ONE MINUTE
TO MIDNIGHT HBDJ CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 1962 JFK KRUSHCHEV CASTRO SORENSON BUNDY
McNAMARA RFK CIA BLOCKADE JCS OPERATION MONGOOSE U-2
HARDBOUND BOOK with DUSTJACKET by MICHAEL DOBBS
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Additional Information from Internet Encyclopedia
The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the
October Crisis of 1962 (Spanish: Crisis de Octubre), the Caribbean Crisis (the
Missile Scare), was a 13-day (October 1628, 1962) confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union initiated by the American discovery of
Soviet ballistic missile deployment in Cuba. The confrontation is often
considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale
nuclear war.
In response to the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of
1961 and the presence of American Jupiter ballistic missiles in Italy and
Turkey, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Cuba's request to place
nuclear missiles on the island to deter a future invasion. An agreement was
reached during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Fidel Castro in July
1962, and construction of a number of missile launch facilities started later
that summer.
Meanwhile, the 1962 United States elections were
under way, and the White House had for months denied charges that it was
ignoring dangerous Soviet missiles 90 miles (140 km) from Florida. The missile
preparations were confirmed when an Air Force U-2 spy plane produced clear
photographic evidence of medium-range (SS-4) and intermediate-range (R-14)
ballistic missile facilities. The US established a naval blockade on October 22
to prevent further missiles from reaching Cuba; Oval Office tapes during the
crisis revealed that Kennedy had also put the blockade in place, as an attempt
to provoke Soviet-backed forces in Berlin as well. The US announced it would
not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba and demanded that the
weapons already in Cuba be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union.
After several days of tense negotiations, an
agreement was reached between US President John F. Kennedy and Khrushchev.
Publicly, the Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and
return them to the Soviet Union, subject to United Nations verification, in
exchange for a US public declaration and agreement to avoid invading Cuba
again. Secretly, the United States agreed that it would dismantle all US-built
Jupiter MRBMs, which had been deployed in Turkey against the Soviet Union;
there has been debate on whether or not Italy was included in the agreement as
well.
When all offensive missiles and Ilyushin Il-28
light bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba, the blockade was formally ended on
November 21, 1962. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet
Union pointed out the necessity of a quick, clear, and direct communication
line between Washington and Moscow. As a result, the MoscowWashington hotline
was established. A series of agreements later reduced USSoviet tensions for
several years until both parties began to build their nuclear arsenal even
further.
The Kennedy administration had been publicly
embarrassed by the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961, which had been
launched under President John F. Kennedy by CIA-trained forces of Cuban exiles.
Afterward, former President Dwight Eisenhower told Kennedy that "the
failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they
would otherwise not do."[6]:10 The half-hearted invasion left Soviet
premier Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was
indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, "too young, intellectual, not
prepared well for decision making in crisis situations... too intelligent and
too weak". US covert operations against Cuba continued in 1961 with the
unsuccessful Operation Mongoose.
In January 1962, US Army General Edward Lansdale
described plans to overthrow the Cuban government in a top-secret report
(partially declassified 1989), addressed to Kennedy and officials involved with
Operation Mongoose.[7] CIA agents or "pathfinders" from the Special
Activities Division were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and
organization, including radio broadcasts.[9] In February 1962, the US launched
an embargo against Cuba,[10] and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret
timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban government,
mandating guerrilla operations to begin in August and September. "Open
revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime" would occur in the first two
weeks of October.
When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his
key election issues was an alleged "missile gap" with the Soviets
leading. Actually, the US at that time led the Soviets by a wide margin that
would only increase. In 1961, the Soviets had only four intercontinental
ballistic missiles (R-7 Semyorka). By October 1962, they may have had a few
dozen, with some intelligence estimates as high as 75.
The US, on the other hand, had 170 ICBMs and was
quickly building more. It also had eight George Washington- and Ethan
Allen-class ballistic missile submarines, with the capability to launch 16
Polaris missiles, each with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km).
Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted to
the world that the Soviets were building missiles "like sausages" but
Soviet missiles' numbers and capabilities were nowhere close to his assertions.
The Soviet Union had medium-range ballistic missiles in quantity, about 700 of
them, but they were very unreliable and inaccurate. The US had a considerable
advantage in total number of nuclear warheads (27,000 against 3,600) and in the
technology required for their accurate delivery. The US also led in missile
defensive capabilities, naval and air power; but the Soviets had a 21 advantage
in conventional ground forces, more pronounced in field guns and tanks,
particularly in the European theater.
In May 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was
persuaded by the idea of countering the US's growing lead in developing and
deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear
missiles in Cuba, despite the misgivings of the Soviet Ambassador in Havana,
Alexandr Ivanovich Alexeyev, who argued that Castro would not accept the
deployment of the missiles.[13] Khrushchev faced a strategic situation in which
the US was perceived to have a "splendid first strike" capability
that put the Soviet Union at a huge disadvantage. In 1962, the Soviets had only
20 ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the US from inside the
Soviet Union.The poor accuracy and reliability of the missiles raised serious
doubts about their effectiveness. A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs
would become operational only after 1965.
Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962
placed less emphasis on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs). The missiles could hit American allies and most of
Alaska from Soviet territory but not the Contiguous United States. Graham
Allison, the director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, points out, "The Soviet Union could not right the nuclear
imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. In order to meet the threat
it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options. Moving existing
nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was
one."
A second reason that Soviet missiles were deployed
to Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin, controlled by the
American, British and French within Communist East Germany, into the Soviet
orbit. The East Germans and Soviets considered western control over a portion
of Berlin a grave threat to East Germany. Khrushchev made West Berlin the
central battlefield of the Cold War. Khrushchev believed that if the US did
nothing over the missile deployments in Cuba, he could muscle the West out of
Berlin using said missiles as a deterrent to western countermeasures in Berlin.
If the US tried to bargain with the Soviets after it became aware of the
missiles, Khrushchev could demand trading the missiles for West Berlin. Since
Berlin was strategically more important than Cuba, the trade would be a win for
Khrushchev, as Kennedy recognised: "The advantage is, from Khrushchev's
point of view, he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to
it."
In early 1962, a group of Soviet military and
missile construction specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to
Havana. They obtained a meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Cuban
leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade Cuba again and
enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba.
According to another source, Castro objected to the missiles deployment that
would have made him look like a Soviet puppet, but he was persuaded that
missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to the US and help the interests of the
entire socialist camp. Also, the deployment would include short-range tactical
weapons (with a range of 40 km, usable only against naval vessels) that would
provide a "nuclear umbrella" for attacks upon the island.
By May, Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place
strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that
a US invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to
the communists, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to confront the
Americans "with more than words.... the logical answer was
missiles".[23]:29 The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing
their plans longhand, which were approved by Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion
Malinovsky on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7.
Specialists in missile construction under the
guise of "machine operators," "irrigation specialists," and
"agricultural specialists" arrived in July. A total of 43,000 foreign
troops would ultimately be brought in. Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergei
Biryuzov, Head of the Soviet Rocket Forces, led a survey team that visited
Cuba. He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged
by palm trees.
The Soviet leadership believed, based on its
perception of Kennedy's lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion,
that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait
accompli.[6]:1 On September 11, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a US
attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships that were carrying supplies to the island
would mean war. The Soviets continued the Maskirovka program to conceal their
actions in Cuba. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into
Cuba were offensive in nature. On September 7, Soviet Ambassador to the United
States Anatoly Dobrynin assured United States Ambassador to the United Nations
Adlai Stevenson that the Soviet Union was supplying only defensive weapons to
Cuba. On September 11, the Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Soviet News
Agency TASS) announced that the Soviet Union had no need or intention to
introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. On October 13, Dobrynin was
questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the
Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans. On
October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy
a personal message from Khrushchev reassuring him that "under no
circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba."
As early as August 1962, the US suspected the
Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba. During that month, its
intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers
of Russian-built MiG-21 fighters and Il-28 light bombers. U-2 spyplanes found
S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2) surface-to-air missile sites at eight
different locations. CIA director John A. McCone was suspicious. Sending
antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he reasoned, "made sense only if Moscow
intended to use them to shield a base for ballistic missiles aimed at the United
States".[29] On August 10, he wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he guessed
that the Soviets were preparing to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba.
The first consignment of R-12 missiles arrived on
the night of September 8, followed by a second on September 16. The R-12 was a
medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a thermonuclear
warhead.[33] It was a single-stage, road-transportable, surface-launched,
storable liquid propellant fueled missile that could deliver a megaton-class
nuclear weapon.[34] The Soviets were building nine sitessix for R-12
medium-range missiles (NATO designation SS-4 Sandal) with an effective range of
2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) and three for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean) with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometres
(2,800 mi).
On October 7, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós
Torrado spoke at the UN General Assembly: "If... we are attacked, we will
defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend
ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would
have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to
employ."[citation needed] On October 10 in another Senate speech Sen.
Keating reaffirmed his earlier warning of August 31 and stated that,
"Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites for
intermediate range tactical missiles."
The United States had been sending U-2
surveillance over Cuba since the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion.[38] The first
issue that led to a pause in reconnaissance flights took place on August 30,
when a U-2 operated by the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command flew over
Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East by mistake. The Soviets lodged a protest
and the US apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese-operated U-2[39][40] was
lost over western China to an SA-2 surface-to-air missile. US officials were
worried that one of the Cuban or Soviet SAMs in Cuba might shoot down a CIA
U-2, initiating another international incident. In a meeting with members of the
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) on September 10, Secretary of
State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy heavily restricted
further U-2 flights over Cuban airspace. The resulting lack of coverage over
the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as the
"Photo Gap".[41] No significant U-2 coverage was achieved over the
interior of the island. US officials attempted to use a Corona
photoreconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments,
but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH-4 mission on October 1
was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable
intelligence. At the end of September, Navy reconnaissance aircraft
photographed the Soviet ship Kasimov, with large crates on its deck the size
and shape of Il-28 jet bomber fuselages.
In September 1962, analysts from the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) noticed that Cuban surface-to-air missile sites were
arranged in a pattern similar to those used by the Soviet Union to protect its
ICBM bases, leading DIA to lobby for the resumption of U-2 flights over the
island.[43] Although in the past the flights had been conducted by the CIA,
pressure from the Defense Department made the authority be transferred to the
Air Force. Following the loss of a CIA U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960,
it was thought that if another U-2 were shot down, an Air Force aircraft
arguably being used for a legitimate military purpose would be easier to
explain than a CIA flight.
When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized
on October 9, poor weather kept the planes from flying. The US first obtained
U-2 photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14, when a U-2 flight
piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 928 pictures on a path selected by DIA
analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site
at San Cristóbal, Pinar del Río Province (now in Artemisa Province), in western
Cuba.
On October 15, the CIA's National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC) reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified
objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. This
identification was made, in part, on the strength of reporting provided by Oleg
Penkovsky, a double agent in the GRU working for CIA and MI6. Although he
provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, technical
and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by
Penkovsky in the months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts
correctly identify the missiles on U-2 imagery.
That evening, the CIA notified the Department of
State and at 8:30 pm EDT, Bundy chose to wait until the next morning to tell
the President. McNamara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met
with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's
analysis of the images.[46] At 6:30 pm EDT, Kennedy convened a meeting of the
nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisors,[47]
in a group he formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security
Council (EXCOMM) after the fact on October 22 by the National Security Action
Memorandum 196.[48] Without informing the members of EXCOMM, President Kennedy
tape recorded all of their proceedings, and Sheldon M. Stern, head of the
Kennedy library transcribed some of them.
Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would
signal the Soviets to presume "a clear line" to conquer Berlin.
Kennedy also believed that US allies would think of the country as
"trigger-happy cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not
peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.
The EXCOMM then discussed the effect on the
strategic balance of power, both political and military. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance,
but McNamara disagreed. An extra 40, he reasoned, would make little difference
to the overall strategic balance. The US already had approximately 5,000
strategic warheads,[54]:261 but the Soviet Union had only 300. McNamara
concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter
the strategic balance. In 1990, he reiterated that "it made no
difference.... The military balance wasn't changed. I didn't believe it then,
and I don't believe it now."
The EXCOMM agreed that the missiles would affect
the political balance. Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less
than a month before the crisis that "if Cuba should possess a capacity to
carry out offensive actions against the United States... the United States
would act." Also, credibility among US allies and people would be damaged
if the Soviet Union appeared to redress the strategic balance by placing
missiles in Cuba. Kennedy explained after the crisis that "it would have
politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and
appearances contribute to reality."
On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, who claimed the weapons were for defensive
purposes only. Not wanting to expose what he already knew and to avoid
panicking the American public,[58] Kennedy did not reveal that he was already
aware of the missile buildup.[59] By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights
showed four operational sites.
Two Operational Plans (OPLAN) were considered.
OPLAN 316 envisioned a full invasion of Cuba by Army and Marine units,
supported by the Navy following Air Force and naval airstrikes. Army units in
the US would have had trouble fielding mechanized and logistical assets, and
the US Navy could not supply enough amphibious shipping to transport even a
modest armored contingent from the Army.
OPLAN 312, primarily an Air Force and Navy carrier
operation, was designed with enough flexibility to do anything from engaging
individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316's ground
forces.
Kennedy met with members of EXCOMM and other top
advisers throughout October 21, considering two remaining options: an air
strike primarily against the Cuban missile bases or a naval blockade of Cuba.[59]
A full-scale invasion was not the administration's first option. McNamara
supported the naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that left
the US in control. The term "blockade" was problematic. According to
international law, a blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration
did not think that the Soviets would be provoked to attack by a mere blockade.
Additionally, legal experts at the State Department and Justice Department
concluded that a declaration of war could be avoided if another legal
justification, based on the Rio Treaty for defense of the Western Hemisphere,
was obtained from a resolution by a two-thirds vote from the members of the
Organization of American States (OAS).
Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations wrote
a position paper that helped Kennedy to differentiate between what they termed
a "quarantine"[65] of offensive weapons and a blockade of all
materials, claiming that a classic blockade was not the original intention.
Since it would take place in international waters, Kennedy obtained the
approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defense
provisions of the Rio Treaty:
Latin American participation in the quarantine now
involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the US Commander
South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine
and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two
Venezuelan destroyers (Destroyers ARV D-11 Nueva Esparta" and "ARV
D-21 Zulia") and one submarine (Caribe) had reported to COMSOLANT, ready
for sea by November 2. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of
Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the
"quarantine". The Dominican Republic had made available one escort
ship. Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military
officers to the US to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force
informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed
to the "quarantine" operation.
This initially was to involve a naval blockade
against offensive weapons within the framework of the Organization of American
States and the Rio Treaty. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types
of goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of
Cuba. The CNO's scenario was followed closely in later implementing the
"quarantine."
On October 19, the EXCOMM formed separate working
groups to examine the air strike and blockade options, and by the afternoon
most support in the EXCOMM shifted to the blockade option. Reservations about
the plan continued to be voiced as late as the October 21, the paramount
concern being that once the blockade was put into effect, the Soviets would
rush to complete some of the missiles. Consequently, the US could find itself
bombing operational missiles if blockade failed to force Khrushchev to remove
the missiles already on the island.
On October 23, at 11:24 am EDT, a cable, drafted
by George Wildman Ball to the US Ambassador in Turkey and NATO, notified them
that they were considering making an offer to withdraw what the US knew to be
nearly-obsolete missiles from Italy and Turkey, in exchange for the Soviet
withdrawal from Cuba. Turkish officials replied that they would "deeply
resent" any trade involving the US missile presence in their country.[74]
Two days later, on the morning of October 25, American journalist Walter
Lippmann proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. Castro reaffirmed
Cuba's right to self-defense and said that all of its weapons were defensive
and Cuba would not allow an inspection.
Three days after Kennedy's speech, the Chinese
People's Daily announced that "650,000,000 Chinese men and women were
standing by the Cuban people." In West Germany, newspapers supported the
US response by contrasting it with the weak American actions in the region
during the preceding months. They also expressed some fear that the Soviets
might retaliate in Berlin. In France on October 23, the crisis made the front page
of all the daily newspapers. The next day, an editorial in Le Monde expressed
doubt about the authenticity of the CIA's photographic evidence. Two days
later, after a visit by a high-ranking CIA agent, the newspaper accepted the
validity of the photographs. Also in France, in the October 29 issue of Le
Figaro, Raymond Aron wrote in support of the American response. On October 24,
Pope John XXIII sent a message to the Soviet embassy in Rome to be transmitted
to the Kremlin in which he voiced his concern for peace. In this message he
stated, "We beg all governments not to remain deaf to this cry of
humanity. That they do all that is in their power to save peace."
The crisis was continuing unabated, and in the
evening of October 24, the Soviet news agency TASS broadcast a telegram from
Khrushchev to Kennedy in which Khrushchev warned that the United States's
"outright piracy" would lead to war. That was followed at 9:24 pm by
a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy, which was received at 10:52 pm EDT.
Khrushchev stated, "if you weigh the present situation with a cool head
without giving way to passion, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot
afford not to decline the despotic demands of the USA" and that the Soviet
Union views the blockade as "an act of aggression" and their ships
will be instructed to ignore it. After October 23, Soviet communications with
the USA increasingly showed indications of having being rushed. Undoubtedly a
product of pressure, it was not uncommon for Khrushchev to repeat himself and
send messages lacking simple editing.[78] With President Kennedy making his
aggressive intentions of a possible air-strike followed by an invasion on Cuba
known, Khrushchev rapidly sought after a diplomatic compromise. Communications
between the two super-powers had entered into a unique and revolutionary
period; with the newly developed threat of mutual destruction through the
deployment of nuclear weapons, diplomacy now demonstrated how power and
coercion could dominate negotiations.
The US requested an emergency meeting of the
United Nations Security Council on October 25. US Ambassador to the United
Nations Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in an
emergency meeting of the Security Council, challenging him to admit the
existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin refused to answer. The next day at
10:00 pm EDT, the US raised the readiness level of SAC forces to DEFCON 2. For
the only confirmed time in US history, B-52 bombers went on continuous airborne
alert, and B-47 medium bombers were dispersed to various military and civilian
airfields and made ready to take off, fully equipped, on 15 minutes'
notice.[80][81] One eighth of SAC's 1,436 bombers were on airborne alert, and
some 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready alert, some of
which targeted Cuba,[82] and Air Defense Command (ADC) redeployed 161
nuclear-armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields within nine hours, with one
third maintaining 15-minute alert status.[61] Twenty-three nuclear-armed B-52s
were sent to orbit points within striking distance of the Soviet Union so that
it would believe that the US was serious.[83] Jack J. Catton later estimated
that about 80 percent of SAC's planes were ready for launch during the crisis;
David A. Burchinal recalled that, by contrast:
the Russians were so thoroughly stood down, and we
knew it. They didn't make any move. They did not increase their alert; they did
not increase any flights, or their air defense posture. They didn't do a thing,
they froze in place. We were never further from nuclear war than at the time of
Cuba, never further.
By October 22, Tactical Air Command (TAC) had 511
fighters plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance aircraft deployed to face
Cuba on one-hour alert status. TAC and the Military Air Transport Service had
problems. The concentration of aircraft in Florida strained command and support
echelons, which faced critical undermanning in security, armaments, and
communications; the absence of initial authorization for war-reserve stocks of
conventional munitions forced TAC to scrounge; and the lack of airlift assets
to support a major airborne drop necessitated the call-up of 24 Reserve
squadrons.
On October 25 at 1:45 am EDT, Kennedy responded to
Khrushchev's telegram by stating that the US was forced into action after
receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in
Cuba, and when the assurances proved to be false, the deployment "required
the responses I have announced.... I hope that your government will take
necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation."
At 7:15 am EDT on October 25, USS Essex and USS
Gearing attempted to intercept Bucharest but failed to do so. Fairly certain
that the tanker did not contain any military material, the US allowed it
through the blockade. Later that day, at 5:43 pm, the commander of the blockade
effort ordered the destroyer USS Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. to intercept and board
the Lebanese freighter Marucla. That took place the next day, and Marucla was
cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked.
At 5:00 pm EDT on October 25, William Clements
announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. That
report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no
slowdown at all. In response, Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199,
authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the command of
SACEUR, which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet
Union. During the day, the Soviets responded to the blockade by turning back 14
ships that were presumably carrying offensive weapons.[81] The first indication
of this came from a report from the British GCHQ sent to the White House
Situation Room containing intercepted communications from Soviet ships
reporting their positions. On October 24, Kislovodsk, a Soviet cargo ship,
reported a position north-east of where it had been 24 hours earlier indicating
it had "discontinued" its voyage and turned back towards the Baltic.
The next day, reports showed more ships originally bound for Cuba had altered
their course.
At 1:00 pm EDT on October 26, John A. Scali of ABC
News had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin, the cover name of Alexander Feklisov, the
KGB station chief in Washington, at Fomin's request. Following the instructions
of the Politburo of the CPSU, Fomin noted, "War seems about to break
out." He asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his "high-level
friends" at the State Department to see if the US would be interested in a
diplomatic solution. He suggested that the language of the deal would contain
an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision
and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons
again in exchange for a public statement by the US that it would avoid invading
Cuba.[91] The US responded by asking the Brazilian government to pass a message
to Castro that the US would be "unlikely to invade" if the missiles
were removed.[74]
Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on
the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more
the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come
when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the
strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what
that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself
understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.
Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom
the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax
the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that
knot. We are ready for this.
Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President
Kennedy, October 26, 1962
On October 26 at 6:00 pm EDT, the State Department
started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by
Khrushchev. It was Saturday at 2:00 am in Moscow. The long letter took several
minutes to arrive, and it took translators additional time to translate and
transcribe it.
Robert F. Kennedy described the letter as
"very long and emotional". Khrushchev reiterated the basic outline
that had been stated to Scali earlier in the day: "I propose: we, for our
part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any
armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with
its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade
Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba
will disappear." At 6:45 pm EDT, news of Fomin's offer to Scali was
finally heard and was interpreted as a "set up" for the arrival of
Khrushchev's letter. The letter was then considered official and accurate
although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his
own accord without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered
and continued into the night.
Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an
invasion of Cuba was soon at hand, and on October 26, he sent a telegram to
Khrushchev that appeared to call for a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the US in
case of attack. In a 2010 interview, Castro expressed regret about his earlier
stance on first use: "After I've seen what I've seen, and knowing what I
know now, it wasn't worth it at all."[94] Castro also ordered all
anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any US aircraft:[95] the orders had
been to fire only on groups of two or more. At 6:00 am EDT on October 27, the
CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San
Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully
operational. It also noted that the Cuban military continued to organize for
action but was under order not to initiate action unless attacked.
At 9:00 am EDT on October 27, Radio Moscow began
broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of the night
before, the message offered a new trade: the missiles on Cuba would be removed
in exchange for the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey. At
10:00 am EDT, the executive committee met again to discuss the situation and
came to the conclusion that the change in the message was because of internal
debate between Khrushchev and other party officials in the Kremlin.[96]:300
Kennedy realized that he would be in an "insupportable position if this
becomes Khrushchev's proposal" because the missiles in Turkey were not
militarily useful and were being removed anyway and "It's gonna to any
man at the United Nations or any other rational man, it will look like a very
fair trade." Bundy explained why Khrushchev's public acquiescence could
not be considered: "The current threat to peace is not in Turkey, it is in
Cuba."
McNamara noted that another tanker, the Grozny,
was about 600 miles (970 km) out and should be intercepted. He also noted that
they had not made the Soviets aware of the blockade line and suggested relaying
that information to them via U Thant at the United Nations.
Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly
stated that it would be upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed. Italy's
Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, who was also Foreign Minister ad interim,
offered to allow withdrawal of the missiles deployed in Apulia as a bargaining
chip. He gave the message to one of his most trusted friends, Ettore Bernabei,
the general manager of RAI-TV, to convey to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. Bernabei
was in New York to attend an international conference on satellite TV
broadcasting. Unknown to the Soviets, the US regarded the Jupiter missiles as
obsolescent and already supplanted by the Polaris nuclear ballistic submarine
missiles.
The engine of the Lockheed U-2 shot down over Cuba
on display at Museum of the Revolution in Havana.
On the morning of October 27, a U-2F (the third
CIA U-2A, modified for air-to-air refueling) piloted by USAF Major Rudolf
Anderson,[99] departed its forward operating location at McCoy AFB, Florida. At
approximately 12:00 pm EDT, the aircraft was struck by an SA-2 surface-to-air
missile launched from Cuba. The aircraft was shot down, and Anderson was
killed. The stress in negotiations between the Soviets and the US intensified;
it was only later believed that the decision to fire the missile was made
locally by an undetermined Soviet commander, acting on his own authority. Later
that day, at about 3:41 pm EDT, several US Navy RF-8A Crusader aircraft, on
low-level photoreconnaissance missions, were fired upon.
On October 28, 1962, Khrushchev told his son
Sergei that the shooting down of Anderson's U-2 was by the "Cuban military
at the direction of Raul Castro".
At 4:00 pm EDT, Kennedy recalled members of EXCOMM
to the White House and ordered that a message should immediately be sent to U
Thant asking the Soviets to suspend work on the missiles while negotiations
were carried out. During the meeting, General Maxwell Taylor delivered the news
that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an
attack on such sites if fired upon, but he decided to not act unless another
attack was made.
Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Khrushchev
agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in the Cleveland Park
neighborhood of Washington, DC, on Saturday evening, October 27.[106] Kennedy
suggested to take Khrushchev's offer to trade away the missiles. Unknown to
most members of the EXCOMM, but with the support of his brother the president,
Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in
Washington to discover whether the intentions were genuine.[107] The EXCOMM was
generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO's authority, and
the Turkish government had repeatedly stated it was against any such trade.
As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged, and
Kennedy was slowly persuaded. The new plan called for him to ignore the latest
message and instead to return to Khrushchev's earlier one. Kennedy was
initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal
because a new one had been offered, but Llewellyn Thompson argued that it was
still possible.[108] White House Special Counsel and Adviser Ted Sorensen and
Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later, with a draft
letter to that effect. The President made several changes, had it typed, and
sent it.
After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting
continued in the Oval Office. The group argued that the letter should be
underscored with an oral message to Dobrynin that stated that if the missiles
were not withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them. Rusk added
one proviso that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey, but
there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed
"voluntarily" in the immediate aftermath. The president agreed, and
the message was sent.
On Saturday, October 27, after much deliberation
between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to
remove all missiles set in Turkey and possibly southern Italy, the former on
the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all
missiles in Cuba.[121] There is some dispute as to whether removing the
missiles from Italy was part of the secret agreement. Khrushchev wrote in his
memoirs that it was, and when the crisis had ended McNamara gave the order to
dismantle the missiles in both Italy and Turkey.
At this point, Khrushchev knew things the US did
not: First, that the shooting down of the U-2 by a Soviet missile violated
direct orders from Moscow, and Cuban antiaircraft fire against other US
reconnaissance aircraft also violated direct orders from Khrushchev to
Castro.[123] Second, the Soviets already had 162 nuclear warheads on Cuba that
the US did not then believe were there.[124] Third, the Soviets and Cubans on
the island would almost certainly have responded to an invasion by using those
nuclear weapons, even though Castro believed that every human in Cuba would
likely die as a result.[125] Khrushchev also knew but may not have considered
the fact that he had submarines armed with nuclear weapons that the US Navy may
not have known about.
Khrushchev knew he was losing control. President
Kennedy had been told in early 1961 that a nuclear war would likely kill a
third of humanity, with most or all of those deaths concentrated in the US, the
USSR, Europe and China; Khrushchev may well have received similar reports from
his military.
With this background, when Khrushchev heard
Kennedy's threats relayed by Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, he
immediately drafted his acceptance of Kennedy's latest terms from his dacha
without involving the Politburo, as he had previously, and had them immediately
broadcast over Radio Moscow, which he believed the US would hear. In that
broadcast at 9:00 am EST, on October 28, Khrushchev stated that "the
Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the
cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a
new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as 'offensive'
and their crating and return to the Soviet Union."[127][128][129] At 10:00
am, October 28, Kennedy first learned of Khrushchev's solution to the crisis
with the US removing the 15 Jupiters in Turkey and the Soviets would remove the
rockets from Cuba. Khrushchev had made the offer in a public statement for the
world to hear. Despite almost solid opposition from his senior advisers,
Kennedy quickly embraced the Soviet offer. "This is a pretty good play of
his," Kennedy said, according to a tape recording that he made secretly of
the Cabinet Room meeting. Kennedy had deployed the Jupiters in March of the
year, causing a stream of angry outbursts from Khrushchev. "Most people
will think this is a rather even trade and we ought to take advantage of
it," Kennedy said. Vice President Lyndon Johnson was the first to endorse
the missile swap but others continued to oppose the offer. Finally, Kennedy
ended the debate. "We can't very well invade Cuba with all its toil and
blood," Kennedy said, "when we could have gotten them out by making a
deal on the same missiles on Turkey. If that's part of the record, then you
don't have a very good war."
Kennedy immediately responded to Khrushchev's
letter, issuing a statement calling it "an important and constructive
contribution to peace".[129] He continued this with a formal letter:
I consider my letter to you of October
twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both
our governments which should be promptly carried out.... The US will make a
statement in the framework of the Security Council in reference to Cuba as
follows: it will declare that the United States of America will respect the
inviolability of Cuban borders, its sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to
interfere in internal affairs, not to intrude themselves and not to permit our
territory to be used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba, and will
restrain those who would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba, either from
US territory or from the territory of other countries neighboring to Cuba.
Kennedy's planned statement would also contain
suggestions he had received from his adviser Schlesinger Jr. in a
"Memorandum for the President" describing the "Post Mortem on
Cuba".[132]
Kennedy's Oval Office telephone conversation with
Eisenhower soon after Khrushchev's message arrived revealed that the President
was planning to use the Cuban Missile Crisis to escalate tensions with
Khrushchev[4] and in the long run, Cuba as well.[4] The President also claimed
that he thought the crisis would result in direct military confrontations in
Berlin by the end of the next month.[4] He also claimed in his conversation
with Eisenhower that the Soviet leader had offered to withdraw from Cuba in
exchange for the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey and that while the Kennedy
Administration had agreed not to invade Cuba,[4] they were only in process of
determining Khrushchev's offer to withdraw from Turkey.
When former US President Harry Truman called
President Kennedy the day of Khrushchev's offer, the President informed him
that his Administration had rejected the Soviet leader's offer to withdraw
missiles from Turkey and was planning on using the Soviet setback in Cuba to
escalate tensions in Berlin
The US continued the blockade; in the following
days, aerial reconnaissance proved that the Soviets were making progress in
removing the missile systems. The 42 missiles and their support equipment were
loaded onto eight Soviet ships. On November 2, 1962, Kennedy addressed the US
via radio and television broadcasts regarding the dismantlement process of the
Soviet R-12 missile bases located in the Caribbean region.[133] The ships left
Cuba on November 5 to 9. The US made a final visual check as each of the ships
passed the blockade line. Further diplomatic efforts were required to remove
the Soviet Il-28 bombers, and they were loaded on three Soviet ships on
December 5 and 6. Concurrent with the Soviet commitment on the Il-28s, the US
government announced the end of the blockade from 6:45 pm EST on November 20,
1962.
At the time when the Kennedy administration
thought that the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved, nuclear tactical rockets
stayed in Cuba since they were not part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev
understandings and the Americans did not know about them. The Soviets changed
their minds, fearing possible future Cuban militant steps, and on November 22,
1962, Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union Anastas Mikoyan told Castro that the
rockets with the nuclear warheads were being removed as well.
In his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin, Robert Kennedy informally proposed that the Jupiter missiles
in Turkey would be removed "within a short time after this crisis was
over".The last US missiles were disassembled by April 24, 1963, and were
flown out of Turkey soon afterward.
The practical effect of the Kennedy-Khrushchev
Pact was that the US would remove their rockets from Italy and Turkey and that
the Soviets had no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were
out-gunned by the US.[136][137] Because the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles
from NATO bases in Italy and Turkey was not made public at the time, Khrushchev
appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened. The perception was that
Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and that Khrushchev had
been humiliated. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full
conflict despite pressures from their respective governments. Khrushchev held
power for another two years.