Publisher Description

Properties and objects are everywhere. We cannot take a step without walking into them; we cannot construct a theory in science without referring to them. Given their ubiquitous character, one might think that there would be a standard metaphysical account of properties and objects, but they remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring presents a defense of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--and of trope bundle theory as the bestaccounts of properties and objects, and advocates a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. This position rejects the existence of universals, and holds that the nature of eachindividual trope is determined by its membership in various natural classes of tropes (in contrast with the view that a trope's nature is logically prior to those class memberships). The first part of the book provides a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory. Ehring demonstrates that there are tropes and indicates some of the things that tropes can do for us metaphysically, including helping to solve the problems of mental causation, while remainingneutral between different theories of tropes. In the second part he offers a more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, and provides a full analysis of what a trope is.

Author Biography

Douglas Ehring, Southern Methodist University, DallasDouglas Ehring was born in New York City. He went to undergraduate school in California, and received his PhD in philosophy from Columbia University. Ehring has taught at SMU in Dallas since 1981, and is currently the William Edward Easterwood Professor of Philosophy there.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Properties and Concrete ParticularsPart 1: Tropes1: Distinguishing Particulars from Universals2: Why Believe in Tropes3: The Individuation of Tropes4: Bundle Theory5: Tropes and Mental CausationPart 2: Natural Class Trope Nominalism6: Why Natural Class Tropes7: The Classic Objections to Natural Class Trope Nominalism8: The Determination ObjectionsBibliographyIndex

Review

"Highly original, carefully argued, and systematic" -- Sophie C. Gibb, Analysis

Promotional

An original account of the relation between property and object.

Long Description

Properties and objects are everywhere. We cannot take a step without walking into them; we cannot construct a theory in science without referring to them. Given their ubiquitous character, one might think that there would be a standard metaphysical account of properties and objects, but they remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring presents a defense of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--and of trope bundle theory as the best
accounts of properties and objects, and advocates a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. This position rejects the existence of universals, and holds that the nature of each
individual trope is determined by its membership in various natural classes of tropes (in contrast with the view that a trope's nature is logically prior to those class memberships). The first part of the book provides a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory. Ehring demonstrates that there are tropes and indicates some of the things that tropes can do for us metaphysically, including helping to solve the problems of mental causation, while remaining
neutral between different theories of tropes. In the second part he offers a more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, and provides a full analysis of what a trope is.

Review Text

"Highly original, carefully argued, and systematic" -- Sophie C. Gibb, Analysis

Review Quote

"highly original, carefully argued, and systematic" --Sophie C. Gibb, Analysis

Feature

A new theory of what there is in the world
An original account of the relation between property and object
Significant implications for philosophy of mind

Details