing 260,000–350,934
non-combatants.[35][36]
Tensions between Japan and the West
From
as early as 1935 Japanese military strategists had concluded the Dutch
East Indies were, because of their oil reserves, of considerable
importance to Japan. By 1940 they had expanded this to include
Indochina, Malaya, and the Philippines within their concept of the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japanese troop build ups in
Hainan, Taiwan, and Haiphong were noted, Imperial Japanese Army officers
were openly talking about an inevitable war, and Admiral Sankichi
Takahashi was reported as saying a showdown with the United States was
necessary.[37]
In an effort to discourage Japanese militarism,
Western powers including Australia, the United States, Britain, and the
Dutch government in exile, which controlled the petroleum-rich Dutch
East Indies, stopped selling oil, iron ore, and steel to Japan, denying
it the raw materials needed to continue its activities in China and
French Indochina. In Japan, the government and nationalists viewed these
embargos as acts of aggression; imported oil made up about 80% of
domestic consumption, without which Japan's economy, let alone its
military, would grind to a halt. The Japanese media, influenced by
military propagandists,[h] began to refer to the embargoes as the "ABCD
("American-British-Chinese-Dutch") encirclement" or "ABCD line".
Faced
with a choice between economic collapse and withdrawal from its recent
conquests (with its attendant loss of face), the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters (GHQ) began planning for a war with the Western
powers in April or May 1941.
Japanese preparations
In
preparation for the war against the United States, which would be
decided at sea and in the air, Japan increased its naval budget as well
as putting large formations of the Army and its attached air force
under navy command. While formerly the IJA consumed the lion's share of
the state's military budget due to the secondary role of the IJN in
Japan's campaign against China (with a 73/27 split in 1940), from 1942
to 1945 there would instead be a roughly 60/40 split in funds between
the army and the navy.[40] Japan's key objective during the initial
part of the conflict was to seize economic resources in the Dutch East
Indies and Malaya which offered Japan a way to escape the effects of
the Allied embargo.[41] This was known as the Southern Plan. It was
also decided—because of the close relationship between the United
Kingdom and United States,[42][43] and the (mistaken[42]) belief that
the US would inevitably become involved—that Japan would also require
taking the Philippines, Wake and Guam.
Japanese planning was for
fighting a limited war where Japan would seize key objectives and then
establish a defensive perimeter to defeat Allied counterattacks, which
in turn would lead to a negotiated peace.[44] The attack on the US
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, by carrier-based aircraft of the
Combined Fleet was intended to give the Japanese time to complete a
perimeter.
The early period of the war was divided into two
operational phases. The First Operational Phase was further divided
into three separate parts in which the major objectives of the
Philippines, British Malaya, Borneo, Burma, Rabaul and the Dutch East
Indies would be occupied. The Second Operational Phase called for
further expansion into the South Pacific by seizing eastern New Guinea,
New Britain, Fiji, Samoa, and strategic points in the Australian area.
In the Central Pacific, Midway was targeted as were the Aleutian
Islands in the North Pacific. Seizure of these key areas would provide
defensive depth and deny the Allies staging areas from which to mount a
counteroffensive.[44]
By November these plans were essentially
complete, and were modified only slightly over the next month. Japanese
military planners' expectation of success rested on the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union being unable to effectively respond to a Japanese
attack because of the threat posed to each by Germany; the Soviet
Union was even seen as unlikely to commence hostilities.
The
Japanese leadership was aware that a total military victory in a
traditional sense against the US was impossible; the alternative would
be negotiating for peace after their initial victories, which would
recognize Japanese hegemony in Asia.[45] In fact, the Imperial GHQ
noted, should acceptable negotiations be reached with the Americans,
the attacks were to be canceled—even if the order to attack had already
been given. The Japanese leadership looked to base the conduct of the
war against America on the historical experiences of the successful
wars against China (1894–95) and Russia (1904–05), in both of which a
strong continental power was defeated by reaching limited military
objectives, not by total conquest.[45]
They also planned, should
the United States transfer its Pacific Fleet to the Philippines, to
intercept and attack this fleet en route with the Combined Fleet, in
keeping with all Japanese Navy prewar planning and doctrine. If the
United States or Britain attacked first, the plans further stipulated
the military were to hold their positions and wait for orders from GHQ.
The planners noted that attacking the Philippines and British Malaya
still had possibilities of success, even in the worst case of a
combined preemptive attack including Soviet forces.
Japanese offensives, 1941–42
Following
prolonged tensions between Japan and the Western powers, units of the
Imperial Japanese Navy and Imperial Japanese Army launched simultaneous
surprise attacks on Australian, British, Dutch and US forces on 7
December (8 December in Asia/West Pacific time zones).
The
locations of this first wave of Japanese attacks included Hawaii,
Malaya, Sarawak, Guam, Wake Island, Hong Kong, and the Philippines.
Japanese forces also simultaneously invaded southern and eastern
Thailand and were resisted for several hours, before the Thai government
signed an armistice and entered an alliance with Japan.
Attack on Pearl Harbor
Main article: Attack on Pearl Harbor
USS Arizona burned for two days after being hit by a Japanese bomb in the attack on Pearl Harbor.
In
the early hours of 7 December (Hawaiian time), Japan launched a major
surprise carrier-based air strike on Pearl Harbor in Honolulu without
explicit warning, which crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet, left eight
American battleships out of action, 188 American aircraft destroyed, and
caused the deaths of 2,403 Americans.[46] The Japanese had gambled
that the United States, when faced with such a sudden and massive blow
and loss of life, would agree to a negotiated settlement and allow
Japan free rein in Asia. This gamble did not pay off. American losses
were less serious than initially thought: the American aircraft
carriers, which would prove to be more important than battleships, were
at sea, and vital naval infrastructure (fuel oil tanks, shipyard
facilities, and a power station), submarine base, and signals
intelligence units were unscathed, and the fact the bombing happened
while the US was not officially at war anywhere in the world[i] caused a
wave of outrage across the United States.[46] Japan's fallback
strategy, relying on a war of attrition to make the US come to terms,
was beyond the IJN's capabilities.[42][47]
Before the attack on
Pearl Harbor, the 800,000-member America First Committee vehemently
opposed any American intervention in the European conflict, even as
America sold military aid to Britain and the Soviet Union through the
Lend-Lease program. Opposition to war in the US vanished after the
attack. On 8 December, the United States,[48] the United Kingdom,[49]
Canada,[50] and the Netherlands[51] declared war on Japan, followed by
China[52] and Australia[53] the next day. Four days after Pearl Harbor,
Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, drawing the
country into a two-theater war. This is widely agreed to be a grand
strategic blunder, as it abrogated both the benefit Germany gained by
Japan's distraction of the US and the reduction in aid to Britain,
which both Congress and Hitler had managed to avoid during over a year
of mutual provocation, which would otherwise have resulted.
South-East Asian campaigns of 1941–42
HMS
Prince of Wales (left, front) and HMS Repulse (left, rear) under
attack by Japanese aircraft. A destroyer is in the foreground.
British,
Australian, and Dutch forces, already drained of personnel and
matériel by two years of war with Germany, and heavily committed in the
Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere, were unable to provide much
more than token resistance to the battle-hardened Japanese. The Allies
suffered many disastrous defeats in the first six months of the war.
Two major British warships, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, were
sunk by a Japanese air attack off Malaya on 10 December 1941.[54]
Thailand,
with its territory already serving as a springboard for the Malayan
Campaign, surrendered within 5 hours of the Japanese invasion.[55] The
government of Thailand formally allied with Japan on 21 December. To the
south, the Imperial Japanese Army had seized the British colony of
Penang on 19 December, encountering little resistance.[56]
Hong
Kong was attacked on 8 December and fell on 25 December 1941, with
Canadian forces and the Royal Hong Kong Volunteers playing an important
part in the defense. American bases on Guam and Wake Island were lost
at around the same time.
Following the Declaration by United
Nations (the first official use of the term United Nations) on 1 January
1942, the Allied governments appointed the British General Sir
Archibald Wavell to the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command
(ABDACOM), a supreme command for Allied forces in Southeast Asia. This
gave Wavell nominal control of a huge force, albeit thinly spread over
an area from Burma to the Philippines to northern Australia. Other
areas, including India, Hawaii, and the rest of Australia remained under
separate local commands. On 15 January, Wavell moved to Bandung in
Java to assume control of ABDACOM.
The Bombing of Darwin, Australia, 19 February 1942
In
January, Japan invaded British Burma, the Dutch East Indies, New
Guinea, the Solomon Islands and captured Manila, Kuala Lumpur and
Rabaul. After being driven out of Malaya, Allied forces in Singapore
attempted to resist the Japanese during the Battle of Singapore, but
were forced to surrender to the Japanese on 15 February 1942; about
130,000 Indian, British, Australian and Dutch personnel became prisoners
of war.[57] The pace of conquest was rapid: Bali[58] and Timor[59]
also fell in February. The rapid collapse of Allied resistance left the
"ABDA area" split in two. Wavell resigned from ABDACOM on 25 February,
handing control of the ABDA Area to local commanders and returning to
the post of Commander-in-Chief, India.
Meanwhile, Japanese
aircraft had all but eliminated Allied air power in Southeast Asia[60]
and were making attacks on northern Australia, beginning with a
psychologically devastating but militarily insignificant attack on the
city of Darwin[60] on 19 February, which killed at least 243 people.
At
the Battle of the Java Sea in late February and early March, the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) inflicted a resounding defeat on the main
ABDA naval force, under Admiral Karel Doorman.[61] The Dutch East Indies
campaign subsequently ended with the surrender of Allied forces on
Java[62] and Sumatra.[63]
In March and April, a powerful IJN
carrier force launched a raid into the Indian Ocean. British Royal Navy
bases in Ceylon were hit and the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes and other
Allied ships were sunk. The attack forced the Royal Navy to withdraw to
the western part of the Indian Ocean.[64] This paved the way for a
Japanese assault on Burma and India.
In Burma, the British, under
intense pressure, made a fighting retreat from Rangoon to the
Indo-Burmese border. This cut the Burma Road, which was the western
Allies' supply line to the Chinese Nationalists. In March 1942, the
Chinese Expeditionary Force started to attack Japanese forces in
northern Burma. On 16 April, 7,000 British soldiers were encircled by
the Japanese 33rd Division during the Battle of Yenangyaung and rescued
by the Chinese 38th Division, led by Sun Li-jen.[65] Cooperation
between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists had waned from its
zenith at the Battle of Wuhan, and the relationship between the two had
gone sour as both attempted to expand their areas of operation in
occupied territories. The Japanese exploited this lack of unity to
press ahead in their offensives.
Philippines
Main article: Philippines campaign (1941–1942)
Surrender of US forces at Corregidor, Philippines, May 1942
On
8 December 1941, Japanese bombers struck American airfields on Luzon.
They caught most of the planes on the ground, destroying 103 aircraft,
more than half of the US air strength.[66] Two days later, further
raids led to the destruction of the Cavite Naval Yard, south of Manila.
By 13 December, Japanese attacks had wrecked every major airfield and
virtually annihilated American air power.[66] During the previous month
before the start of hostilities, a part of the US Asiatic Fleet, had
been sent to the southern Philippines. However, with little air
protection, the remaining surface vessels in the Philippines, especially
the larger ships were sent to Java or to Australia. With their
position also equally untenable, the remaining American bombers, flew
to Australia in mid-December.[66] The only forces that remained to
defend the Philippines were the ground troops, a few fighter aircraft,
about 30 submarines, and a few small vessels.
On 10 December,
Japanese forces began a series of small-scale landings on Luzon. The
main landings by the 14th Army took place at Lingayen Gulf on 22
December, with the bulk of the 16th Infantry Division. Another large
second landing took place two days later at Lamon Bay, south of Manila,
by the 48th infantry Division. As the Japanese troops converged on
Manila, General Douglas MacArthur, began executing plans to make a
final stand on the Bataan Peninsula and the Island of Corregidor in
order to deny the use of Manila Bay to the Japanese. A series of
withdrawal actions brought his troops safely into Bataan, while the
Japanese entered Manila unopposed on 2 January 1942.[67] On 7 January,
the Japanese attacked Bataan. After some initial success, they were
stalled by disease and casualties, but they could be reinforced while
the Americans and Filipinos could not. On 11 March 1942, under orders
from President Roosevelt, MacArthur left Corregidor for Australia, and
Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright assumed command in the
Philippines. The defenders on Bataan, running low on ammunition and
supplies could not hold back a final Japanese offensive. Consequently,
Bataan fell on 9 April, with the 76,000 American and Filipino prisoners
of war being subjected to a grueling 66-mile (106-km) ordeal that came
to be known as the Bataan Death March. On the night of 5–6 May, after
an intensive aerial and artillery bombardment of Corregidor, the
Japanese landed on the island and General Wainwright surrendered on 6
May. In the southern Philippines, where key ports and airfields had
already been seized by the Japanese, the remaining American-Filipino
forces surrendered on 9 May.
US and Filipino forces resisted in
the Philippines until 9 May 1942, when more than 80,000 soldiers were
ordered to surrender. By this time, General Douglas MacArthur, who had
been appointed Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific, had been
withdrawn to Australia. The US Navy, under Admiral Chester Nimitz, had
responsibility for the rest of the Pacific Ocean. This divided command
had unfortunate consequences for the commerce war,[68] and
consequently, the war itself.
Threat to Australia
In late
1941, as the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, most of Australia's best
forces were committed to the fight against Axis forces in the
Mediterranean Theatre. Australia was ill-prepared for an attack, lacking
armaments, modern fighter aircraft, heavy bombers, and aircraft
carriers. While still calling for reinforcements from Churchill, the
Australian Prime Minister John Curtin called for American support with a
historic announcement on 27 December 1941:[69][70]
Dutch
and Australian PoWs at Tarsau, in Thailand in 1943. 22,000 Australians
were captured by the Japanese; 8,000 died as prisoners of war.
The
Australian Government ... regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one
in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in
the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without inhibitions of
any kind, I make it clear that Australia looks to America, free of any
pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.
— Prime Minister John Curtin
Australia
had been shocked by the speedy and crushing collapse of British Malaya
and the Fall of Singapore in which around 15,000 Australian soldiers
were captured and became prisoners of war. Curtin predicted the "battle
for Australia" would soon follow. The Japanese established a major base
in the Australian Territory of New Guinea in March 1942.[71] On 19
February, Darwin suffered a devastating air raid, the first time the
Australian mainland had been attacked. Over the following 19 months,
Australia was attacked from the air almost 100 times.
US
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of Allied forces in the South-West
Pacific Area, with Australian Prime Minister John Curtin
Two
battle-hardened Australian divisions were moving from the Middle East
for Singapore. Churchill wanted them diverted to Burma, but Curtin
insisted on a return to Australia. In early 1942 elements of the
Imperial Japanese Navy proposed an invasion of Australia. The Imperial
Japanese Army opposed the plan and it was rejected in favour of a policy
of isolating Australia from the United States via blockade by
advancing through the South Pacific.[72] The Japanese decided upon a
seaborne invasion of Port Moresby, capital of the Australian Territory
of Papua which would put all of Northern Australia within range of
Japanese bomber aircraft.
President Franklin Roosevelt ordered
General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines to formulate a Pacific
defence plan with Australia in March 1942. Curtin agreed to place
Australian forces under the command of MacArthur, who became Supreme
Commander, South West Pacific. MacArthur moved his headquarters to
Melbourne in March 1942 and American troops began massing in Australia.
Enemy naval activity reached Sydney in late May 1942, when Japanese
midget submarines launched a raid on Sydney Harbour. On 8 June 1942,
two Japanese submarines briefly shelled Sydney's eastern suburbs and
the city of Newcastle.[73]
Allies re-group, 1942–43
Japanese advance until mid-1942
In
early 1942, the governments of smaller powers began to push for an
inter-governmental Asia–Pacific war council, based in Washington, DC. A
council was established in London, with a subsidiary body in
Washington. However, the smaller powers continued to push for an
American-based body. The Pacific War Council was formed in Washington,
on 1 April 1942, with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his key advisor
Harry Hopkins, and representatives from Britain, China, Australia, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Canada. Representatives from India and
the Philippines were later added. The council never had any direct
operational control, and any decisions it made were referred to the
US–UK Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was also in Washington. Allied
resistance, at first symbolic, gradually began to stiffen. Australian
and Dutch forces led civilians in a prolonged guerilla campaign in
Portuguese Timor.
Japanese strategy and the Doolittle Raid
A B-25 bomber takes off from USS Hornet as part of the Doolittle Raid.
Having
accomplished their objectives during the First Operation Phase with
ease, the Japanese now turned to the second.[74] The Second Operational
Phase planned to expand Japan's strategic depth by adding eastern New
Guinea, New Britain, the Aleutians, Midway, the Fiji Islands, Samoa, and
strategic points in the Australian area.[75] However, the Naval
General Staff, the Combined Fleet, and the Imperial Army, all had
different strategies on the next sequence of operations. The Naval
General Staff advocated an advance to the south to seize parts of
Australia. However, with large numbers of troops still engaged in China
combined with those stationed in Manchuria in a standoff with the
Soviet Union, the Imperial Japanese Army declined to contribute the
forces necessary for such an operation,[75] this quickly led to the
abandonment of the concept. The Naval General Staff still wanted to cut
the sea links between Australia and the United States by capturing New
Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. Since this required far fewer troops, on
13 March the Naval General Staff and the Army agreed to operations with
the goal of capturing Fiji and Samoa.[75] The Second Operational Phase
began well when Lae and Salamaua, located in eastern New Guinea, were
captured on 8 March. However, on 10 March, American carrier aircraft
attacked the invasion forces and inflicted considerable losses. The
raid had major operational implications since it forced the Japanese to
stop their advance in the South Pacific, until the Combined Fleet
provided the means to protect future operations from American carrier
attack.[75] Concurrently, the Doolittle Raid occurred in April 1942,
where 16 bombers took off from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet, 600
miles (970 km) from Japan. The raid inflicted minimal material damage
on Japanese soil but was a huge morale boost for the United States; it
also had major psychological repercussions in Japan, in exposing the
vulnerabilities of the Japanese homeland.[76] As the raid was mounted
by a carrier task force, it consequently highlighted the dangers the
Japanese home islands could face until the destruction of the American
carrier forces was achieved.[77] With only Marcus Island and a line of
converted trawlers patrolling the vast waters that separate Wake and
Kamchatka, the Japanese east coast was left open to attack.[77]
Admiral
Yamamoto now perceived that it was essential to complete the
destruction of the United States Navy, which had begun at Pearl
Harbor.[75] He proposed to achieve this by attacking and occupying
Midway Atoll, an objective he thought the Americans would be certain to
fight for, as Midway was close enough to threaten Hawaii.[78] During a
series of meetings held from 2–5 April, the Naval General Staff and
representatives of the Combined Fleet reached a compromise. Yamamoto
got his Midway operation, but only after he had threatened to resign.
In return, however, Yamamoto had to agree to two demands from the Naval
General Staff, both of which had implications for the Midway
operation. In order to cover the offensive in the South Pacific,
Yamamoto agreed to allocate one carrier division to the operation
against Port Moresby. Yamamoto also agreed to include an attack to
seize strategic points in the Aleutian Islands simultaneously with the
Midway operation. These were enough to remove the Japanese margin of
superiority in the coming Midway attack.[79]
Coral Sea
Main article: Battle of the Coral Sea
The aircraft carrier USS Lexington explodes on 8 May 1942, several hours after being damaged by a Japanese carrier air attack.
The
attack on Port Moresby was codenamed MO Operation and was divided into
several parts or phases. In the first, Tulagi would be occupied on 3
May, the carriers would then conduct a wide sweep through the Coral Sea
to find and attack and destroy Allied naval forces, with the landings
conducted to capture Port Moresby scheduled for 10 May.[79] The MO
Operation featured a force of 60 ships led by two carriers: Shōkaku and
Zuikaku, one light carrier (Shōhō), six heavy cruisers, three light
cruisers, and 15 destroyers.[79] Additionally, some 250 aircraft were
assigned to the operation including 140 aboard the three carriers.[79]
However, the actual battle did not go according to plan; although Tulagi
was seized on 3 May, the following day, aircraft from the American
carrier Yorktown struck the invasion force.[79] The element of surprise,
which had been present at Pearl Harbor, was now lost due to the
success of Allied codebreakers who had discovered the attack would be
against Port Moresby. From the Allied point of view, if Port Moresby
fell, the Japanese would control the seas to the north and west of
Australia and could isolate the country. An Allied task force under the
command of Admiral Frank Fletcher, with the carriers USS Lexington and
USS Yorktown, was assembled to stop the Japanese advance. For the next
two days, the American and Japanese carrier forces tried
unsuccessfully to locate each other. On 7 May, the Japanese carriers
launched a full strike on a contact reported to be enemy carriers, but
the report turned out to be false. The strike force found and struck
only an oiler, the Neosho, and the destroyer Sims.[80] The American
carriers also launched a strike with incomplete reconnaissance, and
instead of finding the main Japanese carrier force, they only located
and sank Shōhō. On 8 May, the opposing carrier forces finally found
each other and exchanged air strikes. The 69 aircraft from the two
Japanese carriers succeeded in sinking the carrier Lexington and
damaging Yorktown. In return the Americans damaged Shōkaku. Although
Zuikaku was left undamaged, aircraft and personnel losses to Zuikaku
were heavy and the Japanese were unable to support a landing on Port
Moresby. As a result, the MO Operation was cancelled,[81] and the
Japanese were subsequently forced to abandon their attempts to isolate
Australia.[82] Although they managed to sink a carrier, the battle was a
disaster for the Japanese. Not only was the attack on Port Moresby
halted, which constituted the first strategic Japanese setback of the
war, but all three carriers that were committed to the battle would now
be unavailable for the operation against Midway.[81] The Battle of the
Coral Sea was the first naval battle fought in which the ships
involved never sighted each other, with attacks solely by aircraft.
After
Coral Sea, the Japanese had four fleet carriers operational—Sōryū,
Kaga, Akagi and Hiryū—and believed that the Americans had a maximum of
two—Enterprise and Hornet. Saratoga was out of action, undergoing
repair after a torpedo attack, while Yorktown had been damaged at Coral
Sea and was believed by Japanese naval intelligence to have been sunk.
She would, in fact, sortie for Midway after just three days of repairs
to her flight deck, with civilian work crews still aboard, in time to
be present for the next decisive engagement.
Midway
Main article: Battle of Midway
Hiryū under attack by B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers
Admiral
Yamamoto viewed the operation against Midway as the potentially
decisive battle of the war which could lead to the destruction of
American strategic power in the Pacific,[83] and subsequently open the
door for a negotiated peace settlement with the United States, favorable
to Japan.[81] For the operation, the Japanese had only four carriers;
Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū. Through strategic and tactical surprise,
the Japanese would knock out Midway's air strength and soften it for a
landing by 5,000 troops.[81] After the quick capture of the island, the
Combined Fleet would lay the basis for the most important part of the
operation. Yamamoto hoped that the attack would lure the Americans into
a trap.[84] Midway was to be bait for the USN which would depart Pearl
Harbor to counterattack after Midway had been captured. When the
Americans arrived, he would concentrate his scattered forces to defeat
them. An important aspect of the scheme was Operation AL, which was the
plan to seize two islands in the Aleutians, concurrently with the
attack on Midway.[81] Contradictory to persistent myth, the Aleutian
operation was not a diversion to draw American forces from Midway, as
the Japanese wanted the Americans to be drawn to Midway, rather than
away from it.[85] However, in May, Allied codebreakers discovered the
planned attack on Midway. Yamamoto's complex plan had no provision for
intervention by the American fleet before the Japanese had expected
them. Planned surveillance of the American fleet in Pearl Harbor by
long-ranged seaplanes did not occur as a result of an abortive identical
operation in March. Japanese submarine scouting lines that were
supposed to be in place along the Hawaiian Islands were not completed on
time, consequently the Japanese were unable to detect the American
carriers. In one search area Japanese submarines had arrived on station
only a matter of hours ahead of Task Force 17, containing Yorktown,
which had passed through just before midnight on 31 May.[86]
The
battle began on 3 June, when American aircraft from Midway spotted and
attacked the Japanese transport group 700 miles (1,100 km) west of the
atoll.[87] On 4 June, the Japanese launched a 108-aircraft strike on
the island, the attackers brushing aside Midway's defending fighters
but failing to deliver a decisive blow to the island's facilities.[88]
Most importantly, the strike aircraft based on Midway had already
departed to attack the Japanese carriers, which had been spotted. This
information was passed to the three American carriers and a total of
116 carrier aircraft, in addition to those from Midway, were on their
way to attack the Japanese. The aircraft from Midway attacked, but
failed to score a single hit on the Japanese. In the middle of these
uncoordinated attacks, a Japanese scout aircraft reported the presence
of an American task force, but it was not until later that the presence
of an American carrier was confirmed.[88] Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo
was put in a difficult tactical situation in which he had to counter
continuous American air attacks and prepare to recover his Midway
strike planes, while deciding whether to mount an immediate strike on
the American carrier or wait to prepare a proper attack.[89] After
quick deliberation, he opted for a delayed but better-prepared attack
on the American task force after recovering his Midway strike and
properly arming aircraft.[89] However, beginning at 10.22am, American
SBD Dauntless dive bombers surprised and successfully attacked three of
the Japanese carriers.[89] With their decks laden with fully fueled
and armed aircraft, Sōryū, Kaga, and Akagi were turned into blazing
wrecks. A single Japanese carrier, Hiryū, remained operational, and
launched an immediate counterattack. Both of her attacks hit Yorktown
and put her out of action. Later in the afternoon, aircraft from the
two remaining American carriers found and destroyed Hiryū. The crippled
Yorktown, along with the destroyer Hammann, were both sunk by the
Japanese submarine I-168. With the striking power of the Kido Butai
having been destroyed, Japan's offensive power was blunted. Early on
the morning of 5 June, with the battle lost, the Japanese cancelled the
Midway operation and the initiative in the Pacific was in the
balance.[90] Parshall and Tully note that although the Japanese lost
four carriers, losses at Midway did not radically degrade the fighting
capabilities of the IJN aviation as a whole.[91]
New Guinea and the Solomons
Main articles: New Guinea campaign and Solomon Islands campaign
Japanese
land forces continued to advance in the Solomon Islands and New
Guinea. From July 1942, a few Australian reserve battalions, many of
them very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in
New Guinea, against a Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track, towards
Port Moresby, over the rugged Owen Stanley Ranges. The militia, worn
out and severely depleted by casualties, were relieved in late August
by regular troops from the Second Australian Imperial Force, returning
from action in the Mediterranean theater. In early September 1942
Japanese marines attacked a strategic Royal Australian Air Force base
at Milne Bay, near the eastern tip of New Guinea. They were beaten back
by Allied forces (primarily Australian Army infantry battalions and
Royal Australian Air Force squadrons, with United States Army engineers
and an anti-aircraft battery in support), the first defeat of the war
for Japanese forces on land.[92]
Guadalcanal
Main article: Guadalcanal campaign
US Marines rest in the field during the Guadalcanal campaign in November 1942.
At
the same time as major battles raged in New Guinea, Allied forces
became aware of a Japanese airfield under construction at Guadalcanal
through coastwatchers.[93] On 7 August, US Marines landed on the islands
of Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomons. Vice Admiral Gunichi
Mikawa, commander of the newly formed Eighth Fleet at Rabaul, reacted
quickly. Gathering five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a
destroyer, he sailed to engage the Allied force off the coast of
Guadalcanal. On the night of 8–9 August, Mikawa's quick response
resulted in the Battle of Savo Island, a brilliant Japanese victory
during which four Allied heavy cruisers were sunk,[90] while no
Japanese ships were lost. It was one of the worst Allied naval defeats
of the war.[90] The victory was only mitigated by the failure of the
Japanese to attack the vulnerable transports. Had it been done so, the
first American counterattack in the Pacific could have been stopped.
The Japanese originally perceived the American landings as nothing more
than a reconnaissance in force.[94]
With Japanese and Allied
forces occupying various parts of the island, over the following six
months both sides poured resources into an escalating battle of
attrition on land, at sea, and in the sky. US air cover based at
Henderson Field ensured American control of the waters around
Guadalcanal during day time, while superior night-fighting capabilities
of the Imperial Japanese Navy gave the Japanese the upper hand at
night. In August, Japanese and US carrier forces engaged in an
indecisive clash known as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. In
October, US cruiser and destroyer forces successfully challenged the
Japanese in night-time fighting during the Battle of Cape Esperance,
sinking one Japanese cruiser and one destroyer for the loss of one
destroyer. During the night of 13 October, two Japanese fast
battleships Kongo and Haruna bombarded Henderson Field. The airfield
was temporarily disabled but quickly returned to service. In 26
October, Japanese carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku sank USS Hornet (CV-8)
and heavily damaged USS Enterprise (CV-6) in the Battle of the Santa
Cruz Islands. The loss of Hornet, coupled with the earlier loss of USS
Wasp (CV-7) to the IJN submarine I-19 in September, meant that US
carrier strength in the region was reduced to a single ship,
Enterprise. However, the two IJN carriers had suffered severe losses in
aircraft and pilots as well and had to retire to home waters for
repair and replenishment. From 12 November to 15 November, Japanese and
American surface ships engaged in fierce night actions in the Naval
Battle of Guadalcanal, one of the only two battles in the Pacific War
during which battleships fought each other, that saw two US admirals
killed in action and two Japanese battleships sunk.
During the
campaign, most of the Japanese aircraft based in the South Pacific were
redeployed to the defense of Guadalcanal. Many were lost in numerous
engagements with the Allied air forces based at Henderson Field as well
as carrier based aircraft. Meanwhile, Japanese ground forces launched
repeated attacks on heavily defended US positions around Henderson
Field, in which they suffered appalling casualties. To sustain these
offensives, resupply was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed the
"Tokyo Express" by the Allies. The convoys often faced night battles
with enemy naval forces in which they expended destroyers that the IJN
could ill-afford to lose. Fleet battles involving heavier ships and even
daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near
Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from the multitude of
ships sunk on both sides. However, the Allies were much better able to
replace these losses. Finally recognizing that the campaign to
recapture Henderson Field and secure Guadalcanal had simply become too
costly to continue, the Japanese evacuated the island and withdrew in
February 1943. In the six-month war of attrition, the Japanese had lost
as a result of failing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.[95]
Allied advances in New Guinea and the Solomons
By
late 1942, Japanese headquarters decided to make Guadalcanal their
priority. They ordered the Japanese on the Kokoda Track, within sight of
the lights of Port Moresby, to retreat to the northeastern coast of
New Guinea. Australian and US forces attacked their fortified positions
and after more than two months of fighting in the Buna–Gona area
finally captured the key Japanese beachhead in early 1943.
In
June 1943, the Allies launched Operation Cartwheel, which defined their
offensive strategy in the South Pacific. The operation was aimed at
isolating the major Japanese forward base at Rabaul and cutting its
supply and communication lines. This prepared the way for Nimitz's
island-hopping campaign towards Japan.
Stalemate in China and Southeast Asia
China 1942–1943
Main article: Second Sino-Japanese War
Chinese troops during the Battle of Changde in November 1943
In
mainland China, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions, a grand
total of around 120,000 troops, massed at Yueyang and advanced southward
in three columns, attempting again to cross the Miluo River to reach
Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces scored a victory at Changsha,
the first Allied success against Japan.[96]
After the Doolittle
Raid, the Imperial Japanese Army conducted the Zhejiang-Jiangxi
Campaign, with the goal of searching out the surviving American airmen,
applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them, and destroying air
bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 with 40 infantry and 15–16
artillery battalions, but was repelled by Chinese forces in
September.[97] During this campaign, the Imperial Japanese Army left
behind a trail of devastation and also spread cholera, typhoid, plague
and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates put the death toll at 250,000
civilians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died, out of a total 10,000
who fell ill when their biological weapons rebounded on their
forces.[98][99][100]
On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama,
commander of the Imperial Japanese 11th Army, deployed the 39th, 58th,
13th, 3rd, 116th and 68th Divisions, a total of around 100,000 troops,
to attack Changde.[101] During the seven-week Battle of Changde, the
Chinese forced Japan to fight a costly campaign of attrition. Although
the Imperial Japanese Army initially successfully captured the city, the
Chinese 57th Division was able to pin them down long enough for
reinforcements to arrive and encircle the Japanese. The Chinese then cut
Japanese supply lines, provoking a retreat and Chinese
pursuit.[101][102] During the battle, Japan used chemical weapons.[103]
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph Stilwell, Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theatre from 1942–1945
Burma 1942–1943
Main article: Burma campaign 1942–43
In
the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread
disorder and pro-Independence agitation in eastern India and a
disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million
deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication,
British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in
early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, ignominiously in the view of
some senior officers,[104] while a long distance raid mounted by the
Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was
publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to
mount major offensives themselves the following year.
In August
1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over
strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India
Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and
Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under
Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health
greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was
deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded US forces in the China
Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct
the Ledo Road to link India and China by land. In 1943, the Thai Phayap
Army invasion headed to Xishuangbanna at China, but were driven back
by the Chinese Expeditionary Force.
Allied offensives, 1943–44
Allied attack routes against the Empire of Japan
Midway
proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United
States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential
into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew.[105] At
the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or
technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate
naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind.
In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific,
seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold
had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were
neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to
Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the
submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an
invasion.
The US Navy did not seek out the Japanese fleet for a
decisive battle, as Mahanian doctrine would suggest (and as Japan
hoped); the Allied advance could only be stopped by a Japanese naval
attack, which oil shortages (induced by submarine attack) made
impossible.[47][68]
Invasion of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands
Main article: Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign
In
November 1943 US Marines sustained high casualties when they
overwhelmed the 4,500-strong garrison at Tarawa. This helped the Allies
to improve the techniques of amphibious landings, learning from their
mistakes and implementing changes such as thorough pre-emptive bombings
and bombardment, more careful planning regarding tides and landing
craft schedules, and better overall coordination. Operations on the
Gilberts were followed in late-January and mid-February 1944 by
further, less costly, landings on the Marshall Islands.
Cairo Conference
The
Allied leaders of the Asian and Pacific Theaters: Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill meeting at the
Cairo Conference in 1943
On 22 November 1943 US President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and ROC
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, met in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss a
strategy to defeat Japan. The meeting was also known as the Cairo
Conference and concluded with the Cairo Declaration.
Submarine warfare
Main article: Allied submarines in the Pacific War
US
submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from
bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane,
Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam,
played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a
small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the
case of the US Navy.[68][106] Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its
merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off
nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military
operations. By early 1945, Japanese oil supplies were so limited that
its fleet was virtually stranded.
The Japanese military claimed
its defenses sank 468 Allied submarines during the war.[107] In reality,
only 42 American submarines were sunk in the Pacific due to hostile
action, with 10 others lost in accidents or as the result of friendly
fire.[108] The Dutch lost five submarines due to Japanese attack or
minefields,[109] and the British lost three.
The torpedoed Yamakaze, as seen through the periscope of an American submarine, Nautilus, in June 1942
American
submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines
or aircraft destroyed most of the rest.[108] American submariners also
claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed.[110] Furthermore, they
played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the
Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and,
coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they
gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese
fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including
future US president George H. W. Bush.
Allied submarines did not
adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within
hours of the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan,
Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare
against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or
passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without
aiding survivors.[j] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific, the
Dutch admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad
Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force
of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war
than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned
him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich".[111]
While Japan had a
large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on
the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet submarines performed well,
knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial
Japanese Navy (and pre-war US) doctrine stipulated that only fleet
battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval
campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between
its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine
attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range
reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked US supply lines. The
Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also
achieved little.[112]
As the war turned against Japan, IJN
submarines increasingly served to resupply strongholds which had been
cut off, such as Truk and Rabaul. In addition, Japan honored its
neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union and ignored American freighters
shipping millions of tons of military supplies from San Francisco to
Vladivostok,[113] much to the consternation of its German ally.
The I-400 class, the largest non-nuclear submarines ever constructed
The
US Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset.
However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines,
during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla
submarine" missions. Basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese
aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their
effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of
enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its
Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not
corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an
uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant
marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it.[114] The Japanese
promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20-G
until 1943.
Thus, only in 1944 did the US Navy begin to use its
150 submarines to maximum effect: installing effective shipboard radar,
replacing commanders deemed lacking in aggression, and fixing the
faults in the torpedoes. Japanese commerce protection was "shiftless
beyond description,"[k] and convoys were poorly organized and defended
compared to Allied ones, a product of flawed IJN doctrine and training –
errors concealed by American faults as much as Japanese
overconfidence. The number of American submarines patrols (and
sinkings) rose steeply: 350 patrols (180 ships sunk) in 1942, 350 (335)
in 1943, and 520 (603) in 1944.[116] By 1945, sinkings of Japanese
vessels had decreased because so few targets dared to venture out on
the high seas. In all, Allied submarines destroyed 1,200 merchant ships
– about five million tons of shipping. Most were small cargo carriers,
but 124 were tankers bringing desperately needed oil from the East
Indies. Another 320 were passenger ships and troop transports. At
critical stages of the Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Leyte campaigns,
thousands of Japanese troops were killed or diverted from where they
were needed. Over 200 warships were sunk, ranging from many auxiliaries
and destroyers to one battleship and no fewer than eight carriers.
Underwater
warfare was especially dangerous; of the 16,000 Americans who went out
on patrol, 3,500 (22%) never returned, the highest casualty rate of
any American force in World War II.[117] The Joint Army–Navy Assessment
Committee assessed US submarine credits.[118][119][full citation
needed] The Japanese losses, 130 submarines in all,[120] were
higher.[121]
Japanese counteroffensives in China, 1944
Main article: Operation Ichi-Go
In
mid-1944 Japan mobilized over 500,000 men[122] and launched a massive
operation across China under the code name Operation Ichi-Go, their
largest offensive of World War II, with the goal of connecting
Japanese-controlled territory in China and French Indochina and
capturing airbases in southeastern China where American bombers were
based.[123] During this time, about 250,000 newly American-trained
Chinese troops under Joseph Stilwell and Chinese expeditionary force
were forcibly locked in the Burmese theater by the terms of the
Lend-Lease Agreement.[123] Though Japan suffered about 100,000
casualties,[124] these attacks, the biggest in several years, gained
much ground for Japan before Chinese forces stopped the incursions in
Guangxi. Despite major tactical victories, the operation overall failed
to provide Japan with any significant strategic gains. A great majority
of the Chinese forces were able to retreat out of the area, and later
come back to attack Japanese positions at the Battle of West Hunan.
Japan was not any closer to defeating China after this operation, and
the constant defeats the Japanese suffered in the Pacific meant that
Japan never got the time and resources needed to achieve final victory
over China. Operation Ichi-go created a great sense of social confusion
in the areas of China that it affected. Chinese Communist guerrillas
were able to exploit this confusion to gain influence and control of
greater areas of the countryside in the aftermath of Ichi-go.[125]
Japanese offensive in India, 1944
Main article: Burma Campaign 1944
Chinese forces on M3A3 Stuart tanks on the Ledo Road
British Indian troops during the Battle of Imphal
After
the Allied setbacks in 1943, the South East Asia command prepared to
launch offensives into Burma on several fronts. In the first months of
1944, the Chinese and American troops of the Northern Combat Area
Command (NCAC), commanded by the American Joseph Stilwell, began
extending the Ledo Road from India into northern Burma, while the XV
Corps began an advance along the coast in Arakan Province. In February
1944 the Japanese mounted a local counter-attack in Arakan. After early
Japanese success, this counter-attack was defeated when the Indian
divisions of XV Corps stood firm, relying on aircraft to drop supplies
to isolated forward units until reserve divisions could relieve them.
The
Japanese responded to the Allied attacks by launching an offensive of
their own into India in the middle of March, across the mountainous and
densely forested frontier. This attack, codenamed Operation U-Go, was
advocated by Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi, the recently promoted
commander of the Japanese Fifteenth Army; Imperial General Headquarters
permitted it to proceed, despite misgivings at several intervening
headquarters. Although several units of the British Fourteenth Army had
to fight their way out of encirclement, by early April they had
concentrated around Imphal in Manipur state. A Japanese division which
had advanced to Kohima in Nagaland cut the main road to Imphal, but
failed to capture the whole of the defences at Kohima. During April, the
Japanese attacks against Imphal failed, while fresh Allied formations
drove the Japanese from the positions they had captured at Kohima.
As
many Japanese had feared, Japan's supply arrangements could not
maintain her forces. Once Mutaguchi's hopes for an early victory were
thwarted, his troops, particularly those at Kohima, starved. During May,
while Mutaguchi continued to order attacks, the Allies advanced
southwards from Kohima and northwards from Imphal. The two Allied
attacks met on 22 June, breaking the Japanese siege of Imphal. The
Japanese finally broke off the operation on 3 July. They had lost over
50,000 troops, mainly to starvation and disease. This represented the
worst defeat suffered by the Imperial Japanese Army to that date.[126]
Although
the advance in Arakan had been halted to release troops and aircraft
for the Battle of Imphal, the Americans and Chinese had continued to
advance in northern Burma, aided by the Chindits operating against the
Japanese lines of communication. In the middle of 1944 the Chinese
Expeditionary Force invaded northern Burma from Yunnan. They captured a
fortified position at Mount Song.[127] By the time campaigning ceased
during the monsoon rains, the NCAC had secured a vital airfield at
Myitkyina (August 1944), which eased the problems of air resupply from
India to China over "The Hump".
Beginning of the end in the Pacific, 1944
In
May 1943, the Japanese prepared Operation Z or the Z Plan, which
envisioned the use of Japanese naval power to counter American forces
threatening the outer defense perimeter line. This line extended from
the Aleutians down through Wake, the Marshall and Gilbert Islands,
Nauru, the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, then westward past Java and
Sumatra to Burma.[128] In 1943–44, Allied forces in the Solomons began
driving relentlessly to Rabaul, eventually encircling and neutralizing
the stronghold. With their position in the Solomons disintegrating,
the Japanese modified the Z Plan by eliminating the Gilbert and
Marshall Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago as vital areas to be
defended. They then based their possible actions on the defense of an
inner perimeter, which included the Marianas, Palau, Western New
Guinea, and the Dutch East Indies. Meanwhile, in the Central Pacific
the Americans initiated a major offensive, beginning in November 1943
with landings in the Gilbert Islands.[129] The Japanese were forced to
watch helplessly as their garrisons in the Gilberts and then the
Marshalls were crushed.[129] The strategy of holding overextended
island garrisons was fully exposed.[130]
In February 1944, the
US Navy's fast carrier task force, during Operation Hailstone, attacked
the major naval base of Truk. Although the Japanese had moved their
major vessels out in time to avoid being caught at anchor in the atoll,
two days of air attacks resulted in significant losses to Japanese
aircraft and merchant shipping.[130] The Japanese were forced to
abandon Truk and were now unable to counter the Americans on any front
on the perimeter. Consequently, the Japanese retained their remaining
strength in preparation for what they hoped would be a decisive
battle.[130] The Japanese then developed a new plan, known as A-GO.
A-GO envisioned a decisive fleet action that would be fought somewhere
from the Palaus to the Western Carolines.[131] It was in this area that
the newly formed Mobile Fleet along with large numbers of land-based
aircraft, would be concentrated. If the Americans attacked the
Marianas, they would be attacked by land-based planes in the vicinity.
Then the Americans would be lured into the areas where the Mobile Fleet
could defeat them.[131]
Marianas and Palaus
Main articles: Mariana and Palau Islands campaign, Battle of Saipan, and Battle of Peleliu
On
12 March 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the occupation of
the Northern Marianas, specifically the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and
Guam. A target date was set for 15 June. All forces for the Marianas
operation were to be commanded by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. The
forces assigned to his command consisted of 535 warships and auxiliaries
together with a ground force of three and a half Marine divisions and
one reinforced Army division, a total of more than 127,500 troops.[132]
For the Americans, the Marianas operation would provide the following
benefits: the interruption of the Japanese air pipeline to the south;
the development of advanced naval bases for submarine and surface
operations; the establishment of airfields to base B-29s from which to
bomb the Japanese Home Islands; the choice among several possible
objectives for the next phase of operations, which would keep the
Japanese uncertain of American intentions. It was also hoped that this
penetration of the Japanese inner defense zone, which was a little more
than 1,250 miles (2,010 km) from Tokyo, might force the Japanese fleet
out for a decisive engagement.[133] The ability to plan and execute
such a complex operation in the space of 90 days was indicative of
Allied logistical superiority.
Marines fire captured mountain gun during the attack on Garapan, Saipan, 21 June 1944.
On
15 June, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions supported by a naval
bombardment group totaling eight battleships, eleven cruisers, and
twenty-six destroyers landed on Saipan. However, Japanese fire was so
effective that the first day's objective was not reached until Day 3.
After fanatic Japanese resistance, the Marines captured Aslito airfield
in the south on 18 June. US Navy Seabees quickly made the field
operational for use for American aircraft. On 22 June, the front of the
northward advancing 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions widened to such a
degree that General Holland Smith ordered the bulk of the Army's 27th
Division to take over the line in the center, between the two US Marine
divisions. The 27th Division was late taking its position and was late
in making advances so that the inner flanks of the marine divisions
became exposed. A giant U was formed with the 27th at the base 1,500
yards (1.4 km) behind the advancing formations. This presented the
Japanese with an opportunity to exploit it. On 24 June, General Holland
Smith replaced General Ralph C. Smith, the commanding general of the
27th Division, who he believed lacked an aggressive spirit.[134]
Nafutan,
Saipan's southern point, was secured on 27 June, after the Japanese
troops trapped there expended themselves in a desperate attempt to break
through. In the north, Mount Tapotchau, the highest point on the
island, was taken on 27 June. The Marines then steadily advanced
northward. On the night of 6-7 July, a banzai attack took place in which
three to four thousand Japanese made a fanatical charge that
penetrated the lines near Tanapag before being wiped out. Following
this attack, hundreds of the native population committed mass suicide
by throwing themselves off the cliffs onto the rocks below near the
northern tip of the island. On 9 July, two days after the banzai
attack, organized resistance on Saipan ceased. The US Marines reached
northernmost tip of Saipan, Marpi Point, twenty-four days after the
landing. Only isolated groups of hidden Japanese troops remained.[135]
A
month after the invasion of Saipan, the US recaptured Guam and
captured Tinian. Once captured, the islands of Saipan and Tinian were
used extensively by the United States military as they finally put
mainland Japan within round-trip range of American B-29 bombers. In
response, Japanese forces attacked the bases on Saipan and Tinian from
November 1944 to January 1945. At the same time and afterwards, the
United States Army Air Forces based out of these islands conducted an
intense strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese cities of
military and industrial importance, including Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka,
Kobe and others.
The invasion of Peleliu in the Palau Islands on
15 September, was notable for a drastic change in Japanese defensive
tactics, resulting in the highest casualty rate amongst US forces in an
amphibious operation during the Pacific War.[136] Instead of the
predicted four days, it took until 27 November to secure the island.
The ultimate strategic value of the landings is still contested.[137]
Philippine Sea
Main article: Battle of the Philippine Sea
The Japanese aircraft carrier Zuikaku and two destroyers under attack in the Battle of the Philippine Sea
When
the Americans landed on Saipan in the Marianas the Japanese viewed
holding Saipan as an imperative. Consequently, the Japanese responded
with their largest carrier force of the war: the nine-carrier Mobile
Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, supplemented by
an additional 500 land-based aircraft. Facing them was the US Fifth
Fleet under the command of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, which contained
15 fleet carriers and 956 aircraft. The clash was the largest carrier
battle in history. The battle did not turn out as the Japanese had
hoped. During the previous month, US destroyers had destroyed 17 out of
25 submarines in Ozawa's screening force[138][139] and repeated
American air raids destroyed the Japanese land-based aircraft.
On
19 June, a series of Japanese carrier air strikes were shattered by
strong American defenses. The result was later dubbed the Great
Marianas Turkey Shoot. All US carriers had combat-information centers,
which interpreted the flow of radar data and radioed interception
orders to the combat air patrols. The few Japanese attackers that
managed to reach the US fleet in a staggered sequence encountered
massive anti-aircraft fire with proximity fuzes. Only one American
warship was slightly damaged. On the same day, Shōkaku was hit by four
torpedoes from the submarine Cavalla and sank with heavy loss of life.
The Taihō was also sunk by a single torpedo, from the submarine
Albacore. The next day, the Japanese carrier force was subjected to an
American carrier air attack and suffered the loss of the carrier
Hiyō.[130] The four Japanese air strikes involved 373 carrier aircraft,
of which 130 returned to the carriers.[140] Many of these survivors
were subsequently lost when Taihō and Shōkaku were sunk by American
submarine attacks. After the second day of the battle, losses totaled
three carriers and 445 aircrew with more than 433 carrier aircraft and
around 200 land-based aircraft. The Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76
aircrew, many losses due to aircraft running out of fuel returning to
their carriers at night.
Although the defeat at the Philippine
Sea was severe in terms of the loss of the three fleet carriers Taihō,
Shōkaku and the Hiyō, the real disaster was the annihilation of the
carrier air groups.[141] These losses to the already outnumbered
Japanese fleet air arm were irreplaceable. The Japanese had spent the
better part of a year reconstituting their carrier air groups, and the
Americans had destroyed 90% of it in two days. The Japanese had only
enough pilots left to form the air group for one of their light
carriers. The Mobile Fleet returned home with only 35 aircraft of the
430 with which it had begun the battle.[130] The battle ended in a
total Japanese defeat and resulted in the virtual end of their carrier
force.[142]
Leyte Gulf, 1944
Main article: Battle of Leyte Gulf
The four engagements in the Battle of Leyte Gulf
The
disaster at the Philippine Sea left the Japanese with two choices:
either to commit their remaining strength in an all-out offensive or to
sit by while the Americans occupied the Philippines and cut the sea
lanes between Japan and the vital resources from the Dutch East Indies
and Malaya. Thus the Japanese devised a plan which represented a final
attempt to force a decisive battle by utilizing their last remaining
strength – the firepower of its heavy cruisers and battleships – against
the American beachhead at Leyte. The Japanese planned to use their
remaining carriers as bait in order to lure the American carriers away
from Leyte Gulf long enough for the heavy warships to enter and to
destroy any American ships present.[143]
The Japanese assembled a
force totaling four carriers, nine battleships, 14 heavy cruisers,
seven light cruisers, and 35 destroyers.[143] They split into three
forces. The "Center Force", under the command of Vice Admiral Takeo
Kurita, consisted of five battleships (including the Yamato and
Musashi), 12 cruisers and 13 destroyers; the "Northern Force", under the
command of Jisaburō Ozawa, comprised four carriers, two battleships
partly converted to carriers, three light cruisers and nine destroyers;
the "Southern Force" contained two groups, one under the command of
Shōji Nishimura consisting of two Fusō-class battleships, one heavy
cruiser and four destroyers, the other under Kiyohide Shima comprised
two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and four destroyers. The main Center
Force would pass through the San Bernardino Strait into the Philippine
Sea, turn southwards, and then attack the landing area. The two
separate groups of the Southern Force would join up and strike at the
landing area through the Surigao Strait, while the Northern Force with
the Japanese carriers would lure the main American covering forces away
from Leyte. The carriers embarked a total of just 108 aircraft.[143]
However,
after Center Force departed from Brunei Bay on 23 October, two
American submarines attacked it, resulting in the loss of two heavy
cruisers with another crippled. After entering the Sibuyan Sea on 24
October, Center Force was assaulted by American carrier aircraft
throughout the whole day, forcing another heavy cruiser to retire. The
Americans then targeted the Musashi and sank it under a barrage of
torpedo and bomb hits. Many other ships of Center Force were attacked,
but continued on.[143] Convinced that their attacks had made Center
Force ineffective, the American carriers headed north to address the
newly detected threat of the Japanese carriers of Ozawa's Northern
Force. On the night of 24–25 October, the Southern Force under
Nishimura attempted to enter Leyte Gulf from the south through Surigao
Strait, where an American-Australian force led by Rear Admiral Jesse
Oldendorf and consisting of six battleships, eight cruisers, and 26
destroyers, ambushed the Japanese.[144] Utilizing radar-guided torpedo
attacks, American destroyers sank one of the battleships and three
destroyers while damaging the other battleship. Radar-guided naval
gunfire then finished off the second battleship, with only a single
Japanese destroyer surviving. As a result of observing radio silence,
Shima's group was unable to coordinate and synchronize its movements
with Nishimura's group and subsequently arrived at Surigao Strait in
the middle of the encounter; after making a haphazard torpedo attack,
Shima retreated.[144]
Off Cape Engaño, 500 miles (800 km) north
of Leyte Gulf, the Americans launched over 500 aircraft sorties at the
Northern Force, followed up by a surface group of cruisers and
destroyers. All four Japanese carriers were sunk, but this part of the
Japanese plan had succeeded in drawing the American carriers away from
Leyte Gulf.[144] On 25 October the final major surface action fought
between the Japanese and the American fleets during the war occurred off
Samar, when Center Force fell upon a group of American escort carriers
escorted only by destroyers and destroyer escorts. Both sides were
surprised, but the outcome looked certain since the Japanese had four
battleships, six heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers leading two
destroyer squadrons. However, they did not press home their advantage,
and were content to conduct a largely indecisive gunnery duel before
breaking off. Japanese losses were extremely heavy, with four carriers,
three battleships, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and eleven
destroyers sunk,[145] while the Americans lost one light carrier and two
escort carriers, a destroyer and two destroyer escorts. The Battle of
Leyte Gulf, arguably the largest naval battle in history, was the
largest naval battle of World War II. For the Japanese the defeat at
Leyte Gulf was catastrophic, the Imperial Japanese Navy had suffered its
greatest ever loss of ships and men in combat.[146] The inevitable
liberation of the Philippines also meant that the home islands would be
virtually cut off from the vital resources from Japan's occupied
territories in Southeast Asia.[146]
Philippines, 1944–45
Main article: Philippines campaign (1944–1945)
General Douglas MacArthur wading ashore at Leyte
On
20 October 1944 the US Sixth Army, supported by naval and air
bombardment, landed on the favorable eastern shore of Leyte, north of
Mindanao. The US Sixth Army continued its advance from the east, as the
Japanese rushed reinforcements to the Ormoc Bay area on the western
side of the island. While the Sixth Army was reinforced successfully,
the US Fifth Air Force was able to devastate the Japanese attempts to
resupply. In torrential rains and over difficult terrain, the advance
continued across Leyte and the neighboring island of Samar to the north.
On 7 December US Army units landed at Ormoc Bay and, after a major
land and air battle, cut off the Japanese ability to reinforce and
supply Leyte. Although fierce fighting continued on Leyte for months,
the US Army was in control.
On 15 December 1944 landings against
minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of
Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in
support of major landings scheduled on Luzon. On 9 January 1945, on the
south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General
Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men
followed across the twenty-mile (32 km) beachhead within a few days.
With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field,
40 miles (64 km) northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.
US troops approaching Japanese positions near Baguio, Luzon, 23 March 1945
Two
more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and
another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers
closed on the city and, on 3 February 1945, elements of the 1st Cavalry
Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th
Cavalry passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.
As
the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the
Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On 16 February paratroopers and
amphibious units assaulted the island fortress of Corregidor, and
resistance ended there on 27 February.
In all, ten US divisions
and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest
campaign of the Pacific War, involving more troops than the United
States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France. Forces
included the Mexican Escuadrón 201 fighter squadron as part of the
Fuerza Aérea Expedicionaria Mexicana (FAEM—"Mexican Expeditionary Air
Force"), with the squadron attached to the 58th Fighter Group of the
United States Army Air Forces that flew tactical support missions.[147]
Of the 250,000 Japanese troops defending Luzon, 80 percent died.[148]
The last Japanese soldier in the Philippines to surrender was Hiroo
Onoda on 9 March 1974.[149]
Palawan Island, between Borneo and
Mindoro, the fifth largest and western-most Philippine Island, was
invaded on 28 February with landings of the Eighth Army at Puerto
Princesa. The Japanese put up little direct defense of Palawan, but
cleaning up pockets of Japanese resistance lasted until late April, as
the Japanese used their common tactic of withdrawing into the mountain
jungles, dispersed as small units. Throughout the Philippines, US forces
were aided by Filipino guerrillas to find and dispatch the holdouts.
The
US Eighth Army then moved on to its first landing on Mindanao (17
April), the last of the major Philippine Islands to be taken. Mindanao
was followed by invasion and occupation of Panay, Cebu, Negros and
several islands in the Sulu Archipelago. These islands provided bases
for the US Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces to attack targets throughout
the Philippines and the South China Sea.
Final stages
See also: End of World War II in Asia and Aftermath of World War II
Allied offensives in Burma, 1944–45
Main article: Burma campaign 1944–45
Royal Marines landing at Ramree
In
late 1944 and early 1945, the Allied South East Asia Command launched
offensives into Burma, intending to recover most of the country,
including Rangoon, the capital, before the onset of the monsoon in May.
The
Indian XV Corps advanced along the coast in Arakan Province, at last
capturing Akyab Island after failures in the two previous years. They
then landed troops behind the retreating Japanese, inflicting heavy
casualties, and captured Ramree Island and Cheduba Island off the coast,
establishing airfields on them which were used to support the
offensive into Central Burma.
The Chinese Expeditionary Force
captured Mong-Yu and Lashio,[150] while the Chinese and American
Northern Combat Area Command resumed its advance in northern Burma. In
late January 1945, these two forces linked up with each other at
Hsipaw. The Ledo Road was completed, linking India and China, but too
late in the war to have any significant effect.
The Japanese
Burma Area Army attempted to forestall the main Allied attack on the
central part of the front by withdrawing their troops behind the
Irrawaddy River. Lieutenant General Heitarō Kimura, the new Japanese
commander in Burma, hoped that the Allies' lines of communications
would be overstretched trying to cross this obstacle. However, the
advancing British Fourteenth Army under Lieutenant General William Slim
switched its axis of advance to outflank the main Japanese armies.
During
February, Fourteenth Army secured bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy on a
broad front. On 1 March, units of IV Corps captured the supply centre
of Meiktila, throwing the Japanese into disarray. While the Japanese
attempted to recapture Meiktila, XXXIII Corps captured Mandalay. The
Japanese armies were heavily defeated, and with the capture of Mandalay,
the Burmese population and the Burma National Army (which the Japanese
had raised) turned against the Japanese.
During April,
Fourteenth Army advanced 300 miles (480 km) south towards Rangoon, the
capital and principal port of Burma, but was delayed by Japanese
rearguards 40 miles (64 km) north of Rangoon at the end of the month.
Slim feared that the Japanese would defend Rangoon house-to-house
during the monsoon, which would commit his army to prolonged action
with disastrously inadequate supplies, and in March he had asked that a
plan to capture Rangoon by an amphibious force, Operation Dracula,
which had been abandoned earlier, be reinstated.[151] Dracula was
launched on 1 May, to find that the Japanese had already evacuated
Rangoon. The troops that occupied Rangoon linked up with Fourteenth
Army five days later, securing the Allies' lines of communication.
The
Japanese forces which had been bypassed by the Allied advances
attempted to break out across the Sittaung River during June and July
to rejoin the Burma Area Army which had regrouped in Tenasserim in
southern Burma. They suffered 14,000 casualties, half their strength.
Overall, the Japanese lost some 150,000 men in Burma. Only 1,700
prisoners were taken.[152]
The Allies were preparing to make amphibious landings in Malaya when word of the Japanese surrender arrived.
Iwo Jima
Main article: Battle of Iwo Jima
Iwo Jima location map
Although
the Marianas were secure and American bases firmly established, the
long 1,200 miles (1,900 km) range from the Marianas meant that B-29
aircrews on bombing missions over Japan found themselves ditching in the
sea if they suffered severe damage and were unable to return home.
Attention focused on the island of Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands,
about halfway between the Marianas and Japan. American planners
recognized the strategic importance of the island, which was only 5
miles (8.0 km) long, 8 square miles (21 km2) in area and had no native
population. The island was used by the Japanese as an early-warning
station against impending air raids on Japanese cities,[153]
additionally, Japanese aircraft based on Iwo Jima were able to attack
the B-29s on their bombing missions on route to their missions and on
the returning leg home, and even to attack installations in the Marianas
themselves.[153] The capture of Iwo Jima would provide emergency
landing airfields to repair and refuel crippled B-29s in trouble on
their way home and a base for P-51 fighters escorts for the B-29s.[154]
Iwo Jima could also provide a base from which land-based air support
could protect the US Naval fleets as they moved into Japanese waters
along the arc descending from Tokyo through the Ryukyu Islands.[155]
However,
the Japanese had also come to realize the strategic value of Iwo Jima
and Lt. General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was assigned command of the
island in May 1944. In the months following, the Japanese began work
constructing elaborate defenses, making the best possible use of the
islands natural caves and the uneven, rocky terrain. The island was
transformed into a massive network of bunkers, hidden guns, with
underground passageways leading from one strong point to another.
Natural caves were enlarged, and many new ones were blasted out. A total
of 11 miles (18 km)s of tunnels were constructed.[156] The Japanese
also went to great lengths to construct large underground chambers, some
as much as five stories deep to serve as storage and hospital areas
with thick walls and ceilings made of reinforced concrete.[156] The main
underground command post had a concrete roof 10 feet (3.0 m) thick.
Pillboxes, bunkers and other defensive works were built close to the
ground. A series of strong points covering the landing areas were also
built, most were covered with sand and then carefully camouflaged. The
many well-camouflaged 120mm and 6-inch guns were emplaced so that their
fire could be directed to the beaches. The pillboxes and bunkers were
all connected so that if one was knocked out, it could be reoccupied
again. Smaller-caliber artillery, antiaircraft guns, and mortars were
also well hidden and located where only a direct hit could destroy
them.[157] The Japanese were determined to make the Americans pay a high
price for Iwo Jima and were prepared to defend it to the death.
Kuribayashi knew that he could not win the battle but hoped to inflict
severe casualties so costly that it would slow the American advance on
Japan and maybe give the Japanese some bargaining power.[156] In
February, a total of 21,000 Japanese troops were deployed on Iwo
Jima.[156]
The American operation ("Operation Detachment") to
capture the island involved three Marine divisions of the V Amphibious
Corps, a total of 70,647 troops,[158] under the command of Holland
Smith. From mid-June 1944, Iwo Jima came under American air and naval
bombardment, this continued until the days leading up to the
invasion.[157]
Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima, an iconic
photograph taken by Joe Rosenthal on February 23, 1945, depicts six
United States Marines raising a U.S. flag atop Mount Suribachi.
An
intense naval and air bombardment preceded the landing but did little
but drive the Japanese further underground, making their positions
impervious to enemy fire. The hidden guns and defenses survived the
constant bombardment virtually unscathed. On the morning of 19 February
1945, 30,000 men of 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions under the command of
Maj. General Harry Schmidt landed on the southeast coast of the island
near Mt. Suribachi, an inactive volcano, where most of the island's
defenses were concentrated. The Japanese held fire until the landing
beaches were full. As soon as the Marines pushed inland they came under
devastating machine gun and artillery fire. Although they managed to
gain a foothold on the beaches, the defenders made them pay a high price
for every advance inland. By the end of the day, the Marines reached
the west coast of the island, but their losses were severe; almost 2,000
men killed or wounded. On 23 February, the 28th Marine Regiment
reached the summit of Mt. Suribachi, prompting the now famous Raising
the Flag on Iwo Jima photograph. Navy Secretary James Forrestal, upon
seeing the flag, remarked "there will be a Marine Corps for the next
500 years". The flag raising is often cited as the most reproduced
photograph of all time and became the archetypal representation not
only of that battle, but of the entire Pacific War. For the rest of
February, the Americans pushed north, and by 1 March, had taken
two-thirds of the island. But it was not until 26 March that the island
was finally secured. Iwo Jima was one of the bloodiest battles fought
by the Americans during the Pacific War, the Japanese fought to the
last man.
American casualties were 6,821 killed and 19,207
wounded.[159] The Japanese losses totaled well over 20,000 men killed,
with only 1,083 prisoners were taken.[159] Historians debate whether it
was strategically worth the casualties sustained.[160]
Okinawa
Main article: Battle of Okinawa
USS Bunker Hill burns after being hit by two kamikazes. At Okinawa, the kamikazes caused 4,900 American deaths.
The
largest and bloodiest battle fought by the Americans against the
Japanese came at Okinawa. The seizure of islands in the Ryukyus was to
have been the last step before the actual invasion of the Japanese home
islands. Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands, was located some
340 miles (550 km) from the island of Kyushu.[161] The capture of
Okinawa would provide airbases for B-29 bombers to intensify aerial
bombardment of Japan and for direct land-based air support of the
invasion of Kyushu. The islands could also open the way for tightening
the blockade of Japanese shipping and be used as a staging area and
supply base for any invasion of the home islands.[162]
The
Japanese troops defending Okinawa, under the command of Lieutenant
General Ushijima Mitsuru, totaled some 75,000-100,000, augmented by
thousands of civilians on the heavily populated island. American forces
for the operation totaled 183,000 troops in seven divisions (four US
Army and three Marine) under the Tenth Army.[163] The British Pacific
Fleet operated as a separate unit from the American task forces in the
Okinawa operation. Its objective was to strike airfields on the chain of
islands between Formosa and Okinawa, to prevent the Japanese
reinforcing the defenses of Okinawa from that direction.
After an
intense seven day bombardment the main landings on Okinawa took place
on 1 April, on the Hagushi beaches near the central part of the
island's west coast.[164] However, there was little opposition at the
beaches as the Japanese had decided to meet the Americans farther
inland out of range of naval gunfire. About 60,000 American troops
landed on the first day, seizing the two nearby airfields and pushing
across the narrow waist of the island to cut it in two.
The
first major Japanese counterattack occurred on 6 and 7 April, in the
form of attacks by kamikaze aircraft and a naval operation, called
Ten-Go. A force, under the command of Admiral Seiichi Itō, consisting
of the battleship Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers
was assembled. This force was to be used as bait to draw away as many
American carrier aircraft from Okinawa as possible, in order to leave
Allied naval forces vulnerable to large scale Kamikaze attacks. The
Japanese were short of fuel, consequently the Yamato had only enough to
reach Okinawa. Off Okinawa it was planned to beach the battleship and
use her 18.1 inches (46 cm) guns to support the fighting on the
island.[165] After being sighted by an American submarine and
reconnaissance aircraft, naval attack aircraft were sent to attack the
Japanese force resulting in the sinking of the Yamato, Yahagi and four
of the destroyers.[166] Mass Kamikaze attacks intensified during the
following three months, with a total of 5,500 sorties being flown by
the Japanese.[167]
In the northern part of Okinawa American
troops only met light opposition, and the area was seized the within
about two weeks. However, the main Japanese defenses were in the
southern part of the island. There was bitter fighting against
well-entrenched Japanese troops, but US forces slowly made progress.
The seizure of Shuri castle on 29 May, the center of Japanese
resistance, represented both a strategic and psychological blow.[168]
Organized resistance was not over until 21 June.[169] But many Japanese
went into hiding and the campaign was not declared over until 2 July.
The
battle for Okinawa proved costly and lasted much longer than the
Americans had originally expected. The Japanese had skillfully utilized
terrain to inflict maximum casualties.[170] Total American casualties
were 49,451, including 12,520 dead or missing and 36,631 wounded.[171]
Japanese casualties were approximately 110,000 killed, and 7,400 were
taken prisoner.[171] 94% of the Japanese soldiers died along with many
civilians.[172] Kamikaze attacks also sank 36 ships of all types,
damaged 368 more and led to the deaths of 4,900 US sailors, for the
loss of 7,800 Japanese aircraft.[173]
China, 1945
Main articles: Battle of West Hunan and Second Guangxi Campaign
By
April 1945, China had already been at war with Japan for more than
seven years. Both nations were exhausted by years of battles, bombings
and blockades. After Japanese victories in Operation Ichi-Go, Japan was
losing the battle in Burma and facing constant attacks from Chinese
Nationalist forces and Communist guerrillas in the countryside. The
Imperial Japanese Army began preparations for the Battle of West Hunan
in March 1945. The Japanese mobilized 34th, 47th, 64th, 68th and 116th
Divisions, as well as the 86th Independent Brigade, for a total of
80,000 men to seize Chinese airfields and secure railroads in West Hunan
by early April.[174] In response, the Chinese National Military
Council dispatched the 4th Front Army and the 10th and 27th Army Groups
with He Yingqin as commander-in-chief.[175] At the same time, it
airlifted the entire Chinese New 6th Corps, an American-equipped corps
and veterans of the Burma Expeditionary Force, from Kunming to
Zhijiang.[174] Chinese forces totaled 110,000 men in 20 divisions. They
were supported by about 400 aircraft from Chinese and American air
forces.[176] Chinese forces achieved a decisive victory and launched a
large counterattack in this campaign. Concurrently, the Chinese managed
to repel a Japanese offensive in Henan and Hubei.[175] Afterwards,
Chinese forces retook Hunan and Hubei provinces in South China. Chinese
launched a counter offensive to retake Guangxi which was the last
major Japanese stronghold in South China. In August 1945, Chinese
forces successfully retook Guangxi.[citation needed]
Borneo, 1945
Main article: Borneo campaign (1945)
US LVTs land Australian soldiers at Balikpapan on 7 July 1945.
The
Borneo campaign of 1945 was the last major campaign in the South West
Pacific Area. In a series of amphibious assaults between 1 May and 21
July, the Australian I Corps, under General Leslie Morshead, attacked
Japanese forces occupying the island. Allied naval and air forces,
centered on the US 7th Fleet under Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, the
Australian First Tactical Air Force and the US Thirteenth Air Force also
played important roles in the campaign.
The campaign opened
with a landing on the small island of Tarakan on 1 May. This was
followed on 1 June by simultaneous assaults in the north west, on the
island of Labuan and the coast of Brunei. A week later the Australians
attacked Japanese positions in North Borneo. The attention of the
Allies then switched back to the central east coast, with the last
major amphibious assault of World War II, at Balikpapan on 1 July.
Although
the campaign was criticized in Australia at the time, and in
subsequent years, as pointless or a "waste" of the lives of soldiers,
it did achieve a number of objectives, such as increasing the isolation
of significant Japanese forces occupying the main part of the Dutch
East Indies, capturing major oil supplies and freeing Allied prisoners
of war, who were being held in deteriorating conditions.[177] At one of
the very worst sites, around Sandakan in Borneo, only six of some
2,500 British and Australian prisoners survived.[152]
Landings in the Japanese home islands (1945)
Main articles: Japan campaign and Operation Downfall
Hard-fought
battles on the Japanese islands of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and others
resulted in horrific casualties on both sides but finally produced a
Japanese defeat. Of the 117,000 Okinawan and Japanese troops defending
Okinawa, 94 percent died.[148] Faced with the loss of most of their
experienced pilots, the Japanese increased their use of kamikaze tactics
in an attempt to create unacceptably high casualties for the Allies.
The US Navy proposed to force a Japanese surrender through a total naval
blockade and air raids.[178] Many military historians believe that the
Okinawa campaign led directly to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, as a means of avoiding the planned ground invasion of the
Japanese mainland. This view is explained by Victor Davis Hanson:
"because the Japanese on Okinawa ... were so fierce in their defense
(even when cut off, and without supplies), and because casualties were
so appalling, many American strategists looked for an alternative means
to subdue mainland Japan, other than a direct invasion. This means
presented itself, with the advent of atomic bombs, which worked
admirably in convincing the Japanese to sue for peace [unconditionally],
without American casualties."[179]
Towards the end of the war
as the role of strategic bombing became more important, a new command
for the United States Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific was created
to oversee all US strategic bombing in the hemisphere, under United
States Army Air Forces General Curtis LeMay. Japanese industrial
production plunged as nearly half of the built-up areas of 67 cities
were destroyed by B-29 firebombing raids. On 9–10 March 1945 alone,
about 100,000 people were killed in a conflagration caused by an
incendiary attack on Tokyo. LeMay also oversaw Operation Starvation, in
which the inland waterways of Japan were extensively mined by air,
which disrupted the small amount of remaining Japanese coastal sea
traffic. On 26 July 1945, the President of the United States Harry S.
Truman, the Chairman of the Nationalist Government of China Chiang
Kai-shek and the Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill
issued the Potsdam Declaration, which outlined the terms of surrender
for the Empire of Japan as agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference. This
ultimatum stated that, if Japan did not surrender, it would face
"prompt and utter destruction."[180]
Atomic bombs
Main article: Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The
mushroom cloud from the nuclear explosion over Nagasaki rising 60,000
feet (18 km) into the air on the morning of 9 August 1945
On 6
August 1945, the US dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of
Hiroshima in the first nuclear attack in history. In a press release
issued after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, President Harry S. Truman
warned Japan to surrender or "expect a rain of ruin from the air, the
like of which has never been seen on this earth."[181] Three days
later, on 9 August, the US dropped another atomic bomb on Nagasaki, the
last nuclear attack in history. More than 140,000–240,000 people died
as a direct result of these two bombings.[182] The necessity of the
atomic bombings has long been debated, with detractors claiming that a
naval blockade and incendiary bombing campaign had already made
invasion, hence the atomic bomb, unnecessary.[183] However, other
scholars have argued that the atomic bombings shocked the Japanese
government into surrender, with the Emperor finally indicating his wish
to stop the war. Another argument in favor of the atomic bombs is that
they helped avoid Operation Downfall, or a prolonged blockade and
conventional bombing campaign, any of which would have exacted much
higher casualties among Japanese civilians.[182] Historian Richard B.
Frank wrote that a Soviet invasion of Japan was never likely because
they had insufficient naval capability to mount an amphibious invasion
of Hokkaidō.[184]
Soviet entry
Main articles: Soviet–Japanese War and Soviet invasion of Manchuria
Pacific Fleet marines of the Soviet Navy hoist the Soviet naval ensign in Port Arthur, on 1 October 1945.
In
February 1945 during the Yalta Conference the Soviet Union had agreed
to enter the war against Japan 90 days after the surrender of
Germany.[185] At the time Soviet participation was seen as crucial to
tie down the large number Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea,
keeping them from being transferred to the Home Islands to mount a
defense to an invasion.[185]
On 9 August, exactly on schedule, 90
days after the war ended in Europe, the Soviets entered the war by
invading Manchuria. A battle-hardened, one million-strong Soviet force,
transferred from Europe,[186] attacked Japanese forces in Manchuria and
landed a heavy blow against the Japanese Kantōgun (Kwantung
Army).[187]
The Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation began
on 9 August 1945, with the Soviet invasion of the Japanese puppet state
of Manchukuo and was the last campaign of the Second World War and the
largest of the 1945 Soviet–Japanese War which resumed hostilities
between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Empire of Japan
after almost six years of peace. Soviet gains on the continent were
Manchukuo, Mengjiang (Inner Mongolia) and northern Korea. The USSR's
entry into the war was a significant factor in the Japanese decision to
surrender as it became apparent the Soviets were no longer willing to
act as an intermediary for a negotiated settlement on favorable
terms.[188]
Surrender
Main article: Surrender of Japan
Douglas MacArthur signs the formal Japanese Instrument of Surrender on USS Missouri, 2 September 1945.
The
effects of the "Twin Shocks"—the Soviet entry and the atomic
bombings—were profound. On 10 August the "sacred decision" was made by
Japanese Cabinet to accept the Potsdam terms on one condition: the
"prerogative of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler". At noon on 15 August,
after the American government's intentionally ambiguous reply, stating
that the "authority" of the emperor "shall be subject to the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers", the Emperor broadcast to the nation and
to the world at large the rescript of surrender,[189] ending the
Second World War.
Should we continue to fight, it would not only
result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese
nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human
civilization.
— Emperor Hirohito, The Voice of the Crane: The Imperial Rescript of 15 August 1945[190]
In
Japan, 14 August is considered to be the day that the Pacific War
ended. However, as Imperial Japan actually surrendered on 15 August,
this day became known in the English-speaking countries as V-J Day
(Victory in Japan).[191] The formal Japanese Instrument of Surrender was
signed on 2 September 1945, on the battleship USS Missouri, in Tokyo
Bay. The surrender was accepted by General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers, with representatives of several Allied
nations, from a Japanese delegation led by Mamoru Shigemitsu and
Yoshijirō Umezu.
Following this period, MacArthur went to Tokyo
to oversee the post-war development of the country. This period in
Japanese history is known as the occupation.
Casualties
Allied
United States
American corpses sprawled on the beach of Tarawa, November 1943
There
were some 426,000 American casualties: 161,000 dead (including 111,914
in battle and 49,000 non-battle), 248,316 wounded, and 16,358 captured
(not counting POWs who died).[192][193] Material losses were 188+
warships including 5 battleships, 11 aircraft carriers, 25 cruisers, 84
destroyers and destroyer escorts, and 63 submarines, plus 21,255
aircraft. This gave the USN a 2-1 exchange ratio with the IJN in terms
of ships and aircraft.[194][195]
The US protectorate in the
Philippines suffered considerable losses. Military losses were 27,000
dead (including POWs), 75,000 living POWs, and an unknown number
wounded, not counting irregulars that fought in the insurgency.[196]
Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Filipino civilians died due to either
war-related shortages, massacres, shelling, and bombing.[197]
China
According
to official Chinese Nationalist statistics, losses to the regular
National Revolutionary Army totaled 3,237,000, with 1,320,000 killed,
1,797,000 wounded, and 120,000 missing. The soldiers of the Chinese
Communist Party suffered 584,267 casualties, of which 160,603 were
killed, 133,197 missing, and 290,467 wounded. This would equate to a
total of 3.82 million combined NRA/CCP casualties, of which 1.74 million
were killed or missing. Neither total includes the considerable number
of irregular guerrilla fighters sworn to regional warlords who fought
the Japanese.[198][199] Including them, an academic study published in
the United States estimates Chinese military casualties at 6.75 million
with 3.75 million killed or missing. The casualties break down as 1.5
million killed in battle, 750,000 missing in action, 1.5 million deaths
due to disease and 3 million wounded.[200]
China suffered
enormous civilian losses in the war. Estimates vary wildly, though there
is a general consensus that civilian deaths were in the 17 to 22
million range, mostly from war-related causes such as famine.[201] A
large number of deaths were caused directly by Japanese war crimes. For
instance, 2.7 million Chinese civilians were killed in the "Three Alls"
campaign.[202]
Commonwealth
Between the Malayan Campaign
(130,000 discounting some 20,000 Australians),[203] Burma Campaign
(86,600),[204][full citation needed] Battle of Hong Kong (15,000),[205]
and various naval encounters, British Empire forces incurred some
235,000 casualties in the Pacific Theater, including roughly 82,000
killed (50,000 in combat and 32,000 as POWs).[206] The Royal Navy lost
23 warships in the Pacific and Indian oceans: 1 battleship, 1
battlecruiser, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 5
submarines, and 4 escorts.[207] There were significant indirect losses
to the British Empire territories of India and Burma as a result of the
war. These included 3 million deaths in the Bengal famine of 1943 and
0.25 to 1 million deaths in British Burma.[7]
Australia incurred
losses of 45,841 not including deaths and illnesses from natural causes
such as disease: 17,501 killed (including POW deaths in captivity),
13,997 wounded, and 14,345 living POWs.[208] New Zealand lost 578 men
killed, with an unknown number wounded or captured.[209] 6 warships of
the Royal Australian Navy totaling 29,391 tons were sunk: 3 cruisers
(Canberra, Perth, and Sydney), 2 destroyers (Vampire and Voyager), and 3
corvettes (Armidale, Geelong, and Wallaroo, the latter two in
accidents).[207]
Other
Between Lake Khasan, Khalkin Gol,
advisors deployed to China, and the 1945 operations in Manchuria and the
Kuriles, Soviet casualties against Japan totaled 68,612: 22,731
killed/missing and 45,908 wounded.[210] Material losses included some
1,000 tanks and AFVs, 5 landing ships, and 300
aircraft.[211][212][213][214] Mongolian casualties were 753.[215]
The
entire 140,000-strong Royal Dutch East Indies Army was killed,
captured, or missing by the conclusion of the East Indies Campaign.
1,500 colonial and 900 Dutch soldiers were killed in action.[216] Most
of the colonial soldiers were freed on the spot or deserted. Of the
ethnic Dutch troops, 900 were killed in action and 37,000 became
prisoners. 8,500 of these POWs would die in Japanese captivity.[217]
Dutch naval losses in the Pacific numbered 14 major warships and 14
minor ones totaling some 40,427 tons: 2 cruisers (Java and De Ruyter), 7
destroyers (Evertsen, Kortenaer, Piet Hein, Witte de With, Banckert,
Van Nes, and Van Ghent), 5 submarines (K XVIII, K XVII, K XIII, K X, and
K VII), 7 minelayers (Prins van Oranje, Pro Patria, Bangkalan, Rigel,
Soemenep, Krakatau, and Gouden Leeuw, most of which were scuttled), and
7 minesweepers (A, B, D, C, Pieter de Bitter, Eland Dubois, and Jan
van Amstel).[218] About 30,000 Dutch and 300,000 Indonesian forced
laborers died during the Japanese occupation of the East Indies,[219]
while 3 million Indonesian civilians perished in famines.[220]
Similar
to the Dutch, the 65,000-strong French colonial army in French
Indochina (16,500 European French and 48,500 colonial) disintegrated at
the end of the Japanese invasion. 2,129 European French and 2,100
Indochinese colonial troops were killed, while 12,000 French and 3,000
colonial troops were kept as prisoners. 1-2 million deaths occurred in
French Indochina during the Japanese occupation, mostly due to the 1945
Vietnamese Famine.[221]
Axis
IJA soldiers after a suicide charge on US Marine positions in Guadalcanal
The firebombing of Tokyo, codenamed Operation Meetinghouse, killed an estimated 100,000 people, March 1945
800,000
Japanese civilians[222] and over 2 million Japanese soldiers died
during the war. According to a report compiled by the Relief Bureau of
the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare in March 1964, combined
Japanese Army and Navy deaths during the war (1937–45) numbered
approximately 2,121,000 men, mostly against either the Americans and
their allies (1.1+ million) in places such as the Solomons, Japan,
Taiwan, the Central Pacific, and the Philippines, or against various
Chinese factions (500,000+), predominantly the NRA and CCP, during the
war on the Chinese mainland, the Chinese resistance movement in
Manchuria and Burma campaign. The losses were broken down as
follows:[223]
Key: Location, Army dead, Navy dead, (total dead)
Japan Proper: 58,100, 45,800, (103,900)
Bonin Islands: 2,700, 12,500, (15,200)
Okinawa: 67,900, 21,500, (89,400)
Formosa (Taiwan): 28,500, 10,600, (39,100)
Korea: 19,600, 6,900, (26,500)
Sakhalin, the Aleutian, and Kuril Islands: 8,200, 3,200, (11,400)
Manchuria: 45,900, 800, (46,700)
China (inc. Hong Kong): 435,600, 20,100, (455,700)
Siberia: 52,300, 400, (52,700)
Central Pacific: 95,800, 151,400, (247,200)
Philippines: 377,500, 121,100, (498,600)
French Indochina: 7,900, 4,500, (12,400)
Thailand: 6,900, 100, (7,000)
Burma (inc. India): 163,000, 1,500, (164,500)
Malaya & Singapore: 8,500, 2,900, (11,400)
Andaman & Nicobar Islands: 900, 1,500, (2,400)
Sumatra: 2,700, 500, (3,200)
Java: 2,700, 3,800, (6,500)
Lesser Sundas: 51,800, 1,200, (53,000)
Borneo: 11,300, 6,700, (18,000)
Celebes: 1,500, 4,000, (5,500)
Moluccas: 2,600, 1,800, (4,400)
New Guinea: 112,400, 15,200, (127,600)
Bismarck Archipelago: 19,700, 10,800, (30,500)
Solomon Islands: 63,200, 25,000, (88,200)
Total: 1,647,200, 473,800, (2,121,000)
The
IJN lost over 341 warships, including 11 battleships, 25 aircraft
carriers, 39 cruisers, 135 destroyers, and 131 submarines, almost
entirely in action against the United States Navy. The IJN and IJA
together lost some 45,125 aircraft.[224]
Japan's ally Germany
lost 10 submarines and four auxiliary cruisers (Thor, Michel, Pinguin,
and Kormoran) in the Indian and Pacific oceans.[207] These four alone
sank 420,467 gross tons of Allied shipping.
War crimes
Further
information: List of war crimes § 1939–1945: World War II, Japanese
war crimes, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and
Allied war crimes during World War II § Asia and the Pacific War
Australian
POW Sergeant Leonard G. Siffleet of M Special Unit being beheaded by a
Japanese officer, Yasuno Chikao, on 24 October 1943. AWM photo.
On 7
December 1941, 2,403 non-combatants (2,335 neutral military personnel
and 68 civilians) were killed and 1,247 wounded during the Japanese
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Because the attack happened without a
declaration of war or explicit warning, it was judged by the Tokyo
Trials to be a war crime.[225][226]
During the Pacific War,
Japanese soldiers killed millions of non-combatants, including prisoners
of war, from surrounding nations.[227] At least 20 million Chinese
died during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).[228][229]
Unit
731 was one example of wartime atrocities committed on a civilian
population during World War II, where experiments were performed on
thousands of Chinese and Korean civilians as well as Allied prisoners of
war. In military campaigns, the Imperial Japanese Army used biological
weapons and chemical weapons on the Chinese, killing around 400,000
civilians.[230] The Nanking Massacre is another example of atrocity
committed by Japanese soldiers on a civilian population.[231]
Chinese corpses in a ditch after being killed by the Imperial Japanese Army, Hsuchow
According
to the findings of the Tokyo Tribunal, the death rate of Western
prisoners was 27%, some seven times that of POWs under the Germans and
Italians.[152] The most notorious use of forced labour was in the
construction of the Burma–Thailand "Death Railway." Around 1,536 U.S.
civilians were killed or otherwise died of abuse and mistreatment in
Japanese internment camps in the Far East; in comparison, 883 U.S.
civilians died in German internment camps in Europe.[232]
A
widely publicized example of institutionalized sexual slavery are
"comfort women", a euphemism for the 200,000 women, mostly from Korea
and China, who served in the Imperial Japanese Army's camps during World
War II. Some 35 Dutch comfort women brought a successful case before
the Batavia Military Tribunal in 1948.[233] In 1993, Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yōhei Kōno said that women were coerced into brothels run by
Japan's wartime military. Other Japanese leaders have apologized,
including former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001. In 2007,
then-Prime Minister Shinzō Abe asserted: "The fact is, there is no
evidence to prove there was coercion."[234]
The Three Alls Policy
(Sankō Sakusen) was a Japanese scorched earth policy adopted in China,
the three alls being: "Kill All, Burn All and Loot All". Initiated in
1940 by Ryūkichi Tanaka, the Sankō Sakusen was implemented in full
scale in 1942 in north China by Yasuji Okamura. According to historian
Mitsuyoshi Himeta, the scorched earth campaign was responsible for the
deaths of "more than 2.7 million" Chinese civilians.[235]
The
collection of skulls and other remains of Japanese soldiers by American
soldiers was shown by several studies to have been widespread enough to
be commented upon by Allied military authorities and the US wartime
press.[236]
Following the surrender of Japan, the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East took place in Ichigaya, Tokyo from 29
April 1946 to 12 November 1948 to try those accused of the most
serious war crimes. Meanwhile, military tribunals were also held by the
returning powers throughout Asia and the Pacific for lesser
figures.[237][238]
Aftermath and evaluation
The Indonesian Declaration of Independence adopting Japanese imperial year (Djakarta, hari 17 boelan 8 tahoen 05,
05 signifies 皇紀2605年
(kōki 2605), 1945)
The
Pacific War and consequent advances by the Japanese had greatly
influenced the independence movements of Asian countries and ended
colonialism by the West through following wars such as First Indochina
War. During World War II Japan, itself a significant imperial power,
drove the European powers out of Asia.[239] Japan's advances towards
Southeast Asia caused liberation themselves from colonial rule by the
West and moved towards independence.[240] Arnold J. Toynbee, a British
historian regarded the Pacific War as "Japan put an end to West's
colonialism in Asia once and for all."[240]
In Burma
Burmese officers in Japanese style uniforms in the Burma National Army
An
attack on British Burma by the Japanese and Burma Independence Army
(BIA) under the command of the Thirty Comrades trained by the Japanese
Forces in 三亞特別農民訓練所 (Sanya special farmer training school) was highly
welcomed by all towns and villages in Bruma.[241] Suzuki Keiji, a
commander of BIA claimed to be Bo Mogyo, his chosen Burmese name which
was a references to the thunderbolt which Burmese folk tradition held
would destroy the "umbrella" (a symbol of British colonial rule). Suzuki
was dressed in the Burmese folk costume and worn a crown as he
defeated the British on horseback. The locals danced for joy at this
news with prostration before them and offered whatever they
needed.[242][243][244][245][241] Ba Maw described the Pacific War and
how Japan is regarded in Asian nations in his book "Breakthrough in
Burma" with a full understanding of the concepts of Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere.
"The case of Japan is indeed tragic.
Looking at it historically, no nation has done so much to liberate Asia
from white domination, yet no nation has been so misunderstood by the
very peoples whom it has helped either to liberate or to set an example
to in many things.Japan was betrayed by her militarists and their
racial fantasies.Had her Asian instincts been true, had she only been
faithful to the concept of Asia for the Asians that she herself had
proclaimed at the beginning of the war, Japan's fate. would have been
very different.No military defeat could then have robbed her of the
trust and gratitude of half of Asia or even more, and that would have
mattered a great deal in finding for her a new, great, and abiding
place in a postwar world in which Asia was coming into her own.Even
now, even as things actually are, nothing can ever obliterate the role
Japan has played in bringing liberation to countless colonial
peoples.The phenomenal Japanese victories in the Pacific and in
Southeast Asia which really marked the beginning of the end of all
imperialism and colonialism, the national armies Japan helped to create
during the war which in their turn created a new spirit and will in a
large part of Asia, the independent states she set up in several
Southeast Asian countries as well as her recognition of the provisional
government of Free India at a time when not a single other belligerent
power permitted even the talk of independence within its own
dominions, and finally a demonstration by the entire Japanese people of
the invincibility of the Asian spirit when they rose out of the ashes
to a new greatness, these will outlive all the passing wartime strains
and passions and betrayals in the final summing-up of history."[246]
In India
Major Iwaichi Fujiwara greets Mohan Singh. Circa April 1942.
A
public sentiment towards Britain had deteriorated among some of the
Indian after Fall of Singapore. When the Japanese defeated the British,
the European officers abandoned approx. 40,000 Indian internees which
leaded to shatter British prestige. This ugly evacuation of Europeans
was, as one British nurse in Penang put it, "a thing that I am sure will
never be forgotten or forgiven".[247] Under this situation, there were
several movements against the British, for example, Quit India
Movement launched by Mahatma Gandhi. Meanwhile, Had been supported by
Japan, Subhas Chandra Bose formed Indian National Army in Tokyo in
order to do their best to fight alongside Japan against allies for
India's liberation.[248] Captain S.S. Yadav, general secretary of INA
veterans’ association in India evaluated Japan as a comrade in arms
which dedicated herself to promoting the liberation of India.[249][250]
After the end of the World War II, Nehru, the first Prime Minister of
India refused to take part in the Treaty of San Francisco held in 1951
on several specified grounds and declared that Japan has done no wrong
to India for India to seek an apology and reparations from Japan.[251]
In Indonesia
The
Japanese defeat of the Dutch in Indonesia in 1942 was received with
joy as the Javanese viewed it as a realization of the 800-year-old
prophecy.[252]
"The Javanese would be ruled by whites for 3
centuries and by yellow dwarfs for the life span of a maize plant prior
to the return of the Ratu Adil: whose the name must contain at least
one syllable of the Javanese Noto Nogoro."[253]
When Japan
occupied the Dutch East Indies, in the first weeks of 1942, Indonesians
came down in the streets shouting out to the Japanese army as the
fulfillment of the prophecy ascribed to Joyoboyo, who foretold the day
when white men would one day establish their rule on Java and tyrannize
the people for hundreds years – but they would be driven out by the
arrival of yellow men from the north. These yellow dwarfs, Joyoboyo had
predicted, would remain for one crop cycle, and after that Java would
be freed from foreign domination. To most of the Javanese, Japan was a
liberator: the prophecy had been fulfilled.[254]
In Sri Lanka
In
Ceylon, the Imperial Japanese Army primarily made blood sacrifices to
fight western domination during the Pacific War.[240][255] J.R.
Jayewardene made a resounding plea for Japan citing the Buddha’s
insightful words that ‘Hatred does not cease by hatred,but only by
love;this is the eternal law.” in the Treaty of San Francisco.[251]
In Thailand
Kukrit
Pramoj, the 13rd Prime Ministers of Thailand has a high opinion of
liberation of Asian countries from the West by the Japanese during the
Pacific War:
“It was thanks to Japan that all nations of Asia
gained independence. For Mother Japan, it was a difficult birth which
resulted in much suffering, yet her children are growing up quickly to
be healthy and strong.
Who was it that enabled the citizens of
the nations of Southeast Asia to gain equal status alongside the United
States and Britain today? It is because Japan, who acted like a mother
to us all, carried out acts of benevolence towards us and performed
feats of self-sacrifice. December 8th (1941) is the day when Mother
Japan – who taught us this important lesson – laid her life on the line
for us, after making a momentous decision and risking her own
well-being for our sake.
Furthermore, August 15th (1945) is the
day when our beloved and revered mother was frail and ailing. Neither
of these two days should ever be forgotten.”[256]
Pacific War as a race war
World War II Anti-Japanese propaganda poster from the U.S.
Kevin.M.Doak,
a professor of Japanese Studies in the Department of East Asian
Languages and Cultures at Georgetown University concerns the idea of the
Pacific war as a "race war", as proposed in, for example, John W.
Dower's War Without Mercy: Race & Power In the Pacific War. Based on
Kevin's and John's theories, David Williams, a contributor of Los
Angeles Times and The Japan Times criticizes the Allied illusion for the
justification of that the Pacific War was a "good war" and describes
their insights would imply the end of American exceptionalism.[257]
Spread of Communism
An illustration indicating the spread of Communism amongst the Asia.
As
they did in Europe, the Soviet Union used their advances in Asia to
facilitate the spread of Communism. The Soviet occupation of Manchuria
and the northern half of Korea were crucial to the establishment of both
the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea. Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union would make the Asia-Pacific region a hotbed of conflict, leading
to several proxy wars between the great powers. [258]
See also
World War II portal
War portal
flag Japan portal
European theatre of World War II
Dissent in the Armed Forces of the Empire of Japan
Japanese-American service in World War II
Japanese holdouts
Japanese in the Chinese resistance to the Empire of Japan
Pacific War campaigns
Timeline WWII – Pacific Theater
Yasukuni Shrine
Notes
At war since 1937
Until April 1945
Until July 1945
Until July 1944
Over
17 million Chinese civilian deaths (1937–45);[1] around 4 million
civilian deaths from the Dutch East Indies;[2][page needed] 1–2 million
Indochinese civilians;[3] around 3 million[4] Indian civilian deaths in
the Bengal famine of 1943; 0.5 to 1 million[5] Filipino civilian
deaths; 250,000[6] to 1,000,000[7] Burmese civilian deaths; 50,000[8]
East Timorese civilian deaths; and hundreds of thousands of Malayan,
Pacific and other civilian deaths[2][page needed]
460,000 Japanese
civilian deaths (338,000 in the bombings of Japan,[9] 100,000 in the
Battle of Okinawa, 22,000 in the Battle of Saipan), 543,000 Korean
civilian deaths (mostly due to Japanese forced labor projects),[10]
2,000–8,000 Thai civilian deaths[11]
"For fifty-three long months,
beginning in July 1937, China stood alone, single-handedly fighting an
undeclared war against Japan. On 9 December 1941, after Japan's
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, China finally declared war against
Japan. What had been for so long a war between two countries now became
part of a much wider Pacific conflict."[14]
: "It was not an
official term, but a term of incitement used by the Japanese media,
under the guidance of the military, in order to stir up the Japanese
people's sense of crisis..."[38][39]
The Neutrality Patrol had US destroyers fighting at sea, but no state of war had been declared by Congress.
The
US thereby reversed its opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare.
After the war, when moralistic doubts about Hiroshima and other raids
on civilian targets were loudly voiced, no one criticized Roosevelt's
submarine policy. (Two German admirals, Erich Raeder and Karl Dönitz,
faced charges at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials of violating
international law through unrestricted submarine warfare; the court
acquitted them after they proved that Allied merchant ships were
legitimate military targets under the rules in force at the time.)
Chihaya
went on to note that when the IJN belatedly improved its ASW methods,
the US submarine force responded by increasing Japanese losses.[115]
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Willmott, H.P. (2005). The Battle Of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-34528-6.
Willmott,
H.P. (2002). The War with Japan: The Period of Balance, May
1942-October 1943. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN
1-461-64607-3.
Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-44317-2. (2005).
Y'Blood,
William T. (1981). Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea.
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-994-0.
Yenne, Bill (2014). The Imperial Japanese Army: The Invincible Years 1941–42. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78200-982-5.
Harries,
Meirion; Harries, Susie (1994). Soldiers of the Sun : The Rise and
Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army. New York: Random House. ISBN
0-679-75303-6.
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Soviet factor in ending the Pacific War (2003)
Primary sources
United
States War Department. TM 30-480 Handbook On Japanese Military Forces,
1942 (1942) online; 384pp; highly detailed description of wartime IJA
by U.S. Army Intelligence.
Further reading
Dean, Peter J.
McArthur's Coalition: US and Australian operations in the Southwest
Pacific Area, 1942-1945 ( University Press of Kansas, 2018)
Werner Gruhl (31 December 2011). Imperial Japan's World War Two: 1931–1945. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1-4128-0926-9.
Judge,
Sean M. et al. The Turn of the Tide in the Pacific War: Strategic
Initiative, Intelligence, and Command, 1941-1943 (University Press of
Kansas, 2018)
Myers, Michael W.. Pacific War and Contingent Victory:
Why Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable (UP of Kansas, 2015) 198 pp.
online review
External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Pacific War.
Wikivoyage has a travel guide for Pacific War.
"The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia" compiled by Kent G. Budge, 4000 short articles
Film Footage of the Pacific War
Animated History of the Pacific War
The Pacific War Series – at The War Times Journal
Morinoske: Japanese Pilot testimonials – and more
Imperial Japanese Navy Page
"Japan's War in Colour" on YouTube
A
real tragedy by Ray Daves, a US Navy veteran; from the memoir
Radioman: An Eyewitness Account of Pearl Harbor and World War II in the
Pacific, as told to Carol Edgemon Hipperson
vte
World War II
OutlineMilitary engagements BattlesOperationsCommandersCasualtiesConferences
General
Topics
Air
warfare of World War II In EuropeBlitzkriegComparative military
ranksCryptographyDeclarations of warDiplomacyGovernments in exileHome
front United StatesAustralianUnited KingdomLend-LeaseManhattan
ProjectMilitary awardsMilitary equipmentMilitary productionNaval
historyNazi plunderOppositionTechnology Allied cooperationTotal
warStrategic bombingPuppet statesWomenArt and World War II
Theaters
Asia
and Pacific ChinaSouth-East AsiaPacificNorth and Central
PacificSouth-West PacificIndian OceanEurope Western FrontEastern
FrontMediterranean and Middle East North AfricaEast AfricaItalyWest
AfricaAtlanticNorth AmericaSouth America
Aftermath
Greek Civil
WarExpulsion of GermansPaperclipOsoaviakhimKeelhaulOccupation of
GermanyTerritorial changes of GermanySoviet occupations
RomaniaPolandHungaryBalticOccupation of JapanFirst Indochina
WarIndonesian National RevolutionChinese Civil WarDivision of KoreaCold
WarDecolonizationTreaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany
War crimes
Allied
war crimes Soviet war crimesBritish war crimesUnited States war
crimesGerman war crimes forced labourWehrmacht war crimesThe Holocaust
AftermathResponseNuremberg trialsItalian war crimesJapanese war crimes
Unit 731ProsecutionCroatian war crimes Genocide of SerbsPersecution of
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brothelsRape during the occupation of Japan Sook ChingComfort
womenIanjoRape of NankingRape of ManilaRape during the occupation of
GermanyRape during the liberation of FranceRape during the Soviet
occupation of Poland
Participants
Allies
Allied
leadersAustraliaBelgiumBrazilCanadaChinaCubaCzechoslovakiaDenmarkEthiopiaFranceFree
FranceGreeceIndiaItaly (from September
1943)LuxembourgMexicoNetherlandsNewfoundlandNew
ZealandNorwayPhilippinesPolandSouth AfricaSouthern RhodesiaSoviet
UnionTuvaUnited KingdomUnited States Puerto RicoYugoslavia
Axis
Axis
leadersAlbania protectorateBulgariaWang Jingwei
regimeCroatiaFinlandGermanyHungaryFree IndiaIraqItaly (until September
1943)Italian Social
RepublicJapanManchukuoPhilippinesRomaniaSlovakiaThailandVichy France
Resistance
AlbaniaAustriaBelgiumBulgariaCzech
landsDenmarkEstoniaEthiopiaFranceGermanyGreeceHong
KongItalyJapanJewsKoreaLatviaLithuaniaLuxembourgMalayaNetherlandsNortheast
ChinaNorwayPhilippinesPolandRomaniaThailandSoviet UnionSlovakiaWestern
UkraineVietnamYugoslavia
POWs
Finnish prisoners in the
Soviet UnionGerman prisoners in the Soviet UnionGerman prisoners in the
United StatesItalian prisoners in the Soviet UnionJapanese prisoners
In the Soviet UnionSoviet prisoner mistreatment by GermansPolish
prisoners in the Soviet UnionRomanian prisoners in the Soviet
UnionSoviet prisoners in Finland
Timeline
Prelude
AfricaAsiaEurope
1939
PolandPhoney WarWinter WarAtlanticChangshaChina
1940
WeserübungNetherlandsBelgiumFrance
Armistice of 22 June 1940BritainNorth AfricaWest AfricaBritish
SomalilandNorth ChinaBaltic StatesMoldovaIndochinaGreeceCompass
1941
East
AfricaYugoslaviaShanggaoGreeceCreteIraqSoviet
UnionFinlandLithuaniaSyria and
LebanonKievIranLeningradGorkyMoscowSevastopolPearl HarborHong
KongPhilippinesChangshaMalayaBorneo (1941–1942)Greek famine of 1941–1944
1942
BurmaChangshaJava
SeaCoral SeaGazalaDutch HarborAttu
(occupation)KiskaZhejiang-JiangxiMidwayRzhevBlueStalingradSingaporeDieppeEl
AlameinGuadalcanalTorchChinese famine of 1942–1943
1943
TunisiaKurskSmolenskGorkySolomon
IslandsAttuSicilyCottageLower DnieperItaly Armistice of
CassibileGilbert and Marshall IslandsBurmaNorthern Burma and Western
YunnanChangdeBengal famine of 1943Ruzagayura famine of 1943–1944
1944
Monte
Cassino /
ShingleNarvaKorsun–CherkassyTempestIchi-GoOverlordNeptuneNormandyMariana
and PalauBagrationWestern UkraineTannenberg LineWarsawEastern
RomaniaBelgradeParisDragoonGothic LineMarket
GardenEstoniaCrossbowPointblankLaplandHungaryLeyteArdennes
BodenplattePhilippines (1944–1945)Burma (1944–1945)Dutch famine of
1944–1945
1945
Vistula–OderIwo JimaWestern invasion of
GermanyOkinawaItaly (Spring 1945)BorneoSyrmian
FrontBerlinCzechoslovakiaBudapestWest HunanGuangxiSurrender of Germany
documentProject HulaManchuriaManilaBorneoTaipeiAtomic bombings
DebateKuril Islands ShumshuVietnamese famine of 1945Surrender of Japan
documentEnd of World War II in Asia
BibliographyCategoryIndexPortal
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States and territories in the sphere of influence of the Empire of Japan during World War II
Manchukuo
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North Shanxi Autonomous Government
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Territories
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