'The issues raised or discussed in these studies should challenge scholars and generate discussion for years to come. Perhaps the dialogue that emerges can contribute to resolving impasses creatively and advancing transitional justice in societies struggling to recover from decades of repression.' Nanci Adler, International Journal of Transitional Justice

This book tackles three puzzles of pacted transitions to democracy. First, why do autocrats ever step down from power peacefully if they know that they may be held accountable for their involvement in the ancien régime? Second, when does the opposition indeed refrain from meting out punishment to the former autocrats once the transition is complete? Third, why, in some countries, does transitional justice get adopted when successors of former communists hold parliamentary majorities? Monika Nalepa argues that infiltration of the opposition with collaborators of the authoritarian regime can serve as insurance against transitional justice, making their commitments to amnesty credible. This explanation also accounts for the timing of transitional justice across East Central Europe. Nalepa supports her theory using a combination of elite interviews, archival evidence, and statistical analysis of survey experiments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

1. Introduction
Part I. Skeletons in the Closet: 2. Committing to amnesty
3. The kidnapper's dilemma
4. Hostages and skeletons in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
Part II. Out of the Closet: 5. Voters: transitional justice demand
6. Elites: transitional justice supply
7. The Transitional Justice Bill game
8. Infiltration as insurance
9. Epilogue: between agents and heroes
Appendices: A. Mathematical proofs to Chapter 3
B. Answers of MPs and their constituents to 'more should be done to punish people who were responsible for the injustices of the communist regime'
C. Sampling technique and transitional justice survey questionnaire
D. Birth and death of parliamentary parties by their position regarding lustration
E. Mathematical proofs to Chapter 7
F. Lustration laws by target, targeted activity, and sanction type in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Subject Areas: Comparative politics [JPB], Politics & government [JP]