BLACK
THURSDAY (MARTIN CAIDIN) WW2 MIGHTY 8TH AF SCHWEINFURT RAID B-17
LUFTWAFFE BALL-BEARINGS
LIKE NEW CONDITION
DELL PAPERBACK BOOK in ENGLISH
by MARTIN CAIDIN (1962)
-------------------------
Additional Information from
Internet Encyclopedia
The second Schweinfurt raid,
also called Black Thursday, was a World War II air battle that took place on 14
October 1943, over Nazi Germany between forces of the United States 8th Air
Force and German Luftwaffe fighter arm (Jagdwaffe). The American bombers
conducted a strategic bombing raid on ball bearing factories to reduce
production of these vital parts for all manner of war machines. This was the
second attack on the factories at Schweinfurt. American wartime intelligence
claimed the first SchweinfurtRegensburg mission in August had reduced bearing
production by 34 percent but had cost many bombers. A planned follow-up raid
had to be postponed to rebuild American forces.
As the squadrons rebuilt, plans
for the return mission were modified based on the lessons learned. Planners
added additional fighter escorts to cover the outward and return legs of the
operation and sent the entire force against Schweinfurt alone, instead of
splitting the force. Despite these changes, a series of minor mishaps combined
with the ever-increasing efficiency of the German anti-aircraft effort proved
to be devastating. Of the 291 B-17 Flying Fortresses sent on the mission, 60
were lost, another 17 damaged so heavily that they had to be scrapped and
another 121 had varying degrees of battle damage. Losses represented over 26
percent of the attacking force and losses in aircrew were equally severe, with
650 men lost of 2,900, 22 percent of the bomber crews. The American Official
History of the Army Air Forces in the Second World War acknowledged losses had
been so great that the USAAF would not return to the target for four months,
"The fact was that the Eighth Air Force had for the time being lost air
superiority over Germany".
The operation was a failure. The
bomber formations were left exposed to attacks by German fighters and the
faulty preparations for the creation of reserves in the summer of 1943 meant
that such costly operations could not be sustained. An escort of 24 squadrons
of Spitfires equipped with drop tanks was provided on the first and last leg of
the mission.
The strategy of the Allied air
forces was flawed. Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding RAF Bomber Command
questioned the intelligence that claimed ball bearings to be vital to the
German war economy. Harris refused to cooperate with the Americans, believing
ball bearing targets to be a "panacea". Post-war analysis has shown
Harris's objections to be correct. The Germans had built up enormous reserves
of ball bearings and were receiving supplies from all over Europe, particularly
Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. The operation against these industries would,
even if successful, have achieved little. By 1945, the Germans had assembled
more reserves than ever.
Background
Factories in and around
Schweinfurt accounted for a significant amount of German ball bearing
production. The Kugelfischer plant produced 22 percent, the Vereinigte
Kugellagerfabriken I and II produced 20 percent, and another one percent came
from the Fichtel & Sachs factory. After the German ball bearing
"bottleneck" had been identified in 1942 and ball bearings had been
named the second-most-vital Pointblank industry for the Combined Bomber
Offensive in March 1943, Schweinfurt's ball bearing plants were selected for a
second air raid after being bombed during the August SchweinfurtRegensburg
mission.
Mission
Each of the three bomber wings
was to be escorted by fighters from a single group with multiple squadrons of
P-47 Thunderbolts. The fighters were inexplicably not employing drop tanks
which limited their escort range.[17] One fighter outfit was sidetracked to
escort a squadron of 29 B-24s that switched to a diversion mission to Emden
because of the bad weather forecast. Some 229 of 291 B-17s hit the city area
and ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt in two groups: the first group bombed at
14391445 hours, the second group at 14511457 hours. They claimed 186
Luftwaffe aircraft. 60 B-17s were lost, two damaged beyond repair and 13
damaged; casualties amounted to five KIA, 40 WIA and 594 MIA.
The bomber formations were
spread out and vulnerable because of bad weather. The Luftwaffe military
intelligence officers had suspected a deep penetration air raid because of the
substantial raids. Jagdgeschwader 3 Udet fighter wing intercepted the bombers
as they crossed the coast but P-47s succeeded in shooting down seven Bf 109s
while losing just one P-47. However one P-47 was also lost when it crashed at
Herongate and another during a one-wheel landing on base.[18] Over the
Netherlands elements of two more "named" Luftwaffe fighter wings, JG
1 Oesau and JG 26 Schlageter made repeated attacks. The 305th Bomb Group lost
13 of its 16 B-17s in minutes.[19] The B-17s were attacked after bombing by
fighters that had refueled and rearmed (JG 11 downed 18 B-17s).
A total of 13 bombers were shot
down by German fighters and flak and 12 bombers were damaged so badly that they
crashed upon return or had to be scrapped. Another 121 bombers returned with
moderate damage.[8] Of 2,900 crewmen, about 254 men did not return (65 survived
as prisoners-of-war),[21] while five killed-in-action and 43 wounded were in
the damaged aircraft that returned (594 were listed as missing-in-action).
Among the most seriously affected American units was the 306th Bomb Group. It
lost 100 men: 35 died on the mission or of wounds and 65 were captured. The
305th Bomb Group lost 130 men (87%), with 36 killed.
The defensive efforts of both JG
1 and JG 11 during the "Black Thursday" raid are said to have
included substantial use of the BR 21 unguided stand-off rockets against the
USAAF combat boxes, as both Luftwaffe fighter wings had started use of the
ordnance some six months earlier.
Aftermath
Although the Schweinfurt
factories were badly hit, the mission failed to achieve any lasting effect. The
production of ball bearings in the factories was halted for only 6 weeks[22]
and Germany's war industry could easily rely on its substantial inventory of
ball bearings as well as a large production surplus. In addition, the ball
bearing facilities were dispersed to reduce their bombing risk.[23]: 191
Consequently, despite General Henry H. Arnold's claim that the Black Thursday
"loss of 60 [downed/ditched] American bombers in the Schweinfurt raid was
incidental",[9]: 67 unescorted daylight bomber raids deep into Germany
were suspended until the February 1944 Big Week missions with P-51B Mustang
escorts that included additional Schweinfurt day/night USAAF/RAF bombing on the
24th.
Another example of the strategy
of using heavy bombers against a particular wartime resource, the Oil Campaign
of World War II was essentially started by the RAF Bomber Command as early as
August 1941 two months after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, and six
months before the United States entered the war. It went forward relentlessly
from that time with the USAAF joining in on the efforts by late June 1943
during daylight. The Oil Campaign had its priority diminished from time to time
with important events, such as the lead-up to Operation Overlord, which by June
1944 demanded heavy bomber support for a time, but soon thereafter the
relentless attacks by day and night resumed, starving the entire German
Wehrmacht military of fuel and lubricants from the autumn of 1944 onwards.