OPERATION
COBRA 1944 WW2 NORMANDY BREAKOUT BOCAGE ST. LO FALAISE GAP SEINE
SOFTBOUND BOOK by STEVEN J.
ZALOGA. ILLUSTRATED by TONY BRYAN
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Additional Information from
Internet Encyclopedia
Operation Cobra was the codename
for an offensive launched by the First United States Army (Lieutenant General
Omar Bradley) seven weeks after the D-Day landings, during the Normandy
Campaign of World War II. The intention was to take advantage of the
distraction of the Germans by the British and Canadian attacks around Caen, in
Operation Goodwood and break through the German defenses that were penning in
his troops, while the Germans were unbalanced. Once a corridor had been
created, the First Army would then be able to advance into Brittany, rolling up
the German flanks once free of the constraints of the bocage country. After a
slow start the offensive gathered momentum and German resistance collapsed as
scattered remnants of broken units fought to escape to the Seine. Lacking the
resources to cope with the situation, the German response was ineffectual and
the entire Normandy front soon collapsed. Operation Cobra, together with
concurrent offensives by the British Second Army and the Canadian First Army,
was decisive in securing an Allied victory in the Normandy Campaign.
Having been delayed several
times by poor weather, Operation Cobra commenced on 25 July, with a
concentrated aerial bombardment from thousands of Allied aircraft. Supporting
offensives had drawn the bulk of German armored reserves toward the British and
Canadian sector and coupled with the general lack of men and materiel available
to the Germans, it was impossible for them to form successive lines of defense.
Units of the U.S. VII Corps led the initial two-division assault, while other
First U.S. Army corps mounted supporting attacks designed to pin German units
in place. Progress was slow on the first day but opposition started to crumble
once the defensive crust had been broken. By 27 July, most organized resistance
had been overcome and the VII and VIII Corps advanced rapidly, isolating the
Cotentin Peninsula.
By 31 July, XIX Corps had
destroyed the last forces opposing the First Army, which emerged from the
bocage. Reinforcements were moved west by Field Marshal G�nther von Kluge and
employed in various counterattacks, the largest of which, Unternehmen L�ttich
(Operation Li�ge), was launched on 7 August between Mortain and Avranches.
Although this led to the bloodiest phase of the battle, it was mounted by
already exhausted and understrength units and was a costly failure. On 8
August, troops of the newly activated Third United States Army captured the
city of Le Mans, formerly the German 7th Army headquarters. Operation Cobra
transformed the high-intensity infantry combat of Normandy into rapid maneuver
warfare and led to the creation of the Falaise pocket and the loss of the
German position in northwestern France.
Following the successful Allied
invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, progress inland was slow. To facilitate
the Allied build-up in France and to secure room for further expansion, the
deep water port of Cherbourg on the western flank of the American sector and
the historic town of Caen in the British and Canadian sector to the east, were
early objectives.[13] The original plan for the Normandy campaign envisioned
strong offensive efforts in both sectors, in which the Second Army
(Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey) would secure Caen and the area south of
it and the First US Army (Lieutenant General Omar Bradley) would "wheel
round" to the Loire.[14][15]
General Sir Bernard
Montgomery�commanding all Allied ground forces in Normandy�intended Caen to be
taken on D-Day, while Cherbourg was expected to fall 15 days later.[16] The
Second Army was to seize Caen and then form a front to the southeast, extending
to Caumont-l'�vent�, to acquire airfields and protect the left flank of the
First US Army as it moved on Cherbourg.[17] Possession of Caen and its
surroundings�desirable for open terrain that would permit maneuver
warfare�would also give the Second Army a suitable staging area for a push
south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing east to
advance on Argentan and then the Touques River.[18][19] The capture of Caen has
been described by the British official historian Lionel Ellis as the most
important D-Day objective assigned to the British I Corps (Lieutenant-General
John Crocker). Ellis and Chester Wilmot called the Allied plan
"ambitious" since the Caen sector contained the strongest defenses in
Normandy.
The initial attempt by I Corps
to reach the city on D-Day was blocked by elements of the 21st Panzer Division
and with the Germans committing most of the reinforcements sent to meet the
invasion to the defense of Caen, the Anglo-Canadian front rapidly congealed
short of the Second Army's objectives.[23][nb 3] Operation Perch in the week
following D-Day and Operation Epsom (26�30 June) brought some territorial gains
and depleted its defenders but Caen remained in German hands until Operation
Charnwood (7�9 July), when the Second Army managed to take the northern part of
the city up to the River Orne in a frontal assault.
The successive Anglo-Canadian
offensives around Caen kept the best of the German forces in Normandy,
including most of the armor, to the eastern end of the Allied lodgement but
even so the First US Army made slow progress against dogged German
resistance.[20] In part, operations were slow due to the constraints of the
bocage landscape of densely packed banked hedgerows, sunken lanes and small
woods, for which U.S. units had not trained.[25] With no ports in Allied hands,
all reinforcement and supply had to take place over the beaches via the two
Mulberry harbors and was at the mercy of the weather.[26] On 19 June, a severe
storm descended on the English Channel, lasting for three days and causing
significant delays to the Allied build-up and the cancellation of some
operations.[27] The First US Army advance in the western sector was eventually
halted by Bradley before the town of Saint-L�, to concentrate on the seizure of
Cherbourg.[28][29] The defense of Cherbourg consisted largely of four German
battlegroups formed from the remnants of units that had retreated up the
Cotentin peninsula but the port defenses had been designed principally to meet
an attack from the sea.[30] Organized German resistance ended only on 27 June,
when the 9th US Infantry Division managed to reduce the defenses of
Cap-de-la-Hague, north-west of the port.[31] Within four days, VII Corps (Major
General J. Lawton Collins) resumed the offensive toward Saint-L�, alongside XIX
Corps and VIII Corps, causing the Germans to move more armor into the U.S.
sector.
The originator of the idea for
Operation Cobra is disputed. According to Montgomery's official biographer, the
foundation of Operation Cobra was laid on 13 June.[33][34] Planning was
immensely aided by detailed Ultra intelligence which supplied up-to-date
decodes of communications between Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, the German
armed forces high command) and Hitler's generals.[35] Montgomery's plan at that
time called for the U.S. First Army to take Saint-L� and Coutances and then
make two southward thrusts; one from Caumont toward Vire and Mortain and the
other from Saint-L� toward Villedieu and Avranches. Although pressure was to be
kept up along the Cotentin Peninsula towards La Haye-du-Puits and Valognes, the
capture of Cherbourg was not the priority.[33] With the capture of Cherbourg by
VII Corps on 27 June, Montgomery's initial timetable was overtaken by events
and the thrust from Caumont was never adopted.
Following the conclusion of
Operation Charnwood and the cancellation of the First Army offensive towards
Saint-L�, Montgomery met with Bradley and Dempsey on 10 July to discuss plans
for the 21st Army Group.[37][38][39] Bradley said that progress on the western
flank was very slow but that plans had been laid for another breakout attempt,
codenamed Operation Cobra, to be launched by the First Army on 18
July.[40][41][42][43][44][45][28][nb 4] Montgomery approved the plan and that
the strategy would remain the diversion of German attention from the First Army
to the British and Canadian sector.[46][28] Dempsey was instructed to "go
on hitting, drawing the German strength, especially the armour, onto
yourself�so as to ease the way for Brad".[39] To accomplish this,
Operation Goodwood was planned and Eisenhower ensured that both operations
would have the support of the Allied strategic bombers.
On 12 July, Bradley briefed his
commanders on the Cobra plan, which consisted of three phases. The main effort
would be under the control of VII Corps. In the first phase, the breakthrough
attack would be conducted by the 9th Infantry Division (Major General Manton S.
Eddy) and the 30th Infantry Division (Major General Leland Hobbs), which would
break into the German defensive zone and then hold the flanks of the
penetration while the 1st Infantry Division (Major General Clarence Huebner)
and 2nd Armored Division (Major General Edward H. Brooks) pushed into the depth
of the position until resistance collapsed.[48] The 1st Infantry Division
"was to take Marigny, with this objective exploited by a stream of General
Watson's 3rd Armored Division armor that would move south toward
Coutances".[49] The 2nd Armored Division�part of "Collins'
exploitation force" of the 2nd Armored Division in the east of the VII
Corps sector and the "1st Infantry Division reinforced by Combat Command B
(CCB) of the 3rd Armored division in the west"[50]�would "pass
through the 30th Infantry Division sector ... and guard the overall American
left flank."[49] If VII Corps succeeded, the western German position would
become untenable, permitting a relatively easy advance to the southwest end of
the bocage to cut off and seize the Brittany peninsula. First Army intelligence
estimated that no German counterattack would occur in the first few days after
Cobra's launch and that if they did later, they would be no more than
battalion-sized operations.
Cobra was to be a concentrated
attack on a 6,400 m (7,000 yd) front, unlike previous American broad front
offensives and would have a mass of air support.[54] Fighter-bombers would
concentrate on hitting forward German defenses in a 230 m (250 yd) belt
immediately south of the Saint-L��Periers road, while General Spaatz's heavy
bombers would bomb to a depth of 2,300 m (2,500 yd) behind the German main line
of resistance.[55] It was anticipated that the physical destruction and shock
value of a short, intense preliminary bombardment would greatly weaken the
German defense[54] so in addition to divisional artillery, Army- and
Corps-level units would provide support, including nine heavy, five medium and
seven light artillery battalions.[56] Over 1,000 divisional and corps artillery
pieces were committed to the offensive[56] and approximately 140,000 artillery
rounds were allocated to the operation in VII Corps, with another 27,000 for
VIII Corps.
To overcome the constraints of
the bocage that had made attacks so difficult and costly for both sides, Rhino
modifications were made to some M4 Sherman, M5A1 Stuart tanks and M10 tank
destroyers, by fitting them with hedge-breaching 'tusks' that could force a
path through hedgerows.[48] German tanks remained restricted to the roads but
U.S. armored vehicles could maneuver more freely,[48] although the
effectiveness of the devices was exaggerated.[59] By the eve of Cobra, 60
percent of the tanks of the First Army had the rhino modification.[60] To
preserve operational security, Bradley forbade their use until Cobra was
launched.[61] In all, 1,269 M4 medium tanks, 694 M5A1 light tanks and 288 M10
tank destroyers were available.
To gain good terrain for
Operation Cobra, Bradley and Collins conceived a plan to push forward to the
Saint-L��Periers road, along which VII and VIII Corps were securing jumping-off
positions.[33] On 18 July, at a cost of 5,000 casualties, the American 29th and
35th Infantry Divisions managed to gain the vital heights of Saint-L�, driving
back General der Fallschirmtruppen Eugen Meindl's II Parachute Corps.[33]
Meindl's paratroopers, together with the 352nd Infantry Division (which had
been in action since its D-Day defense of Omaha Beach) were now in ruins, and
the stage for the main offensive was set.[33] Due to poor weather conditions
that had also been hampering Goodwood and Atlantic, Bradley decided to postpone
Cobra for a few days�a decision that worried Montgomery, as the British and
Canadian operations had been launched to support a breakout attempt that was
failing to materialize.[77][78] By 24 July the skies had cleared enough for the
start order to be given, and 1,600 Allied aircraft took off for Normandy.[77]
However, the weather closed in again over the battlefield. Under poor
visibility conditions, more than 25 Americans were killed and 130 wounded in
the bombing before the air support operation was postponed until the following
day. Some enraged soldiers opened fire on their own aircraft, a not uncommon
practice in Normandy when suffering from friendly fire.
After the one-day postponement,
Cobra got underway at 09:38 on 25 July, when around 600 Allied fighter-bombers
attacked strongpoints and enemy artillery along a 270 m (300 yd)-wide strip of
ground located in the St. L� area.[79] For the next hour, 1,800 heavy bombers
of the U.S. Eighth Air Force saturated a 6,000 yd � 2,200 yd (3.4 mi � 1.3 mi;
5.5 km � 2.0 km) area on the Saint-L��Periers road, succeeded by a third and
final wave of medium bombers.[80] Approximately 3,000 U.S. aircraft had
carpet-bombed a narrow section of the front, with the Panzer-Lehr-Division
taking the brunt of the attack.[55] However, once again not all the casualties
were German; Bradley had specifically requested that the bombers approach the
target from the east, out of the sun and parallel to the Saint-L��Periers road,
in order to minimize the risk of friendly losses, but most of the airmen
instead came in from the north, perpendicular to the front line.[80] Bradley,
however, had apparently misunderstood explanations from the heavy bomber
commanders that a parallel approach was impossible because of the time and
space constraints Bradley had set. Additionally, a parallel approach would not
in any event have assured that all bombs would fall behind German lines because
of deflection errors or obscured aim points due to dust and smoke.[81] Despite
efforts by U.S. units to identify their positions, inaccurate bombing by the
Eighth Air Force killed 111 men and wounded 490.[82] The dead included
Bradley's friend and fellow West Pointer Lieutenant General Lesley McNair�the
highest-ranking U.S. soldier to be killed in action in the European Theater of
Operations.
By 11:00, the infantry began to
move forward, advancing from crater to crater beyond what had been the German
outpost line.[82] Although no serious opposition was forecast,[83] the remnants
of Fritz Bayerlein′s Panzer Lehr�consisting of roughly 2,200 men and 45 armored
vehicles[74]�had regrouped and were prepared to meet the advancing U.S. troops,
and to the west of Panzer Lehr the German 5th Parachute Division had escaped
the bombing almost intact.[83] Collins' VII Corps were quite disheartened to
meet fierce enemy artillery fire, which they expected to have been suppressed
by the bombing.[84] Several U.S. units found themselves entangled in fights
against strongpoints held by a handful of German tanks, supporting infantry and
88 mm (3.46 in) guns[84]�VII Corps gained only 2,000 m (2,200 yd) during the
rest of the day.[83] However, if the first day's results had been
disappointing, General Collins found cause for encouragement; although the
Germans were fiercely holding their positions, these did not seem to form a continuous
line and were susceptible to being outflanked or bypassed.[84] Even with prior
warning of the American offensive, the British and Canadian actions around Caen
had convinced the Germans that the real threat lay there, and tied down their
available forces to such an extent that a succession of meticulously prepared
defensive positions in depth, as encountered during Goodwood and Atlantic, were
not created to meet Cobra.
On the morning of 26 July, the
U.S. 2nd Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division joined the attack as
planned,[83] reaching one of Cobra's first objectives�a road junction north of
Le Mesnil-Herman�the following day.[85] Also on 26 July, VIII Corps (Major
General Troy H. Middleton) entered the battle, led by the 8th U.S. Infantry
Division and 90th U.S. Infantry Division.[86] Despite clear paths of advance
through the floods and swamps across their front, both divisions initially
disappointed the First Army by failing to gain significant ground[86] but first
light the next morning revealed that the Germans had been compelled to retreat
by their crumbling left flank, leaving only immense minefields to delay VIII
Corps.[86] By noon on 27 July, the 9th U.S. Infantry Division was also clear of
any organized German resistance and was advancing rapidly.
By 28 July, the German defenses
across the U.S. front had largely collapsed under the full weight of the VII
and VIII Corps advance and resistance was disorganized and patchy.[86] The 4th
Armored Division (VIII Corps)�entering combat for the first time�captured
Coutances but met stiff opposition east of the town and U.S. units penetrating
into the depth of the German positions were counter-attacked by elements of the
2nd SS Panzer Division, 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division and the 353rd Infantry
Division, seeking to escape entrapment.[87] Around Roncey, P-47 Thunderbolts of
the 405th Fighter Group destroyed a German column of 122 tanks, 259 other
vehicles and 11 artillery pieces. An attack by British Typhoons close to La
Baleine destroyed 9 tanks, 8 other armored vehicles and 20 other vehicles.[88]
A counter-attack was mounted against the U.S. 2nd Armored Division by German
remnants but this was a disaster and the Germans abandoned their vehicles and
fled on foot.[87] Two columns of the 2nd SS Panzer Division were mauled by the
U.S. 2nd Armored Division. A column around La Chapelle was bombarded at point
blank range by 2nd Armored Division artillery. In two hours, American artillery
fired over 700 rounds, into the column. The Germans suffered the loss of 50
dead, 60 wounded and 197 taken prisoner. Material losses were over 260 German
combat vehicles destroyed.[89] Beyond the town another 1,150 German soldiers
were killed and the Germans lost 96 armored combat vehicles and trucks.[90] The
U.S. 2nd Armored Division destroyed 64 German tanks and 538 other German combat
vehicles during Operation Cobra.[91] The U.S. 2nd Armored Division suffered 49
tank losses in the process.[92] The 2nd Armored Division also inflicted over
7,370 casualties on the Germans while suffering 914 casualties.[93] At the
beginning of Operation Cobra the German Panzer Lehr Division had only 2,200
combat troops, 12 Panzer IV and 16 Panthers fit for action and 30 tanks in
various states of repair behind the lines.[94] Panzer Lehr was in the path of
Allied bombing that consisted of 1,500 bombers. The division suffered about
1,000 casualties during this bombardment.[95] An exhausted and demoralized
Bayerlein reported that his Panzer Lehr Division was "finally
annihilated", with its armor wiped out, its personnel either casualties or
missing and all headquarters records lost.
Field Marshal G�nther von Kluge
Oberbefehlshaber West (commander of German forces on the Western Front)�was
mustering reinforcements, and elements of the 2nd Panzer Division and the 116th
Panzer Division were approaching the battlefield. The U.S. XIX Corps (Major
General Charles H. Corlett) entered the battle on 28 July on the left of VII
Corps and between 28 and 31 July became embroiled with these reinforcements in
the fiercest fighting since Cobra began.[96] During the night of 29/30 July
near Saint-Denis-le-Gast, to the east of Coutances, elements of the 2nd Armored
Division found themselves fighting for their lives against a German column from
the 2nd SS Panzer Division and 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division, which passed
through the American lines in the darkness.[87] Other elements of the 2nd
Armored Division were attacked near Cambry and fought for six hours; Bradley
and his commanders knew that they were dominating the battlefield and such
desperate assaults were no threat to the American position.[87] When ordered to
concentrate his division, Colonel Heinz G�nther Guderian the senior staff
officer of the 116th Panzer Division was frustrated by the high level of Allied
fighter-bomber activity.[97] Without receiving direct support from the 2nd
Panzer Division as promised, Guderian stated that his panzergrenadiers could
not succeed in a counterattack against the Americans.[98] Advancing southward
along the coast, later that day, the U.S. VIII Corps seized the town of
Avranches�described by historian Andrew Williams as "the gateway to Brittany
and southern Normandy"[53]�and by 31 July XIX Corps had thrown back the
last German counterattacks after fierce fighting, inflicting heavy losses in
men and tanks.[97] The American advance was now relentless, and the First Army
was finally free of the bocage.
On 30 July, to protect Cobra's
flank and prevent the disengagement and relocation of further German forces,
VIII Corps and XXX Corps of the Second Army began Operation Bluecoat southwards
from Caumont toward Vire and Mont Pin�on.[99] Bluecoat kept German armored
units fixed on the British eastern front and continued the wearing down of the
strength of German armored formations in the area. The breakthrough in the
center of the Allied front surprised the Germans, when they were distracted by
the Allied attacks at both ends of the Normandy bridgehead.[100] By the time of
the American breakout at Avranches, there was little to no reserve strength
left for Unternehmen L�ttich, which had been defeated by 12 August, leaving the
7th Army with no choice but to retire rapidly east of the Orne river, with a
rearguard of the remaining armored and motorized units, to allow time for the
surviving infantry to reach the Seine. After the first stage of the withdrawal
beyond the Orne, the maneuver collapsed for a lack of fuel, Allied air attacks
and the constant pressure of the Allied armies, culminating in the encirclement
of German forces in the Falaise pocket.