The March Retreat

The Approach of the Storm

HAIG had decided to bring the Battles of Ypres to a close. The Fifth Army was once again withdrawn, to be launched into another maelstrom, fiercer and more desperate than any which it had as yet encountered.

By the 2nd of November 1917, we handed the area of the II Corps back to the Second Army. This Army made another attack on Passchendaele on November 6, in which we took no part beyond supporting it with our artillery, and on November 14 our Head-quarters in the north closed and we opened at Dury, south of Amiens, where we remained about a month in G.H.Q,. Reserve.

During this period of waiting, Byng brought off his successful surprise with tanks in the direction of Cambrai, capturing about 100 German guns.

 

I was on leave at the time and this success caused immense excitement and rejoicings at home. For the first time in the war bells were rung all over the country. But the enemy command was not long in striking back, and within a few days the Germans attacked Byng at his weakest spot, captured 100 guns from him, and inflicted heavy casualties on his troops.

As a surprise Byng's attack was brilliantly executed. It might indeed have produced even greater results, and Cambrai itself could have been captured. Nevertheless, there were not sufficient troops at hand to gain any decisive results, and some critics are inclined to think that it was, in consequence, a wasted effort, but the constant demands of the French for activity on our part cannot be overlooked, and this was but one more incident in the long-drawn British effort.

No definite orders about the future of the Fifth Army were at first given to its Staff, but by the end of November we were able to make a good guess that our destination was the French front on the right of the Third Army. Up to date this had been a quiet sector and was lightly held by two French corps only ; but though quiet at the moment, it was a considerable addition to the British front—about twenty-eight miles—to which Haig very naturally objected and against which he strongly protested.

The French argument was that the share of the front to be held by them and the British should be calculated principally on the mileage of the total front. Strategical reasons were not considered ; the vital importance of the Channel Ports to Great Britain in general and the British Army in particular was overlooked, and the strength of the German Army opposite the British as compared to its strength on the French front received little or no consideration : nor did the fact that serious fighting was impossible on more than half of the front of the French Army—in the semi-mountainous country of the Vosges, behind which lay the great fortresses.

Our Mission at French G.Q..G., however, strongly espoused the French view, and Lloyd George and his Cabinet having more confidence in the French Command than in Haig, the latter's protests were over-ridden and we eventually had to take over the whole of this great increase of front. The results which quickly followed placed the British Army in the greatest peril, at the same time thoroughly shaking the confidence and nerve of the Cabinet at home when it awoke by the end of March to the full consequences of its own decision.

By the 13th of December we found ourselves at Villers-Bretonneux, and the Fifth Army, instead of taking over at once from the French, was directed to take over the VII Corps and the Cavalry Corps on the right of the Third Army. This gave the Fifth Army a front of about twelve miles to begin with, down to the Omignon River, with the 16th, 21st and 9th Divisions on the VII Corps front, under General Sir T. Snow on the left, and five cavalry divisions and the 24th Division on the Cavalry Corps front, under Sir Charles Kavanagh on the right.

I found on taking over my new front that the enemy was active in making raids and took a prisoner or two from us regularly, several nights a week, and this was the first sign which came to my notice that our front was likely to be the one selected for attack by the Germans.

The trench system was in a very neglected state. On some parts of the front there was no continuous line, no dugouts or observation posts, and communication trenches were few and provided inadequate cover.

Administratively, especially to the south towards Barisis, the area was very awkward. It had naturally been organized to receive from and to deliver towards Paris. It had now to face towards the British centres of activity, a change which caused much thought and constructive work to those concerned.

During 1917 the policy of the British Army had been entirely offensive, and all its resources in engineers, material, etc., had been devoted to dealing with this side of the operations. Defensive measures, therefore, had been much neglected.

On the first day that I drove out of my Headquarters to go to the front, I saw to my surprise parties of French civilians busy filling in trenches and removing wire along a line which ran about a mile on the east of the village of Villers-Bretonneux. This line was part of the defences of Amiens, which had been elaborately constructed and heavily wired nearly two years previously and were still in an excellent state. The agricultural population, however, was anxious to bring all this land back into cultivation, and its appeals had been yielded to. The choice of the moment for granting this concession was ill-advised, for the collapse of Russia had made the prospect of a great German attack almost a certainty, and it was no time for demolishing good defences. Almost my first act, therefore, on taking over this sector was to stop all further demolition of this line, and to commence its reconstruction. It was well I did so, for it was on this line that " Carey's Force " stood—the last reserve scraped together by the Fifth Army for the defence of the battle front at the end of March 1918.

By December 17 very full and detailed instructions were issued for the organization of our line defensively, and for the conduct of the troops in case of attack, and the next day the Army Staff had a conference which dealt with the improvement and increase of trenches, railways, bridges, roads and organization of the necessary labour.

There was a great deal which required attention and work—and with the weak divisions and extended fronts it was very difficult to provide sufficient labour for everything . . .