The essays in this volume address questions about responsibility that arise in moral philosophy and legal theory. Some analyse different theories of causality, asking which theory offers the best account of human agency and the most satisfactory resolution of troubling controversies about free will and determinism. Some essays look at responsibility in the legal realm, seeking to determine how the law should assign liability for negligence, or whether the courts should allow defendants to offer excuses for their wrongdoing or to claim some form of 'diminished responsibility'. Other essays explore libertarian views about political freedom and accountability, asking whether libertarian positions on consent, contract law, and responsibility are consistent, or whether restitution is superior to retribution or deterrence as a basis for a theory of corrective justice. Still others examine the notion of partial or divided responsibility, or the relationship between responsibility and the emotions.

1. Causation and responsibility Michael S. Moore
2. Negligence Kenneth W. Simons
3. Responsibility and consent: the Libertarian's problems with freedom of contract Leo Katz
4. The irrelevance of responsibility Roderick T. Long
5. On responsibility in science and law John Staddon
6. Responsibility and the abuse excuse Michael Stocker
7. Why citizens should vote: a causal responsibility approach Alvin I. Goldman
8. Institutionally divided moral responsibility Henry S. Richardson
9. Fate, fatalism, and agency in stoicism Susan Sauve Meyer
10. Ultimate responsibility and dumb luck Alfred R. Mele
11. Taking responsibility for our emotions Nancy Sherman.

Subject Areas: Sociology & anthropology [JH], Social & political philosophy [HPS]